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Preface 
I o a large extent our environmental problems are caused by the expansion of 
our cities. Yet, "as the world becomes more urban," Rutherford Platt writes in 
The Ecological City (1994), "public and scholarly interest in the quality of the 
human habitat has become increasingly nonurban in focus."1 Although schol­
ars have generally ignored the functions of natural systems in metropolitan re­
gions, America has a rich heritage of trying to reconcile urbanization and 
environmental protection. Early in this century, pioneer planners tried to 
mold the forces of urbanization around the constructs of nature.2 Only re­
cently, however, have practitioners looked to these planners for inspiration 
and guidance. This book explores the long-standing relationship between ur­
ban planning and environmental protection in St. Petersburg, Florida. 
In February 1971, a billowing cloud of black smoke introduced me to the 
distinctive characteristics of Florida's natural environment. The state was in 
the middle of its worst drought in forty years, and the conflagration I saw that 
morning (and every morning for the next two months) was muck burning four 
to five feet below the ground. The earth was literally on fire! As I watched 
the St. John's basin burn, the Everglades were also ablaze, and saltwater was 
intruding into the water supplies of Miami, Tampa, and St. Petersburg. 
These events were attributed to natural causes, but I soon learned that they 
were exacerbated by the failure to include nature in plans for urban develop­
ment. Between 1945 and 1970, thousands of acres of wetlands had been indis­
criminately drained to provide living space for the state's rapidly expanding 
population. The drought revealed the fragility of the relationship between 
humans and nature in Florida. Yet there was no lack of planning; the problem 
came from not implementing the plans. 
John Nolen, a founding father of the planning profession, drew up Florida's 
first comprehensive city plan for St. Petersburg in 1923, and the roots of this 
plan go back to the early 1900s. But St. Petersburg, like many American cities, 
preferred boosting a seductive image to the commitment of planning, and 
Nolen's plan was not adopted. The ecologically based conceptual plan that the 
city finally adopted in 1974, however, differed amazingly little from Nolen's. 
Nolen's groundbreaking effort in St. Petersburg provides an important link 
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between past and present. If Florida's cities and counties are to implement 
their state-mandated growth-management plans effectively, it is important to 
understand why Nolen's vision of planning was taboo for half a century. Al­
though planning controversies have become much more sophisticated since 
the 1920s, they still resemble the battle that ensued when Nolen's plan to 
structure St. Petersburg's expansion was attacked by realtors and subdividers 
demanding the freedom to build a city that met their needs. 
In a state that is growing at a greater rate than China or India, the ideal of 
"sustainable development" remains problematic. Nevertheless, the environ­
mental catastrophes that plagued Florida in the early 1970s forced municipal­
ities to incorporate urban planning into the process of city building. Clashes 
between land speculators, regulators, and environmentalists continue; the de­
graded waters and lands within and surrounding our urban centers are a con­
stant reminder of the need for environmental protection. But we have now 
reached a point where a pattern of development friendly to both nature and 
humans may yet emerge. 
I also wrote this book so that my daughter might understand why she may 
never enjoy the same sense of place that I had, growing up on the shore of the 
Indian River Lagoon. On her second birthday we visited a park, purchased 
with funds from a natural lands referendum, near my boyhood home on Mer­
ritt Island. The visit recalled fond memories of days spent exploring the estu-
ary's many wonders. I also remembered a few very special nights, when I lay in 
bed listening to porpoises breathing offshore, within fifty feet of my bedroom. 
The next dawn the water boiled as these sleek mammals worked their way 
through a school of bonita. Most mornings, however, were more peaceful. As 
I ate breakfast, I would watch "Oskhosh," the name my father had given our 
resident great blue heron, slowly work his way along the shore. My reveries had 
to give way to reality, however, when my barefooted daughter sprinted down 
the sandy beach and headed into the green, algae-infested water. Fortunately, 
I grabbed her before she made much headway. What we encountered was 
shocking. Our nature outing seemed more like a trek through an abandoned 
lot in the Bronx as we carefully worked our way around broken glass, concrete 
blocks, large bolts and nails, boards, and a dozen tires. While my daughter's ex­
uberance was contagious, I could not shake the sensation that something had 
died. It was not only the demise of the lagoon that troubled me, but the fact 
that my daughter would never have the experiences that I so relished as a 
child. As our pile of debris accumulated, "Clean up, Da-da," I wondered if she 
would ever remember a place by giving names to the wildlife. 
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City Planning in Eden 
His car full of family grows silent and dazed as he drives the miles, stop­
ping now and then at the overhead lights that signal an intersecting 
road, a secondary road heading west to beaches and what mangrove 
swamps are left and east to the scruffy prairie being skinned in great 
square tracts for yet more development. Development) We are being 
developed to death. 
John Updike, Rabbit at Rest 
Florida epitomizes the potential of modern life. The forces of genius have 
transformed this once uninhabitable wilderness into an air-conditioned ver­
sion of the American Dream. While modern engineering techniques have 
made Florida livable, the countless developments resting over drained 
swamgland and filled bays are neither safe nor sustainable. Florida has be­
come a preferred site for novels and movies that depict natural disasters de­
stroying a fabricated Eden. Although "unscrupulous" developers are often 
blamed for Florida's poorly designed communities, the guilt is shared by all. 
Developers are wedded to the bottom line—and the bottom line is that 
people want to live in the Sunshine State. St. Petersburg, the principal city 
in Florida's most urbanized county, exemplifies how tenuous the relationship 
is between humans and the environment in a place shaped and reshaped by 
natural disasters. 
This book examines the efforts of planners and their advocates to harmo­
nize city building and environmental protection. Despite its geriatric image, 
St. Petersburg is a young city, the product of America's amazing twentieth-
century prosperity. The city has grown in concert with efforts to impose a 
rational order on society.1 Since the 1890s planners have combined Uto­
pian visions with regulatory techniques to channel development into desired 
urban forms.2 Their plans, however, have often generated more conflict than 
consensus. 
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Planning for Survival? 
American city planning is a paradoxical enterprise. How can planners impose 
controls that protect the public in a capitalist society based on expansion, 
property rights, and free enterprise?3 And if planners are charged with pro­
tecting the public health, safety, and welfare, just what controls are necessary? 
The noted urbanist Lewis Mumford confronted this issue in a speech at the 
1927 National Planning Conference. There he urged planners to utilize an or­
ganic or ecological approach in their profession. The growing problems of 
urban America, Mumford felt, escalated when planners viewed cities as 
machines designed for production rather than biological organisms capable of 
reproduction. Unless cities were designed in accordance with natural con­
straints, Mumford warned, America's expanding urban centers would pass "the 
limits of functional size and use." In the past, when urban civilizations had ex­
ceeded natural limits, they collapsed. Initial periods of excessive growth were 
followed by ecological deterioration, catastrophe, and the demise of civiliza­
tion. The "necropolis," or dead city, was the ultimate fate of any society that 
promoted unlimited growth. But fortunately, "at least one city planner," he de­
clared, "realizes where the path of intelligent and humane achievement will 
lead during the next generation."4 
Mumford was referring to John Nolen (1869-1931), one of the heirs of 
Frederick Law Olmsted's romantic environmentalism.5 Like Olmsted, Nolen 
believed natural settings offered relief from the problems of urban life, but he 
had moved beyond Olmsted's belief that cities were inherently evil and that 
they formed "unnatural men." Between 1903 and 1919, Nolen wrote a series 
of pioneering works on urban planning that introduced the concept of a flex­
ible, "organic city," where human life could evolve to new heights. The design 
of the organic city demanded that the human habitat be integrated within the 
surrounding landscape by following nature's guidelines.6 
In 1919, after two decades of trying to reshape the American city, Nolen 
had despaired of the planning profession's ability either to erase the urban 
landscape's "cruel monotony" or to "check rank individualism," which domi­
nated the city-building process.7 But he still believed that the construction of 
a series of comprehensively planned "new towns" and "regional cities" would 
reveal the benefits of city planning to a wide audience. With a new urban 
model, development could proceed in a more efficient form.8 In 1921, Nolen 
discovered a place to test his theories: Florida, America's fastest growing state. 
In 1921, St. Petersburg experienced the first effects of the "Great Florida 
Land Boom."9 The rush of building and land speculation intensified in that 
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year, and William L. Straub, editor of the St. Petersburg Times, convinced the 
city commission to establish an advisory city planning board. In early 1922, 
the board hired John Nolen to prepare Florida's first comprehensive plan. Af­
ter touring St. Petersburg and the Pinellas Peninsula, Nolen realized that he 
had found the ideal site for his prototype community. 
St. Petersburg was a special place. Located in a site unsuitable for trade 
or industry, it was a city geared to consumption rather than production. 
The "Sunshine City's" subtropical environs offered the perfect conditions for 
leisure, the phenomenon feeding America's robust new consumer economy. 
The 1920s had ushered in a new reign of prosperity that allowed middle-class 
Americans to vacation in Florida's exotic locales for the first time.10 If St. Pe­
tersburg hoped to maintain its lucrative tourist trade, the city's planning 
advocates believed, it needed a distinctive natural setting. In contrast to in­
dustrial cities like Chicago and Detroit, where the land was reshaped to pro­
mote industry and production, St. Petersburg would offer a new model, that of 
a resort city where humans lived in harmony with nature.11 St. Petersburg was 
a site "blessed by a benevolent Nature," Nolen wrote, "and the enhancement 
of the beauty that already exists is a work that should be kept continually ac­
tive, insuring for future generations the glories of today." Besides preserving 
the region's natural beauty, the plan he designed would "make St. Petersburg's 
suburban developments not only among the most interesting, but also the 
most unique and attractive in the country."12 
The Nolen Plan was more than a design that was pleasing aesthetically; it 
also provided a strong economic rationale for restricting growth to certain ar­
eas. If followed, the plan would assure the vitality of the city's dominant in-
dustry—tourism. As America became more urbanized and prosperous the 
demand to visit enticing natural areas, Nolen contended, could only increase. 
Investing in tourism promised an immense return. 
While the mayor, Straub, and the director of public works supported urban 
planning, the city's throng of real estate salesmen campaigned against it. Their 
desire to make quick profits outweighed any lofty notion of building a model 
city. The Nolen Plan's land-use controls and bureaucratic directives seemed 
ludicrous to the investors and salesmen reaping huge rewards from speculative 
land ventures. These men's hope for continued prosperity required a city with 
unlimited prospects for growth. In their minds, "property rights and personal 
rights," as President Coolidge fondly stated, were "the same thing."13 
Florida's first experiment in planning went down to a crushing defeat in a 
referendum, but this setback did not mark the end of city planning in St. Pe­
tersburg. Instead it represented the beginning of a movement to bring order to 
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a chaotic real estate market and to protect natural resources. Planners in St. 
Petersburg, however, did not approach Nolen's vision until a series of envi­
ronmental catastrophes forced the state legislature to reconfigure the rights of 
property. 
Paradise in Peril 
Over the last century, Florida's subtropical environment has been central to an 
image that conjures up thoughts of Eden and visions of escape.14 Its explosive 
growth and robust tourist economy attest to the Sunshine State's special al­
lure. In 1920, not quite a million people lived in Florida. Over the next sev­
enty years, the state's population increased by 1300 percent, to 12,937,926. 
This exponential growth rate is unmatched even elsewhere in the Sunbelt. 
Texas (16,987,000) and California (29,760,000) have larger populations, but 
their rate of increase over the same period (361 percent for Texas and 877 per­
cent for California) pales in comparison to Florida's.15 
To accommodate the crowds that flocked south, a tangled suburban maze 
replaced the state's expanses of mangroves, cypress swamps, freshwater prai­
ries, and tidal marshes. Two hundred years ago, wetlands covered 54 percent 
of Florida; by 1990 that area had shrunk to 29 percent. Draining 9.7 million 
acres of wetlands allowed entrepreneurs to refashion the landscape into a jum­
bled mixture of tourist attractions, billboards, strip centers, crowded beach­
front condominiums, and strings of characterless subdivisions.16 While Florida 
has a few stellar developments, over the last half century speculation, misrep­
resentation, poor planning, and a general lack of collective responsibility have 
been the principal characteristics of city building in Florida.17 Maybe John 
Nolen said it best in 1926, after he reviewed the state's cities: "Almost every­
thing that is good and everything that is bad is to be seen there in the flesh."18 
Florida's rapid urbanization has fostered an ecological crisis. The Everglades 
and the coral reefs are dying; mercury contamination has reached the most iso­
lated waters in southern Florida; in Sarasota Bay shellfish have the highest 
concentration of lead in the United States; and even Disney World has been 
cited for illegal dumping of toxic wastes. There are perhaps a score of Florida 
panthers left. The bird population has dropped by 90 percent in the Everglades 
over the last two decades. And there are far more manatees on license plates 
than there are swimming peacefully in Florida's waters. The vast urban com­
plex on both coasts continues moving inland to replenish diminishing water 
supplies. As inland water tables have dropped, sinkholes and saltwater intru­
sion have become more prevalent. "What we are seeing," John Ogden, direc­
City Planning in Eden 
tor of the Institute of Oceanography in St. Petersburg, states, "are problems of 
an unprecedented complexity."19 
In the last two decades, Florida has instituted a battery of progressive 
growth-management measures to mitigate the most abusive building prac­
tices. In response to the state's ecological crisis in the early 1970s, Governor 
Rubin Askew pushed through a package of reforms that moved Florida from a 
state devoted to boosterism into the national leader in environmental protec­
tion and urban planning. This movement culminated in 1985, when the leg­
islature enacted the nation's most stringent growth-management bill.20 
Florida is now a good laboratory for the business of city building and the art 
of designing cities. Besides its landmark legislation, it hosts some of the United 
States' most interesting communities. Innovative new towns like Seaside 
and Miami Lakes, and established communities like Winter Park and Coral 
Gables, show the state's charm and potential. While the prognosis for Florida's 
remaining natural habitat remains guarded, there is reason to believe that a 
balanced urban landscape may yet appear. 
St. Petersburg: Florida's Bellwether 
St. Petersburg embodies Florida's fortunes. Once a sleepy retirement commu­
nity ringed by orange groves, it is now a packed conglomeration of subdivisions 
and strip shopping centers in Florida's most densely populated county. As 
people continue to funnel into the South and the West, this Sunbelt city of­
fers the nation a glimpse of the future. With its large elderly contingent, rapid 
growth since World War II, service economy, high-tech industries, and fragile 
environment, St. Petersburg is dealing with the problems and prospects that 
will soon face the rest of the state and the nation. According to John Naisbitt, 
author of the bestseller Megatrends, Pinellas County is the nation's "bellwether 
county," an indicator of the future. "Those responsible for the state's growth 
management policy in Tallahassee," Naisbitt reported in 1985, "will learn im­
portant lessons presently facing the residents and leadership of the county."21 
In 1990, Florida's chief planning agency, the Department of Community 
Affairs (DCA), presented awards for achievements in growth management. 
St. Petersburg's plan was recognized as the best among Florida's major cities. 
Not only did it meet the demanding criteria established by the 1985 Florida 
Growth Management Act; it also surpassed state standards in its efforts to pre­
serve and enhance the natural environment. Since more than half of Florida's 
municipalities had failed the DCA's review, St. Petersburg's urban vision was 
exceptional.22 
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Located between the Gulf of Mexico and Tampa Bay, St. Petersburg oc­
cupies the lower third of the Pinellas Peninsula. A microcosm of the state, 
Pinellas's balmy temperatures, moderating breezes, white-sand beaches, and 
waterfront living serve as a year-round lure to tourists and a haven for retirees. 
Between 1940 and 1990, St. Petersburg's population has shown a nearly four­
fold increase, from 60,812 to 239,000. Pinellas County's population has in­
creased more than 900 percent, from 91,852 to 860,900. With only 280 square 
miles, Pinellas County's population density (3,075 people per square mile) is 
more than three times that of Broward County, Florida's second most densely 
populated county. It is also the most populous county in the St. Petersburg-
Tampa metropolitan area, which, with 2,100,000 residents, is the nation's 
nineteenth largest metropolitan area. This figure represents an increase of over 
1,000 percent since 1940. The national growth rate for the same period is only 
90 percent. Among major Sunbelt cities, as defined by Bradley Rice and 
Richard Bernard, only San Diego and Phoenix are comparable. In addition, 
2,900,000 tourists, the equivalent of 103,500 year-round residents, descend on 
Pinellas each year. While this translates into economic growth, it also places 
an added burden on the infrastructure and the environment. There is no indi­
cation of a slowdown, and during the 1990s Tampa Bay should remain one of 
the ten fastest-growing urban areas in the United States.23 
A host of problems has attended Pinellas's rapid growth. Its roads are the 
most congested in Florida. During the winter, when multitudes of tourists de­
scend from the North, they are virtually impassable. There is no rapid transit 
system, and plans for one are sketchy at best. To add to the problem, local 
governments, in particular the Pinellas County Commission, have been no­
toriously lax in regulating roadside developments. Miles of commercial 
developments lining the region's major thoroughfares, congestion, neon ad­
vertisements, and a mass of billboards all combine to mar the landscape.24 
The more than seventeen million vehicles that travel the St. Petersburg-
Tampa roads annually are the principal culprits behind the region's growing air 
pollution problem. Two pollutants—sulfur dioxide and ozone—plague the re­
gion, and in the early 1980s the EPA designated the Pinellas Peninsula a 
nonattainment area because the region failed to meet federal standards for 
these toxic automobile byproducts. While conditions have improved over the 
last ten years, the brown cloud hovering over the Pinellas Peninsula is a con­
stant reminder of the threat to the regional ecosystem.25 
The waters surrounding the peninsula have been especially endangered by 
urbanization. While St. Petersburg has operated a tertiary sewage treatment 
system (which recycles the effluent) for almost twenty years, a decade lapsed 
before other Tampa Bay cities also stopped pumping partially treated sewage 
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into polluted waters that had been largely pristine in the 1940s. Dredge-and-
fi.ll operations haye also laid waste to what was once one of Florida's most pro­
ductive ecosystems. Despite strident protests, almost 25 percent of Boca Ciega 
Bay, which separates St. Petersburg from its outlying barrier islands, was filled 
in or dredged between 1940 and 1965.26 
Boca Ciega Bay is now one of the most degraded bodies of water in the na­
tion* Originally this shallow bay had crystal waters two to four feet deep, a 
sandy bottom, and large expanses of seagrass meadows supporting an abun­
dance of marine life. Waters in these fill areas are now over ten feet deep and 
turbid, while the bottom of the bay is covered with layers of odorous anaero­
bic muck. The vast seagrass meadows are gone, shellfishingis prohibited, and 
the commercialfishing industry is nearly extinct.27 
Even though the region receives more thanfifty inches of rainfall a year, St. 
Petersburg and the rest of Pinellas must import over half of its water. As early 
as the 1920s, the low pumping capacity of the aquifer on the southern portion 
of the peninsula forced St. Petersburg officials to secure wellfields further in­
land. During the 1950s and 1960s, the region's rapid growth aggravated the 
problem, and by the 1970s all Pinellas communities depended heavily on in­
land counties for their water. Since a drought in the mid-1980s, year-round 
water restrictions have been in effect.28 
Despite these problems, life could be much worse for St. Petersburg and its 
neighbors. In the early 1970s, environmental problems forced municipal offi­
cials to restructure St. Petersburg's planning system. In 1976,fifty years after 
the citizens of St. Petersburgfirst voted against planning, the city council re­
ceived a strong directive from the electorate to adopt an ecologically based 
plan that bore a striking resemblance to Nolen's earlier work. 
Nolen's work has lived on in another vein. He is one of the patron saints for 
the budding traditional town planning movement. Leon Krier, a classical ur­
banist and leading theorist of the movement, castigates our auto-oriented, 
sprawling urban form as "anti-ecological."29 Andres Duany and Elizabeth 
Plater-Zyberk, two of the leading proponents of traditional town planning, de­
signed Seaside, one of the most acclaimed new towns in the United States. 
Seaside's renown reflects the interest in a tradition that Duany and Plater-
Zyberk are seeking to reinvigorate.30 "If you want to understand what we are 
doing," Duany told a Philadelphia audience in 1990, "study John Nolen's 
plans."31 
John Nolen's plan for St. Petersburg stands at the heart of this book. As a 
pioneer of the planning profession, Nolen helped formulate land planning 
principles still followed today. But before we can expect Nolen's work to in­
spire a revival of traditional town planning, we must discern why the people 
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Figure 1 John Nolen at work. Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collec­
tions, Cornell University Library. 
of St. Petersburg rejected it, and why,fifty years later, the city adopted a com­
parable plan. To understand this turn of events, I examine the projects, vi­
sions, and plans that formed St. Petersburg and the impact of city building on 
the peninsula's environment. Finally, because St. Petersburg is almost entirely 
"built out," the city's efforts to revitalize the downtown, restore the natural en­
vironment, and recycle resources offer other Florida cities a model for solving 
the problems endemic to city building. 
Planning is crucial, because our most pressing environmental problems no 
longer pertain to technological issues, but to questions of design.32 The town 
planning principles that Nolen set forth still offer the best means to preserve 
the ecology of a region while allowing development to proceed on the most 
suitable lands.33 Designing metropolitan areas for "reasoned growth," as Greg 
Easterbrook calls it, "holds out the hope of permitting an expanding economy 
and protecting natural habitats at the same time." Despite this promise, East­
erbrook found that the "land-use planning taboo" continues to thwart efforts 
that would ensure America's long-term economic and ecological health.34 
While I look at the cultural tempest that accompanied St. Petersburg's various 
plans, 1 also thought it was imperative to provide some indication of the dis­
aster that awaits us if those pushing the property-rights movement succeed in 
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destroying growth management.35 For anyone contemplating an alternative 
to reasoned growth, St. Petersburg's history offers an exemplary lesson ex­
plaining why, despite the most fervent protests, it became inevitable to accept 
planning. 
In trying to unravel the complex relationships that constitute the phe­
nomenon of urbanization, clear definitions are crucial. In this book, "urban (or 
city) planning" describes the effort to have the government systematically or­
der development around a desired urban form or natural system to promote 
some concept of the public welfare. Most urban development in America, 
however, is not the product of planning but the result of countless uncoordi­
nated efforts by individuals and corporate and governmental bodies ("city 
building")-361 also wanted to give some indication of how city building37 drove 
St. Petersburg's expansion and altered the environment. City building, in this 
book, describes not only the general urbanization process, but also the meth­
ods employed by businesses hoping to profit from intensified land use. Finally, 
I use the term environmentalism to refer to the endeavor to change the way pub­
lic and private interests affect the environment.38 To understand this collec­
tive effort to transform society, I include discussions of ecology, conservation, 
and the relationship between humans and those chaotic aspects of nature that 
they can neither fully control nor fully understand. 

I

William Streub's Crusade for Beauty 
It was in the wilds and virgin land where the encroachment of civiliza­
tion has had no chance to mar the natural scenery, that the architect lin­
gered the longest. He made extensive notes all in the interest of 
preparing the plans that if accepted and worked out will make this 
county a veritable Garden of Eden. 
St Petersburg Times, 1914 
In the 1890s, William Lincoln Straub'sfiery editorials for the Grand Forks Daily 
Herald established the young newspaperman as one of the Northern Plains* 
leading journalists. Poor health, however, cut his promising career short. In 
1899, after doctors told him he would die without major surgery, Straub moved 
to St. Petersburg in the hope that he could regain his health in the mild Florida 
climate. The town's "cleanliness, clear waters, and bright beaches'* captivated 
Straub, and after a regimen of sunning and outdoor activity his chronic 
bronchial condition gradually disappeared. In 1901 he returned to work as ed­
itor of the St. Petersburg Times.1 
Over the next thirty-eight years, Straub crafted a lasting, although con­
frontational, relationship with his adopted home. He was six feet tall, "with 
a rugged, friendly face and gray eyes that peered through wire-rim glasses." 
Straub'sflamboyant prose and unbounded energy made him one of St. Peters-
burg's biggest boosters. While he joined in the chorus promoting the city's 
beautiful locale, he constantly worked to alter the status quo in his desire to 
shape the community's future.2 
A determined civic activist, with, he claimed, "a hide impervious to any­
thing said about" him, Straub, once he had taken up a cause, wrote editorials 
and published cartoons that spared no one. According to Walter Fuller, a con­
temporary, "Straub was the greatest influence for the development of the 
community ever to appear on the scene." In 1905 he played a key role in 
the formation of St. Petersburg's board of trade, the forerunner to the Cham­
ber of Commerce. Two years later he penned the "Pinellas Declaration of 
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Independence," a document that ignited a movement culminating in the 
peninsula's secession from Hillsborough County (greater Tampa) in 1913.3 
Straub also led campaigns to adopt a city-manager style of government, create 
a parks board, and build a library.4 The longtime editor's most enduring com­
mitment, though, was to city planning. 
Like other planning enthusiasts, Straub's interest in city and regional plan­
ning grew from an initial involvement in park planning.5 Over the years, his 
campaign to regulate the real estate market and protect the environment an­
tagonized a large bloc of the town's conservative citizenry. In the face of con­
tinual criticism—and sometimes outright ridicule—of his stance, Straub 
remained determined to safeguard the place where he had found sanctuary. 
Straub believed that Pinellas deserved reverent care and treatment. "We 
have no moral right," a St. Petersburg Times editorial stated in 1913, "to destroy 
any part of this great capital, instead it should be passed on with interest. To 
the extent that we wisely or unwisely use the heritage of millions now in their 
infancy or yet to be born, will this generation be blessed or cursed by its heirs." 
Straub constantly argued that this "struggle for preservation" would only suc­
ceed if the community "guarded and protected" the region's natural wonders.6 
Pinellas: The Meeting of Land and Sea 
Straub glorified Pinellas in his description of it: "Here stands the work of godly 
hands, theflowering peninsula of Pinellas, with her cluster of green islands and 
keys. Like gorgeous strings of emerald and jade, sweeping over the master plan 
of divine dreams."7 The beauty that characterized the Pinellas landscape dur­
ing Straub's lifetime was the result of a relatively recent geologic transforma­
tion. The Pinellas subpeninsula has emerged over the last 200,000 years as the 
shallow seas that once covered the Florida peninsula gradually disappeared. 
But these seas did not recede in either a uniform or a consistent manner. Some­
times they inundated the Pinellas Peninsula, leaving only a few small islands 
above sea level; at others they retreated to reveal large expanses of land. The 
interplay of waves and currents on the emergent land created marine terraces, 
generally level landforms with gentle seaward slopes. Three marine terraces 
(seefigure 2) made up the general topography of the Pinellas Peninsula. The 
edges of the Wilcomico and Penholoway Terraces show where former shore­
lines were, while the Palmico Terrace abuts the waters surrounding Pinellas. 
Most of the Palmico Terrace is less than twenty-five feet above sea level, and 
its land is generally poorly drained. The Wilcomico and Penholoway Terraces' 
elevations range between thirty and sixty feet and from seventy and ninety­
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Marino Terraces in Pinellas County 
| Wicomlco Terrace 
] Penholoway Terraee 
I Pamllco Terrace 
SOURCE: Ralph a Heath and Peter C. Smith, 
Florida. Report of Investigation* No. 
Figure 2 The Pinellas Peninsula has emerged from the sea over 
the last 200,000 years. The land comprises a series of low-lying 
marine terraces with gentle seaward slopes and low elevations. 
Courtesy of the Pinellas County Department of Planning. 
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seven feet, respectively. Their nutrient-poor soils consist primarily of sand and 
shells. Below the ground lie beds of limestone a thousand feet thick.8 
The peninsula's other landforms are the barrier islands running along the 
coast from north to south. They are separated from the mainland by a series 
of shallow lagoons. Once sandbars, the barrier islands formed gradually over 
three or four thousand years from sediment deposited by the waves. Sand ac­
cumulated around any obstacle, usually vegetation, to form dunes. The gulf's 
winds and waves fostered the sand dunes' continued growth and, once the 
dunes had reached a height somewhere between three and six feet, they acted 
as a stable foundation for the fragile barrier islands.9 
Besides anchoring the beaches, the vegetation-covered sand dunes shel­
tered the islands' landward side, where colonies of bushes, shrubs, palms, and 
pines flourished. The barrier islands' seaward coasts featured white sand 
beaches, while the shores facing the bay held a mixture of mangroves and ma­
rine grasses.10 Red mangroves played an especially important role in the estu­
arine ecosystem. Their prop roots trapped loose materials and leaf litter, 
creating habitats for marine life and buffering the island from storm tides. The 
mangrove was also a vital link in the food chain. When mangroves dropped 
their nutrient-rich leaves, the leaves nourished detritus consumers like 
shrimp, which were a primary food source for larger fish. The trees' prop roots 
also hosted scores of marine creatures—tunicates, sponges, barnacles, oysters, 
mussels, and other mollusks—that played an important role in the marine 
ecosystem that lay between the mainland and the beaches.11 
A series of bays separated the barrier islandsfrom the mainland. The largest 
coastal lagoon (today called Boca Ciega Bay) lay off south Pinellas. It is sixteen 
miles long, has an average width of two miles, and a depth of two to four feet. 
A dense mangrove swamp fringed the bay's ninety-mile shoreline. The man­
groves' extensive root system restricted the seaward movement of upland sedi­
ments, helping to keep the brackish bay water clean and clear. The bay's vast 
underwater meadows of turtle grass prevented erosion of the sea floor while 
serving as both a nursery and a feeding ground for the abundant marine life.12 
The barrier islands cushioned the coastal lagoons from the tropical storms 
and hurricanes that swept through the region. The dunes and the mangroves 
acted like shock absorbers and bore the brunt of the storms. Yet despite a dune 
system's amazing resilience, a barrier island could wash away in minutes when 
hurricane floodwaters or a storm surge made its eventual seaward return. Such 
a backwash occurs when hurricane winds change direction and combine with 
gravitational forces to force the storm surge over—and sometimes through— 
any obstacle in its way.13 
In 1848, the worst hurricane ever to hit the west coast of Florida literally 
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blew the water out of Tampa Bay, exposing large sand flats, during the back­
wash stage.14 The entire barrier island chain from Pinellas south to Captiva 
and Sanibel flooded when the Gulf of Mexico's waters rose 143 feet above 
normal The hurricane's storm surge reshaped Pinellas's barrier island chain. It 
carved out two new inlets, washed away some keys, and built up others with 
sands dredged from both land and sea. Although the mainland escaped such 
punishment, two-thirds of the Pinellas Peninsula experienced heavy flooding. 
Fortunately, in 1848 Pinellas's barrier islands were uninhabited, and only a few 
hardy settlers lived on the mainland's higher elevations.15 
Three centuries earlier, thefirst white men came to the Pinellas Peninsula 
on an ill-fated Spanish expedition headed by P&nfilo de Narv&ez. Although 
only Cabeza de Vaca and three others returned from this voyage, Narvdez had 
four hundred men when he reached Tampa Bay on April 4,1528. Three days 
later the explorers landed on one of Pinellas's southernmost barrier islands, 
near present-day Pass-a-Grill6. They splashed ashore across a wide expanse of 
open beach with unspoiled dune systems and thick clusters of mangroves. As 
they made their way to the mainland, the Spaniards encountered a primeval 
pine forest. They called their new discovery punta pinal, or pine point. It came 
to be known as Pinellas.16 
The expedition trailed north and encountered a lush hardwood forest in 
the central portion of the peninsula, but the trek ended when the visitors en­
countered the mosquitoes that swarmed around Pinellas's freshwater swamps, 
creeks, and uplands. A host of wildlife lived in this varied environment, in­
cluding bears, Florida panthers, deer, turkeys, and bald eagles. In immense off­
shore rookeries, such large wading birds as snowy egrets and roseate spoonbills 
flourished. The waters in and around the peninsula teemed with tarpon, bass, 
pompano, trout, mullet, redfish, and grouper. Shellfish—stone crabs, clams, 
oysters, scallops, and shrimp—alsoflourished in the local waters.17 
After failing to discover any gold in their trek across the lower Pinellas 
Peninsula, Narv&ez and his disgruntled soldiers left the region to search for 
gold elsewhere* In 1567 Pedro Menendez de Avil£s led another expedition 
through Tampa Bay, and these conquistadores fared no better in their search 
for mineral riches than their predecessors had. Menendez, the founder of St. 
Augustine, felt the area held some strategic importance and left behind a small 
garrison settlement. Two years later missionaries visited the site, but they were 
unable to find any signs of their countrymen. Although the Spanish con­
structed no permanent settlements, they left a dire legacy. The diseases they 
brought with them decimated the local Native American population; when 
other Europeans came to the area in the 1840s, they found only traces of hu­
18 man occupancy.
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In 1870, fewer than fifty families occupied the peninsula.19 These early 
settlers, together with itinerant lumberjacks and hunters, harvested many of 
the region's resources. Large stands of pines, cypress, and hardwood trees were 
either cut for lumber or cleared for pasture and cultivation. Organized hunting 
parties systematically eliminated the peninsula's two largest predators, the 
black bear and the Florida panther, because they threatened the region's grow­
ing herds of cattle. Plume hunters, seeking to profit from America's millinery 
fashions, killed thousands of wading birds and pushed these species toward 
extinction.20 
In 1880 only twenty-five of PinellasJs three hundred inhabitants lived on 
the southern portion of the peninsula.21 Roads were practically nonexistent, 
and trips to Tampa were made almost exclusively by boat. There was only one 
commercial establishment, a small general store with less than $200 worth of 
merchandise. Despite these crude conditions, the settlers had laid the founda­
tion for a prospering citrus industry. In addition, large herds of cattle grazed in 
the central and southern portions of the peninsula, and a few small commer­
cial fishing operations mined the bountiful coastal waters.22 While these 
pursuits provided a livelihood for the peninsula's early pioneers, thefirst indi­
cation that Pinellas could attract wealth came in 1885 at the American Med­
ical Association's annual meeting. In a paper delivered to the full convention, 
W. C. Van Bibber declared that south Pinellas offered the ideal location for a 
"Health City."23 
Ten years earlier, a group of English doctors had broached the idea of con­
structing such a city, and in the early 1880s they hired Van Bibber tofinda site. 
After a year of research, he recommended that his clients purchase land on the 
southern portion of Pinellas, which he called Point Pinellas, where broad 
beaches stretched for miles. The region possessed a "peculiar, healthy climate" 
as attested to by its "natural products, the ruddy appearance of its few inhabi­
tants" and its average winter temperature of 72 degrees. With "little upon its 
soil but primal forests," Van Bibber wrote, "there is a large subpeninsula, Point 
Pinellas, waiting for the hand of improvement." Although funding for the 
project collapsed, Van Bibber'sfindings set the tone for future generations of 
planners and city builders.24 
Florida's First City Planning Experiment 
City building on the Pinellas Peninsula began with the completion of the Or­
ange Belt Railway in 1888. This narrow-gauge railroad ran the length of the 
peninsula, passing through Tarpon Springs, Dunedin, Clearwater, and Largo 
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until it ended in St. Petersburg. On June 8,1888, thefirst train ambled into St. 
Petersburg bringing only one passenger, a shoe salesman eager to snare clients 
in a boomtown. His hopes were quickly dashed when he saw a desolate village 
with a few ramshackle dwellings and fewer than thirty inhabitants.25 
The Orange Belt's Russian builder, Peter A. Demens, had founded the small 
village only the year before. Its high ground and waterfront location made St. 
Petersburg, as Demens named the site, the logical point for the railway's ter­
minus. Despite its inauspicious beginnings, a steady increase in rail traffic, its 
pleasant location on Tampa Bay, and the growing citrus market made St. Pe­
tersburg the peninsula's leading destination. In 1890, the population was 273, 
and by the turn of the century S  t Petersburg had 1,575 inhabitants.26 
Between 1900 and 1901 the town went through a construction boom, as a 
hundred buildings, worth $130,000, were built. In addition, the tourist indus­
try enjoyed its best season. William Straub, in an early editorial for the St. Pe­
tersburg Times, envisioned an even greater season "as long as people who like 
a balmy climate in the winter continue to inhabit the northland."27 
Straub argued that tourism represented the city's lifeblood because, aside 
from the surrounding waters, the region had few natural resources. A scenic 
setting and a pleasing climate attracted people from all parts of the country, 
and Straub believed that these features constituted the city's chief treasures.28 
The residents held a common pride in the town's natural amenities and its in­
comparable location on high, well drained ground that sloped gently to the 
water's edge. But although the townspeople boasted of St. Petersburg's water­
front location and how it attracted tourists, they had done little to protect or 
enhance this asset. "The sorry fact is," Straub reported in 1902, "our munici­
pality has accomplished practically nothing for its improvement."29 
Straub claimed that the community's negligence had allowed the water­
front to become an eyesore* An electric plant, a lumberyard, a warehouse, and 
unsightly debris cluttered this potentially scenic locale (figure 3). In addition, 
marine life in various stages of decomposition and other waste materials pro­
duced such noxious odors that shoreline residents feared for their health. The 
many rotting docks and boats added to this general appearance of decay and 
neglect.30 Straub also voiced concern over the town's inability to provide 
tourists with a place either to stroll along the water's edge or to sit and enjoy 
the beautiful view across Tampa Bay.31 
The sordid state of the waterfront provided ample proof, according to 
Straub, that the logic behind the building of a commercial or industrial city 
would not work for a city that wanted to cultivate the tourist trade. The wa­
terfront represented St. Petersburg's primary asset, and enhancing the shore­
lines, Straub wrote, "can only come through municipal ownership."32 He 
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Figure 3 An electric plant, woodyard, warehouse, and unsightly debris disfigured the St. 
Petersburg waterfront around 1900. Decaying seaweed, marine life in various stages of de­
composition, and other waste materials produced such a stench that residents of the shore 
feared for their health. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Historical Museum. 
realized that he would "be called crazy for his plans" because "publicly owned 
waterfronts were almost unknown and unthought of in American cities." Nev­
ertheless, in 1902 he started regularly running editorials that urged municipal 
officials to break from tradition and purchase the waterfront.33 Straub also 
wanted the city's water commerce and industrial uses confined to Bayboro 
Harbor, located south of the city, so that the city could set aside the rest of the 
waterfront as a park where people could contemplate the surrounding sub­
tropical beauty.34 
Between 1902 and 1905, Straub's crusade for public ownership of the wa­
terfront floundered. The owners of the frontage property, who were, as one re­
porter wrote, "without exception, aggressively interested in free enterprise and 
private profits," put little credence in the value of scenic vistas or public recre­
ation. The city council also ignored Straub's editorials claiming that commer­
cial exploitation of the waterfront would destroy the city's greatest assets. The 
townspeople seemed to be deaf. While the residents of St. Petersburg managed 
to take care of their own needs, Straub complained, "in affairs of great impor­
tance to all" the town held "as sleepy and lethargic a bunch as you can find in 
a month's journey."35 
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Straub continued his acerbic editorials, or "waterfront agitation," as some 
called it, decrying the shoreline's deplorable condition and the community's 
lack of civic enterprise. The city council eventually acceded to his constant 
badgering, and two committees were appointed to study the waterfront. Nei­
ther group resolved the issue and they both disbanded after one committee fell 
victim to apathy and the other to infighting.36 
In late 1905 Straub gained a measure of success when he played a key role 
in founding the board of trade, the forerunner to the Chamber of Commerce. 
At the board's inaugural meeting in December, Straub urged members to join 
him in securing a municipal waterfront to aid the tourism industry. The gath­
ering approved the measure and installed Straub as chairman of the Water­
front Committee. The committee members immediately endorsed a slate of 
city council candidates who supported the waterfront agenda. Over the next 
four months, Straub spearheaded an impassioned campaign for the "water­
front candidates," and in April they swept into office.37 
On April 24, 1906, the new city council passed a resolution to acquire the 
waterfront. Since it did not provide for funding, however, the resolution 
merely represented the council's good intentions. Straub cleared the funding 
hurdle by persuading three members of the Waterfront Committee, developer 
Perry Snell, postmaster Roy Hanna, and A. F. Bartlett, the board of trade's 
president, to act as trustees and lend the city $3,120 to buy land. This money 
was enough to purchase one-third of the city's mile-long waterfront, and it also 
set a precedent for future council action. Shortly thereafter, an investor pro­
posed to build cottages and an adjoining pier on the municipal waterfront. The 
city council responded by passing an ordinance that limited construction on 
the publicly owned lands to boathouses and bathing pavilions. This ordi­
nance, according to Walter Fuller, represented Florida's first venture in city 
planning.38 
After this success, Straub envisioned the creation of a "City Beautiful" that 
would radiate outfrom "the waterfront... the crowning glory of the city." Dur­
ing the summer of 1906, Straub pushed residents to support a $63,000 bond is­
sue that would lay the foundation for the future. In addition to beautifying the 
waterfront, these funds could help city officials pave the streets, install water 
mains, build a sewage system, acquire land for parks, and even create a system 
for laying out new residential additions. He challenged citizens "to keep right 
at it" and to build a city that would conform "to the highest ideals of a beauti­
ful city."39 
The concept of raising taxes to enhance public life proved too extravagant 
for this backwater town of 5,000. Straub labeled his victorious*opponents "a 
small town reactionary force" and chastised voters for not risking their capital 
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to make necessary improvements. If businessmen in St. Petersburg readily used 
credit to enhance their enterprises, he argued, "Why should an entire com­
munity hesitate at a step that each individual would consider safe and wise?" 
Tax increases were inevitable in a growing city that lacked basic services, and 
rather than trying to escape responsibility, citizens needed to "work together 
for the City Beautiful," Straub wrote. "It will pay us, as nothing else will"40 
After voters turned down the bond issue, the city council refused to con­
sider raising revenues for acquiring the waterfront. The board of trade also 
failed to secure any monies and, in 1908, the city had still not reached con­
sensus on the waterfront question. Residents had tired of the constant politi­
cal haranguing, and they wanted the issue resolved. In the 1908 municipal 
election, a coalition vowing not to spend public funds on the waterfront dom­
inated the returns. When the new city council convened, Hanna, Snell, and 
Bartlett received word that the money they had lent the city would not be re­
paid. They were incensed and immediately demanded restitution from either 
Straub or the city council.41 
Straub was caught in a bind. His financial assets were limited, and the coun­
cil adamantly opposed returning any funds. As a last resort* Straub organized 
a group of local entrepreneurs into the St. Petersburg Waterfront Company, 
which he represented in the St. Petersburg Times as interested in developing 
the waterfront. He believed that the threat of massive commercial develop­
ment would stir public indignation and force the council to purchase the 
trustees' waterfront property. Straub's ploy worked to perfection. When the ru­
mor went out that "Yankees'* intended to build an industrial center on the wa­
terfront, residents besieged the city council. The council and the electorate 
endorsed a bond referendum that not only paid off Hanna, Snell, and Bartlett, 
but also provided funds for the acquisition of additional land. On January 8, 
1909, the city of St. Petersburg held title to one-third of the waterfront; by the 
end of the year it owned the rights to the entire waterfront except for two small 
parcels.42 
Over the next fifteen years St. Petersburg backed bonds worth over 
$1,300,000 for developing and beautifying the waterfront. Between 1910 and 
1918, the city dredged a channel for recreational craft, constructed a twenty-
nine-acre yacht basin, afifty-acre park, and a seawall. During this period the 
city gradually shifted all water commerce to Bayboro Harbor.43 In 1918, St. Pe­
tersburg gained title to the two remaining waterfront holdings, and in the early 
1920s, Perry Snell donated a mile of waterfront property to the north of the 
city. By 1923, citizens constantly boasted how their public waterfront had 
made St. Petersburg one of Florida's favorite vacation spots. The new park 
served multiple purposes, with its major-league (spring training) baseball sta­
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Figure 4 Straub's crusade for a publicly owned waterfront in St. Petersburg lent legitimacy 
to the idea of government intervention for the community's welfare. Courtesy of the St. 
Petersburg Historical Museum. 
dium, yacht club and basin, and tennis courts. Local citizens were adamant, 
however, that the waterfront's most attractive feature was the landscaped land 
hugging the coast (figure 4).44 
Once the waterfront improvements were under way, Straub became even 
more unflagging in his promotion of the "City Beautiful."45 "All other issues 
and improvements and industries and enterprises, public and private, com­
bined into one," he wrote in 1913, "are not doing as much to make St. Peters­
burg great as the City Beautiful Movement." That same year, the St. Petersburg 
Times issued a "City Beautiful platform" that called for municipal ownership of 
all utilities, regulation of new building projects, the improvement and beauti­
flcation of city parks and the waterfront, the acquisition of future parkland, 
and the building of a library. "The City Beautiful means," Straub told his read­
ers, "the city must make these improvements itself, because private enterprises 
will not do it."46 
As part of his new campaign, Straub wanted the city council to plan the 
city's expansion and to intercede when the community's general welfare was 
threatened. The City Beautiful philosophy, the Miami Herald reported, "was 
ingrained into the whole community" and "placed Miami and St. Petersburg 
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at opposite poles."47 After the waterfront park made St. Petersburg one of 
Florida's exceptional destinations, Straub decided to expand his vision of 
beauty to include the Pinellas Peninsula. 
Pinellas: The County Beautiful 
In March 1913, after leading the movement to form Pinellas County, Straub 
set out to establish the peninsula as a haven of "beauty and health." Six years 
earlier, Straub had penned the "Pinellas Declaration of Independence," a fiery 
call for the secession of the peninsular communities from Hillsborough 
County. The St. Petersburg Times's editor was "the man behind the gun who 
furnished the facts andfigures which took a slice off this county to make Pinel­
las," a Hillsborough official noted, "and if we had not fought him hard and con­
stantly, he would have stolen Tampa Bay, the Gulf of Mexico, and theflurry of 
clouds from out of our skies."48 
Once Pinellas gained its independence, Straub wanted the peninsula's 
15,000 inhabitants to band together to preserve the surrounding natural 
beauty. With more local control, the new county government could make cer­
tain that "our city and county landscapes be not left in the uncertain and self­
ish hands of real estate dealers." Straub proposed that the county commission 
appoint a board of disinterested citizens for the single purpose of "considering 
the City Beautiful and the public good, regardless of other interests." While 
property owners would make decisions "that shall seem good and sufficient to 
them," Straub asked, "shall the rest of the natural beauty be lost to the city?— 
The county?—The public?" On March 13, 1913, Straub announced, "Pinel­
las should have a county planning board."49 
The impetus for StraubJs proposal camefrom the counsel of the Boston ar­
chitect Henry Long. Ten days before, Long had arrived in St. Petersburg to pre­
pare plans for improving Bayboro Harbor. At StraubJs request, Long delivered 
a speech on park planning to the board of trade. He recommended that the 
board appoint a committee to devise a plan that would enhance and protect 
the area's natural lands and vistas. The plan could also influence the pattern 
of development on the southern portion of the peninsula by creating a system 
of parks, gardens of native and tropicalflowers, and scenic vistas for builders 
to incorporate into their projects. The board needed to convince city officials, 
Long told his listeners, to connect these public investments to the waterfront 
by a series of public driveways and boulevards. "Are you going to get hold of 
this peninsula," Long asked the gathering, "get control of the waterways and 
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lakes around your city, lay out as many parks and boulevards as your artist may 
select?" If the board could manage such a feat, Long predicted, real estate sales 
would not only escalate, "St. Petersburg could be made one of the most beau­
tiful cities in the world."50 
The Bostonian's appeal heartened Straub. For a decade he had wanted an 
expert's confirmation of his aesthetic vision, which the townspeople tended to 
dismiss as a quixotic crusade,51 After listening to Long, the city's businessmen 
realized that public investment in a park system could be profitable. At its 
April meeting, the board of trade passed a resolution to lobby the city council 
for the creation of a parks board that would oversee the implementation of a 
park plan.52 
Long's counsel convinced Straub that an outside consultant could play an 
important role in promoting his City Beautiful agenda. After Long's eloquent 
testimony to the economic value of natural beauty, Straub made a point of 
bringing in an expert whenever it came time to design a public improvement 
plan. Before leaving, Long suggested that Straub contact the Olmsted Broth­
ersfirm, the nation's most prestigious name in landscape architecture, for guid­
ance in park planning. 
In May 1913, the St. Petersburg City Council voted in favor of creating an 
advisory parks board.53 The parks board held its first meeting in June and 
elected Roy Hanna, the city's leading conservationist, to chair the group. Af­
ter witnessing the wholesale slaughter of thousands of wading birds in the 
1890s, Hanna had decided to establish a bird sanctuary and had purchased a 
small island, Indian Key, from the state. In 1902, Hanna contacted President 
Theodore Roosevelt when he heard that the federal government was inter­
ested in making Indian Key a bird reservation. After receiving a letter from 
Roosevelt, Hanna relinquished title to the government and, at his request, the 
Department of the Interior renamed the island Bird Key. After this triumph, 
Hanna founded a local chapter of the Audubon Society, and he continued 
working with the federal government to establish three additional small is­
lands as part of the Bird Key preserve.54 
At the parks board's second meeting, the group agreed that the city com­
mission should contact the Olmsted Brothers to discuss the feasibility of cre­
ating a park plan. The commission gave its approval and sent Hanna to the 
Olmsted Brothers headquarters near Boston. When Hanna arrived at the 
Olmsted offices, he met with the landscape architect James Frederick Dawson. 
After reviewing some of the firm's projects, Hanna and Dawson toured the 
"Emerald Necklace" parkway, a famous Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr., project, 
which connected Boston Common and Franklin Park. After his New England 
23 
Chapter I 
sojourn, Hanna convinced the parks board to approach the county commis­
sion with the idea of creating a system of parks throughout the peninsula.55 
Straub quickly lent his support to HannaJs proposal. The editor had culti­
vated connections throughout the peninsula when he led the independence 
movement, but now he faced a more difficult task. When he drafted the 
"Pinellas Declaration of Independence," Straub had spoken for a group of civic 
leaders united in their desire to see less interference in their private affairs. 
Now he needed their support to create a parks board with far-reaching powers. 
Fortunately for Straub, Pinellas lacked an entrenched elite with the power to 
crush his plans for the peninsula's development. 
Straub employed a familiar strategy to build a broad-based consensus for 
park planning. In fall 1913 he spent two months convincing Pinellas's leaders 
that the new county needed a board of trade to promote issues vital to the "up­
building of the county." In his newspaper he ran a series of editorials explain­
ing the important role St. Petersburg's board of trade played in civic affairs 
and the tourism trade. On November 23, 1913, Straub's persistence paid off 
when the Pinellas County Board of Trade, at their first meeting, elected him 
president.56 
The county board of trade's first resolution was a "declaration for the 
County Beautiful." They would make, the St. PetersburgTimes reported, "Peer­
less Pinellas the most beautiful and popular playground in America." The 
gathering agreed that the quickening pace of development could mar the re-
gion's attractive setting. To prevent this and promote the tourism industry, the 
board declared, "It is in our opinion essential for the county to have definite 
plans for its development, as it is for advanced cities."57 
Straub briefed the new organization'sfifty-three members on the progress of 
the waterfront plan in St. Petersburg. Tourism had increased, profits were up, 
and the community shared a common bond in its efforts to build a more beau­
tiful city. With Pinellas's newly won independence, Straub felt the board of 
trade could duplicate these accomplishments across the peninsula. Roy Hanna 
displayed examples of the Olmsteds' work and explained how a series of inter­
connected urban parks and natural areas would improve recreational opportu­
nities and enhance property values. After concluding his presentation, the 
excited gathering elected Hanna to petition the county commission to hire 
the Olmsted Brothers. On January 5, 1914, using the same presentation, 
Hanna convinced the Pinellas County Commission to hire the Olmsted firm 
to design a park plan for the peninsula.58 
By the next county board of trade meeting, enthusiasm for the County 
Beautiful had snowballed. The membership adopted a new resolution to set 
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Pinellas County off as "one beautiful garden." Stirred by this vision of Eden, 
members voted to help defray the costs of bringing a representative from the 
Olmsted Brothers to Pinellas.59 
On February 16,1914, James Dawson arrived in St. Petersburg. Initially, the 
landscape of the small city disappointed him. While duly impressed by the wa­
terfront, he expected much more from a city in the "land offlowers." St. Pe­
tersburg offered only a small, overtaxed downtown park and, outside of a thin 
string of pines, there was surprisingly little foliage for such a temperate place. 
A few days later, Dawson's interest picked up when he explored Pinellas's hin­
terlands with Hanna. They encountered primeval stretches of swamp and 
forest, Hanna noted, "where the feet of white men seldom tread." The St. Pe­
tersburg Times reported that the landscape architect made his "most extensive 
notes . .  . in the wilds and virgin land where the encroachment of civilization 
has had no chance to mar the natural scenery."60 
In Pinellas's interior wetlands, Dawson found the essence of subtropical 
Florida. Giant live oaks encased in resurrection ferns and draped with Spanish 
moss marked the boundary where land and water met. As the elevation dipped 
the humid microclimate of the cypress dome produced a green, surreal world 
of knobby cypress knees emerging from a carpet of ferns. The nutrient-rich 
waters supported a host of such colorful plants as pickerel weed and duck po­
tato, while countless pineapple air-plants decorated the ever present cypress. 
Above, the towering canopy of the bald cypress was punctuated by an occa­
sional tupelo gum, a deciduous tree, with a bulging, bell-shaped trunk.61 In this 
watery habitat, the two explorers encountered a wealth of species that equaled 
that of the tropical rainforest.62 
The Dawson Plan 
After a week of research and inspection, Dawson returned to Massachusetts. 
It took him six months to complete the project, which followed the traditional 
Olmsted format. The plan contained seventy-odd pages, without illustrations 
or maps, and described the virtues of a park system, the particulars of various 
sites, and the potential directions for real estate development. Thefinal prod­
uct also reflected the desires of Straub and his supporters to make the penin­
sula an Edenic reserve. A system of parkways connected urban "pleasure 
grounds," neighborhood parks, and natural preserves. The swaths of green that 
crossed the peninsula followed a formula that the Olmsteds had used in cities 
from Boston to Seattle.63 
25 
Chapter I 
In Pinellas, Dawson wanted parkways to link the existing parks in St. Pe­
tersburg and Clearwater with the pristine bodies of water in the hinterland and 
along the coast. Scenic preserves were set aside in areas where creeks and lakes 
merged with marshland. These places had both abundant wildlife and the 
peninsula's last stands of old-growth hardwoods. If the plan was implemented 
properly, people would be able to relax in a landscaped park or explore the nat­
ural features that made the Pinellas subpeninsula unique in the Tampa Bay 
ecosystem,64 
Dawson also encouraged the county to set aside an interconnected system 
of marshes and swampy areas for their usefulness as well as their sublime 
beauty. Since low-lying lands were subject toflooding and unsuitable for build­
ing, making such areas into parks was an efficient way of controlling flood­
waters. In addition, parkways encompassing drainage canals and creeks were 
more cost effective for storingfloodwaters than was the construction of un­
derground conduits.65 
The concluding section of the plan proposed a series of funding alternatives 
to implement the proposed park system. The Olmsted firm always recom­
mended that local governments purchase parklands before property costs be­
came so high that the public could not afford them. Municipal officials had a 
number of options: loans, bonds, special assessments, or tax increases. Usually 
local governments chose to raise money for land purchases by floating long-
term bonds. By the time the bonds came due, the Olmstedfirm predicted that 
the dollar value of the parks and the surrounding lands would far exceed the 
total paid on the loan. Although the expenditure of public monies would in­
evitably cause an outcry, the consultant thought that the returns would be es­
pecially lucrative in a county dependent on tourism. 
Besides abetting the tourism industry, the Olmsted firm believed that a 
comprehensive park system would enhance the tax base because property val­
ues consistently escalated along parkways and parks. At the same time, the city 
might entice property owners holding lands designated for parks to sell por­
tions at market rates to the city, provided they could reinvest their monies in 
comparable adjoining lands. Dawson urged those questioning this advice to 
visit Olmsted park systems in other cities and study the increased valuations 
in lands surrounding public green spaces.66 
After reviewing Dawson's plan, Straub thought he had seen the blueprint 
for Eden. If the county commission adopted this work, the business of city 
building would take on an entirely different meaning. The Pinellas board of 
trade would work with the county commissioners to ensure, Straub wrote, that 
"natural and scenic beauties are conserved and not marrfed by helter-skelter 
real estate developments."67 
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Straub's optimism seemed well founded* St. Petersburg's municipal water­
front had brought the city national exposure. Among southern cities, it was a 
shining representative of what public planning could accomplish. In July 
1913, the Manufacturers' Record reported why the people of St. Petersburg 
were "jealous of their waterfront." This prominent southern journal reported, 
"It is a thing of wondrous beauty and to the city a thing of wondrous value." 
With this public improvement, St. Petersburg appeared "to be rapidly reach­
ing the dreams of its makers." Readers were urged to visit the city so they could 
"catch the inspiration of the place" and visualize how to improve their own 
cities.68 In early 1915, the Christian Science Monitor commented that if other 
cities in the state followed St. Petersburg's lead, rather than Florida's being 
"commonly spoken of as the Italy of America, Italy might some day feel com­
plimented on being called the Florida of Europe."69 
Straub used this praise to promote the new park plan, especially when ques­
tions were raised over the expenditure of public funds. The benefits St. Pe­
tersburg had reaped from the waterfront had also attracted attention in 
Clearwater, the site of the new county courthouse. Civic leaders lauded the 
park plan and its backers as the "biggest thing Pinellas County had yet done," 
the Clearwater News reported. "When people from all parts of the county get 
together in one big, central organization and take up the work of developing 
the county along sane and sensible lines, the results will be far-reaching." By 
fall 1914, the board of trade had met four times, and with each meeting the 
membership grew and the rhetoric became more exuberant. "The Pinellas 
County Beautiful, the biggest and best movement for the upbuilding of the 
county, ever undertaken in Florida or the South," the St. Petersburg Times an­
nounced in October 1914, "will succeed."70 
Florida municipalities and counties were not vested with the general pow­
ers of government (home rule). To gain these powers, local governments had 
to procure general enabling acts from the state legislature.71 For Pinellas to es­
tablish a parks board that could disburse funds and acquire lands, the Pinellas 
delegation had to obtain enabling legislationfrom Tallahassee, and the county 
commission had to endorse the bill with a majority vote. The Olmsted Broth­
ers drew up the necessary legislation, and the Pinellas delegation introduced 
the bill to the legislature for ratification in spring 1915. 
The County Beautiful Bill, as it was named by its sponsors, called for a 
three-person county parks board with one member elected from each of the 
county's school districts. Members of the board would not be paid for their ser­
vices, but they could employ an executive officer. The board would oversee the 
plan's production, but final adoption rested with the county commissioners. 
Once the plan was adopted, the parks board could implement it by acquiring 
27 
Chapter I 
land through purchase or condemnation. Financing the board would require a 
one-mill levy in the first year, a two-mill levy in the second year, and a maxi­
mum of a three-mill levy in its third year and every year thereafter. For any 
projects that exceeded budgetary constraints, the county commissioners 
could call a bond election, and the parks board would set the amount of the 
requisition.72 
The Role of Natural Beauty in City Building 
In May 1915, the Florida legislature passed the Pinellas County Beautiful Bill. 
The bill, however, received a far different reception in Pinellas. The euphoria 
over the prospect of turning the peninsula into a garden retreat quickly abated 
when boosters confronted the prospect of higher taxes. Straub wrote, "The 
idea was that it was nice but it would not pay—there was so much more that 
was practical and businesslike." While civic-minded residents could support 
volunteer efforts like the board of trade, many felt that subsidizing a bureau­
cratic initiative stretched the limits of democratic propriety.73 The editor of 
the Clearwater Sun claimed not only that the creation of a park system was a 
waste of money, but that such an endeavor heightened the potential for polit­
ical intrigue and the abuse of power. "[The bill] places more power in the hands 
of three men," the editor railed, "than is exercised by the president of the 
United States."74 
The county commissioners also reversed their position once they realized 
that the executive manager of the proposed board could set up an independent 
domain that would influence the peninsula's development. While Straub 
blamed the demise of the County Beautiful Bill on "a 'don't care' Board of 
County Commissioners," the idea that beauty was valuable meant little in a 
region where it was common. Property owners and businessmen found it ludi­
crous that the government would raise taxes for parks when so many natural 
escapes were close at hand.75 The peninsula's civic leaders had formed a new 
county to limit bureaucratic meddling, especially in the growing real estate 
market* In the rush to profit from the sale and development of land, those in­
volved in city building could easily embrace a world with less natural beauty. 
Yet, whether they knew it or not, the failure to preserve a portion of the nat­
ural beauty that defined the region also had its costs.76 
Straub learned some important lessons from the collapse of the County 
Beautiful movement. First, outside consultants provided valuable services, but 
their work still had to play on the stage of local politics. Next, idealistic visions 
might capture the fancy of local boosters, but pleasing notions counted for 
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little when it came time to ante up. Straub, like other well-meaning reformers 
during this era, also discovered that expending public funds and instituting 
collective controls ran counter to the traditions of American democracy. He 
found that the sacred article of property rights and the pursuit of wealth could 
dissolve the bonds of the best plan, even one to create a new Eden.77 
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In Florida w e have the greatest opportunity of modem times to plan in 
advance for the growth of our cities and towns, thereby eliminating for­
ever the objectionable slums. . . . The state has every condition favor­
able for the soundest growth along lines exhibiting forethought in 
planning. 
George Gallup, 1926 
In 1921 a tide of speculation and prosperity, now known as the "Great Florida 
Land Boom/' swept through St. Petersburg.1 An increase in postwar domestic 
spending, the Model T, modern advertising, the advent of leisure, and an un­
surpassed spirit of financial optimism fueled an explosion in the real estate 
market. St. Petersburg received national attention as tourists and speculators 
swarmed into the city to buy land and bask in the subtropical surroundings. 
Enthralled with both the city's natural and business climates, thousands re­
turned after having vacationed there to take up permanent residence, and the 
demand for public services quickly overwhelmed the Public Works Depart-
ment.2 Other Florida cities faced similar problems, but St. Petersburg's city 
commission pursued a unique strategy to solve its predicament by hiring city 
planner John Nolen. Nolen had watched the nation's fastest growing state 
with, he wrote, "unusual interest. The settlement of other sections was 
brought about by personal sacrifice and often danger, but Florida is being set­
tled under modern methods, with almost unlimited resources of capital, expe­
rience and business enterprise." With just under a million residents in 1920, 
this "lastfrontier," as Nolen called Florida, offered "a great laboratory of town 
and city building."3 
St* Petersburg Enters the New Urban Age 
Among Florida's leading cities, only Miami (see tables 1 and 2) grew faster 
than St. Petersburg during the 1920s. The accelerated growth of these two 
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Table 1 
Population of Leading Florida Cities, 1900-1930 
1900 1910 J920 J930 
Jacksonville 28,249 57,699 91,558 129,549 
Pensacola 17,747 22,892 31,035 37,579 
Tampa 15,830 37,782 51,608 101,161 
Miami 1,681 5,471 29,571 110,637 
St. Petersburg 1,575 4,127 14,237 40,425 
Source: Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930 
Table 2 
Percentage of Population Increase in Leading Florida Cities, 1900-1930 
1900-1910 I910-J920 1920-1930 
Jacksonville 103.0 58.7 41.5 
Pensacola 29.5 35.0 1.8 
Tampa 138.5 36.6 96.0 
Miami 225.5 440.5 274.1 
St. Petersburg 162.0 245.0 183.9 
Source: Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930 
Table 3 
Florida's Population Growth, 1900-1930 
% Increase from 
Population Previous Decade 
1930 1,468,211 51.6 
1920 968,470 28.7 
1910 752,619 42.4 
1900 528,542 35.0 
Source: Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930 
cities mirrored a phenomenon that occurred throughout the state. In 1900 
Florida, with 528,542 residents, was the least populated state east of the Mis­
sissippi. By 1930 its population had almost tripled. While Florida's total pop­
ulation grew 51.6 percent during the 1920s, its urban population increased 114 
percent (see tables 3 and 4). Over 80 percent of the state's 499,741 immigrants 
took up residence in cities and, by 1939, 51.7 percent of all Floridians lived in 
urban areas. 
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Table 4 
Florida's Urban Population, 1900-1930 
Urban % of Total % Change from 
Population Population Previous Decade 
1930 759,778 51.7 114.9 
1920 353,515 36.7 61.4 
1910 219,080 29.1 104.7 
1900 107,031 20.3 38.4 
Source: Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930 
TableS 
Population Growth in Selected Southern States, 1900-1930 
J900 1920 J920 1930 
Florida 528,542 752,619 968,470 1,468,211 
Louisiana 1,381,625 1,655,388 1,798,509 2,101,593 
Virginia 1,854,184 2,061,612 2,309,187 2,421,851 
Texas 3,048,710 3,896,542 4,663,228 5,824,715 
Georgia 2,216,331 2,609,121 2,895,832 2,908,506 
Alabama 1,828,647 2,138,093 2,348,174 2,646,248 
Source: Bureau of the Census, Census of the United States, 1910, 1920, and 1930 
While a majority of Americans lived in cities for the first time in 1920, at 
the end of the decade Florida was thefirst state from the former Confederacy 
to have a majority of its population classified as urban (tables 5 and 6). (An­
other twenty years would go by before other southern states reached this 
point.)4 Other southern cities acted as crucibles of change for the region, but 
in Florida the opportunities for city building proceeded from a different 
premise.5 The booming Florida real estate market pushed St. Petersburg into a 
vibrant new world that held possibilities unforeseen not only by Southerners, 
but by an entire generation of Americans. 
The 1920s, though often portrayed as a reactionary decade, were actually a 
time of unabashed optimism. "There was in the twenties," Clarence Stein, a 
member of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), recalled, 
"a tremendous enthusiasm to build a new and better world."6 The luxurious 
lifestyle accompanying the world'sfirst economy of mass consumption fostered 
a new sense of hope in a nation anxious to repress the horrors of World War I. 
In the early 1920s, Americans enveloped themselves in a common aspiration 
to build a new civilization founded on industrial efficiency, scientific progress, 
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Table 6 
Percentage of Urban Population in Selected Southern States, 1900-1930 
1900 1910 1920 1930 
Florida 20.3 29.1 36.7 51.7 
Louisiana 26.5 30.0 34.9 39.7 
Virginia 18.3 23.1 29.2 32.4 
Texas 17.1 24.1 32.4 41.0 
Georgia 15.6 20.6 25.1 30.8 
Alabama 11,9 17.3 21.7 28.1 
Source: Bureau of the Census, Census of the United States, 1910, 1920, and 1930 
and consumerism. Corporate America's technical wizardry and avowed mas­
tery of the marketplace was changing the world, fueling the notion that a new 
people's capitalism would eliminate class divisions, and that a middle-class 
Utopia would arise once Americans had acclimated themselves to abundance.7 
Consumerism, modern technology, and the corporation were not only 
changing American life, but creating a world that yearned for change. The na-
tion's rising standard of living produced a stream of innovations that grew from 
the search for profits and competitive advantages. Every individual or group 
competing for consumers contributed to this stream; the fluctuating market 
economy soon made any business not actively seeking change obsolete. In St. 
Petersburg, change meant vitality and progress. Almost every issue of the city's 
newspapers carried news of businesses that were reorganizing, shifting empha­
sis, and moving into new areas. "New blood is entering oldfirms," a business 
reporter noted, "men from olderfirms are branching into new enterprises, men 
are moving from one business to another."8 If these changes were startling, 
they were also healthy. In an age of growth and prosperity, change equaled 
progress. 
Prosperity had its price. If the people of St. Petersburg wanted to enjoy their 
new blessings, they needed to adjust to a place where disruption and modern-
world vitality constantly intermingled as technical advances and shifts in the 
market offered new opportunities for growth and development.9 They needed 
desperately to form, William Straub believed, new and imaginative responses 
to the rapid transformation of the city's life and landscape. In their pursuit of 
easy riches, citizens had left many important issues unattended. If they con­
tinued to boost and gamble rather than plan, Straub wrote in 1921, "we may 
perish by our own ostrich-like ignorance."10 
Many in St. Petersburg believed that they could escape change because 
they lived in a place that was supposed to elude the hectic pace of the new age. 
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Local boosters claimed that the city's good fortune came from the decades of 
hard work it had taken to create an environment suited to the needs of mod­
ern America. They believed that their subtropical sanctuary provided the per­
fect escape, as poet Sidney Lanier had written a half century earlier, "from that 
universal killing ague of modern times—the fever and the unrest of trade."11 
In St. Petersburg many thought that securing the future merely required lead­
ing others to the new Eden. 
Florida: The "Eden of the South" 
After the Civil War and Reconstruction, Florida reentered the Union intent 
on reshaping the state's image and attracting northern capital and business 
skills.12 Like other former Confederate states, Florida adhered to the "New 
South Creed," a philosophy of progress and optimism that mixed the tradi­
tions of the Old South with the mores of Social Darwinism. The creation of a 
new South depended on building an industrial empire that would rival the 
North's and return a measure of self-esteem to a defeated people. To resurrect 
their dormant economy, new South promoters advocated cooperating with 
northern business interests to exploit the region's abundant resources. New 
South champions, such as Henry Grady of the Atlanta Constitution and 
Richard Edmonds of the Manufacturers1 Record, predicted that when northern 
entrepreneurial skills combined with the South's traditional values, the region 
would emerge as a paragon of productivity and virtue.13 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, Florida remained peculiarly south­
ern. Like the rest of what had been the Confederacy, Florida had failed to make 
the necessary structural changes that would enable its economy to compete 
with the rest of America. The state's Democratic leaders extolled the virtues 
of a new South, but poverty, single-party politics, Jim Crow, and an agrarian 
conservatism held sway over the state's overwhelmingly rural population. 
Even with these obstructions, however, it was possible to get a glimpse of the 
new South's most elusive commodity—prosperity.14 
In 1888, Standard Oil tycoon Henry Flagler built the Ponce de Leon Hotel 
in St. Augustine, the first in a series of luxury hotels that furnished exotic es­
capes for travelers on his Florida East Coast Railway. Flagler placed his mod­
ern Moorish palaces in garden settings and near pristine beaches to create 
images long associated with Oriental decadence. Like the Crusaders encoun­
tering Arabia, tourists were primed for a land of sweetmeats, lush gardens, ser­
vants, and trickling fountains.15 By 1900, Flagler's architectural marvels had 
A Laboratory for Urban Planning? 
captivated a wealthy set who regularly ventured to the small islands of civi­
lization he had created in Florida's primitive subtropical wilderness.16 
Flagler's ventures improved Florida's economy and gave it a new direction. 
Publications released by the government, railroad lines, and land companies 
used the state's tropical landscape and the myth of the Fountain of Youth 
to entice newcomers into what Elliot Mackle has called the "Eden of the 
South."17 Many believed that nature's rejuvenating powers existed in their 
purest form in Florida, where one could alsofind elegant hotels, such wealthy 
winter residents as Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, and a profitable 
real estate market. Whether newcomers came to enjoy themselves or to make 
money, the state's natural environment enraptured them. Profits had become 
"Eden's" most enticing fruit.18 
The state's changing fortunes and the completion of a comprehensive rail 
network spurred an 83 percent population increase, from 528,542 to 968,470, 
between 1900 and 1920. But despite the surge in population and economic ac­
tivity, Florida remained a poor, underdeveloped state. The few elegant resorts 
had undoubtedly improved Florida's image and prospects, but these pleasure 
palaces remained out of reach for the middle class until the 1920s. In the early 
1920s, the nation underwent a momentous shift to become the world's first 
mass consumer economy. Coolidge prosperity gave Americans more leisure 
and money, and they used these gifts to escape the routine of business and ba­
nality of life. In Florida, Americans found a vacationland that combined 
American sport with subtropical beauty (figure 5).19 
After spending two generations cultivating an image geared to escapist fan­
tasies, in the early 1920s Florida succeeded in capturing the nation's imagi­
nation. America's newest vacation spot was the "Headline of America," 
according to the New York Times. Henry Grady's prophecies werefinally being 
fulfilled: "The South is a miracle," Collier's Weekly announced, "a pretty fairy 
tale which no one if he can be carried aboard the Florida train or on a litter can 
afford to miss."20 "The future of Florida is roseate with potentialities and pos­
sibilities beyond the power of the mind to fully grasp," proclaimed Richard Ed-
monds.21 The image of swaying palms, tropical waters, and the Fountain of 
Youth still defined Florida, but the state now offered new pleasures that re­
flected the transformation in American life. 
In the 1920s Americans faced an unusual problem. The advent of prosper­
ity had given them an abundance of free time. As a people, Americans were so 
accustomed to pouring their energy into getting ahead that even vacationers 
needed structure and something to do.22 Resort cities accommodated tourists' 
needs by incorporating new activities into the Florida lifestyle. St. Petersburg's 
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PRESIDENT HARDING DISCOVERS THE "FOUNTAIN OF YOUTH" 
IN FLORIDA'S SUNSHINE, FRESH AIR AND EXERCISE 
Figure 5 During the boom years, St. Petersburg mixed the racist image of 
the Old South with the Fountain of Youth myth to sell itself as the "Eden 
of the South." Bushnell, 1923, St. Petersburg Times. 
Chamber of Commerc e reminded visitors to prepare for "the robust activities 
that are a part of your life. Pack your summer clothes, golf sticks, fishing tackle, 
bathing suits, camera, and tennis racquets for a land of perpetual sunshine."23 
In the early 1920s, it seemed as though Ponce de Leon's dream had come to 
fruition in St. Petersburg. "I staked my all on this land, my fortune, my friends, 
and finally my life. Now 1 have come back that I might know it was not in 
vain," the conquistador states, in Ruth Crawford's inventive account of Ponce 
de Le6n's visit to St. Petersburg. The surprised explorer found that a "land of 
youth" actually existed where "there was no age" because the "spirit of youth" 
and the "generosity of the land" erased generational differences. In St. Peters­
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burg, families lived together, "played together and made work their play." 
"Men went to work not as drudges, but as those who took joy in their work­
manship." After surveying this paradise surrounded by water, where "the sun 
invited the people to play on the beaches/' Ponce de Leon realized that he had 
"dreamed true." When the time came for the famed explorer to depart, he 
speculated, "Perhaps if I hid myself in the park near the water, I could stay one 
more day. Surely when there are so many dreamers, one who had gone back to 
his dreams would not be missed."24 
The image of the early explorer accompanied the thousands who journeyed 
to Florida in search of Eden. "Not since the Great West was opened up," Per­
riton Maxwell, an editor for Suniland, reported, "has history recorded such an 
amazing growth of civilization as in Florida."25 Whether seeking a hiatus in the 
Garden or a bucolic, suburban residence, world-weary people yearning for the 
rewards of modern life found a seductive lure in St. Petersburg: "Homes con­
tribute to the fascination of the suburbs. Yet they attain no small degree of 
their surpassing beauty from rare natural attractiveness of location. Picture bits 
of South Sea Islands, Palms on Golden Beaches, swaying to the trade winds, 
the sweeping shore of the French Riviera, Italian sunsets, glowing on a com­
munity of perfect homes and hovering overall is the atmosphere of ancient 
Spain. This is Beach Park on Old Tampa Bay."26 
Realtors published thousands of advertisements like these as they mixed 
selling and seduction. This new twist in promotion swelled the pages and bol­
stered the sales of St. Petersburg's leading newspaper, the St. Petersburg Times. 
In 1925, at the height of the boom, the Times's twenty-five million lines of ad­
vertising ranked second nationally only to the Miami Herald's record forty-two 
million lines. OnNovember 22,1925, the Sunday Times allocated ninety of its 
134 pages to real estate advertising, with fifty-five pages listing vacant lots for 
sale. Nationwide speculation in Florida real estate more than tripled the cir­
culation of the St. Petersburg Times between 1920 and 1927.27 
Both public and private initiatives contributed to the proliferation of ad­
vertising. In the 1920s, every city in Florida actively engaged in advertising or 
otherwise boosting the community.28 The people of St. Petersburg made such 
activity a communal project. "It takes boosting to get ahead," the St. Peters­
burg Times declared, and because of this, the "Chamber of Commerce is the 
most important industry in the city."29 The civic leadership's preoccupation 
with boosting reflected an acute discernment of the marketplace's new propri­
eties. The leaders understood that the city's vitality did not depend on pro­
ducing goods, but on the promotion and creation of a fabricated environment 
where visitors could pursue their fantasies. C. B. Axford, a leading builder, 
wrote of the need to attract tourists: "We have no factories, no vast industries 
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. .  . we are solely dependent to take wealth and tribute from all the world to 
make our city grow."30 Boosting qualified as a civic duty.31 
The journalist Frank Stockbridge found boosting so intense in St. Peters­
burg that he called it "the city that advertising built." He reported, "There is 
no community in all Florida [in which] the united efforts of the entire citizen­
ship [have] been so acutely and intelligently concentrated upon advertising its 
advantages."32 In the early 1920s, St. Petersburg imposed the state's first spe­
cial tax to pay for advertising.33 The Chamber of Commerce spent the funds 
raised, allocating a statewide high of $8,000 on advertising in 1921, $27,000 
in 1923, $45,000 in 1924, $160,000 in 1925, and $270,000 in 1926.34 
These expenditures seemed well-placed. In late 1921, the Automobile As­
sociation reported that it received more inquiries for routes to St. Petersburg 
than any other Florida point. Two years later, John M. Bowman, president of 
New York's Biltmore Hotel commented that, "the amazing growth of St. Pe­
tersburg is in direct proportion to the unusual and widespread advertising the 
city received."35 In 1924, the city gained recognition as a vacation Mecca in 
the Saturday Evening Post, Literary Digest, National Geographic, Travel, Vogue, 
Vanity Fair, Homes and Gardens, and Cosmopolitan,36 
Locals and visitors alike were mesmerized by St. Petersburg's growth. "It 
seems almost like looking at the dramatization of a fairy tale to view the won­
derful development that has taken place in St. Petersburg," Senator Walter F. 
George of Georgia concluded after his twenty-five-year absence from the city. 
In 1923, L. E Epplich, president of the National Realtors' Association, was 
"simply astounded" by what he saw, "The progressive spirit of the city is evi­
dent everywhere—in the wide streets, new churches, and buildings under 
construction."37 If the city continued to grow at its present rate, one realtor 
predicted in 1923, its population would jump to almost 150,000 in a decade: 
"Thousands of families in the North are bound to settle in this 'Fountain of 
Youth' section with its wonderful climate." The secret of this rapid growth, the 
Chamber of Commerce revealed, "is found in the simple fact that in one com­
munity have been combined in a remarkable manner those advantages and 
attractions, natural and man-made, which civilized mankind dreams of and 
desires."38 
Planning for Prosperity 
Despite all that was written idealizing it, St. Petersburg suffered from many 
problems. Land speculators, or "subdivides," purchased vacant land, then di­
vided it into small (forty-foot wide) lots because such lots' return per square 
35 
A Laboratory for Urban Planning? 
foot was two to three times that of larger ones. Because no planning guidelines 
had been laid down, the city had turned into a confusing patchwork of dis­
connected subdivisions by late 1921. Lots ran in every direction, while streets 
and alleys were laid out haphazardly, often failing to meet at intersections—or 
just running into dead ends. When the Department of Public Works tried to 
extend urban services to a subdivision, the engineering obstacles were often 
insurmountable.39 
On July 5, 1921, the city commission hired E. C. Garvin as the first direc­
tor of public works. The commission hoped that Garvin, a licensed civil engi­
neer with degrees from George Washington and Case Western Reserve 
Universities, could bring some order to the city's chaotic expansion. Garvin 
quickly realized the difficulty of his task after tract owners flooded his office 
with demands for public improvements: sewers, sidewalks, and especially 
streets. These investors were anxious to sell their lots at the market's inflated 
prices, and they believed that a better infrastructure would impress prospec­
tive buyers that the Florida Riviera, Paradise Park, Elysian Fields, or Seminole 
Estates stood at the vanguard of civilization. "In that day," Walter Fuller re­
called, "a lot was something to sell the avid speculator and not something on 
which to build a home." All the subdivider wanted was a "contract or deed, a 
street and an imposing entrance."40 
Without a plan to follow, the Department of Public Works faced an awe­
some task in trying to meet the increasing demand for public improvements. 
In some areas where Garvin's staff were called on to provide services, they had 
no idea how the land would be used in the future. He desperately needed a city 
plan to get a fix on the location of subdivisions, so that his office could imple­
ment an efficient design for streets, sewers, and other improvements.41 
Once Garvin came on board, Straub began a drive for city planning. A few 
months earlier he had helped form a local chapter of the Rotary, and this group 
served as his springboard for reform. Straub was the group's president and, a 
week after Garvin's hiring, he petitioned the city commission, on behalf of the 
Rotary, to establish a city planning board. After twenty years, local politicians 
were well acquainted with Straub's crusades. Although city planning was a 
subject foreign to most of the commissioners, they acceded to Straub's request, 
although more to "shut him up," as one member recounted, "than anything 
else."42 After a unanimous vote, on August 15, 1921, the mayor appointed 
Straub, Annie McRae, and a realtor, T J. Heller, to sit on the new advisory 
board. A week later, Straub chaired the Planning Board's opening meeting, 
with Annie McRae as secretary.43 
At the Planning Board's second meeting, its members sent the city com­
mission a resolution asking for funds to hire a consultant. The commission 
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consented and, in late November 1921, after reading one of his books, Annie 
McRae wrote John Nolen that the city needed his services. Nolen responded 
by congratulating the city for establishing Florida's first planning board and in­
forming McRae: "The opportunity to plan seems to me most unusual and I 
would be more than happy to cooperate with you and the City Planning 
Board." Although St. Petersburg was not a new town, more than 90 percent of 
the city stood vacant, and it was, as Nolen wrote, "bound to grow."44 
John Nolen: Pioneer Planner 
John Nolen's vision of urban reform helped pioneer the planning profession. 
Although separated in age by a quarter of a century from Lewis Mumford and 
his colleagues in the RPAA, Nolen was a kindred spirit. "What we may have 
had in common," Stein stated, "was a tremendous enthusiasm to build a new 
and better world."45 Nolen's Utopian quest led him to city planning. Born in 
Philadelphia in 1869, Nolen was admitted to the University of Pennsylvania 
in 1890, where he majored in economics and public administration. Simon N. 
Patten, the Wharton School's professor of political economy, captivated 
Nolen with his theories of social engineering. Patten believed that America's 
economic transformation gave urban reformers the opportunity to enhance 
the quality of the public realm. He thought that the provision of municipal art, 
parks, lectures, and concerts would help the urban masses adjust to a new pros­
perity that would make leisure a given in life. Like other Patten students— 
Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and Rexford G. Tugwell—Nolen went into the 
world confident that, through the cooperative efforts of the public and private 
sectors, Americans were destined to enjoy a higher standard of living.46 
After graduatingfrom the University of Pennsylvania in 1893, Nolen spent 
ten years serving as the executive secretary of the Society for the Extension of 
University Teaching. Nolen honed his public-relations skills and spent an in­
creasing amount of time studying municipal affairs. In 1901, Nolen left his job 
to pursue a new career in city planning. He spent two years in Europe studying 
innovations in land-use zoning and town design. Immediately after his return 
to the United States, Nolen enrolled in Harvard University's newly formed 
School of Landscape Architecture.47 
At Harvard, Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. instructed Nolen in the art of land­
scape design. Olmsted and his star pupil also spent many hours discussing the 
potential of America'sfledgling city planning movement. A decade earlier, a 
tour of Europe with his renowned father had introduced the younger Olmsted 
40 
A Laboratory for Urban Planning? 
to English and German experiments in urban planning, and by the early 
1900s, he was the leading spokesman for America's city planning profession. 
Besides teaching Nolen the intricacies of urban design, Olmsted introduced 
him to the idea that planners could unify the complex elements comprising 
the "organic city."48 
Although Nolen's theory of planning evolved over the years, his design 
technique centered on the Olmsteds' ideal of harmonizing natural and urban 
landscapes.49 After leaving Harvard, Nolen worked as a consultant on park 
plans and municipal improvement projects in the South, the East, and the 
Midwest. By 1907 he had joined Olmsted and a small cadre of like-minded re­
formers in promoting comprehensive city planning as a tool to ameliorate the 
nation's urban ills.50 
Between 1907 and 1919, Nolen helped establish the theoretical constructs 
of comprehensive planning. Nolen, Olmsted Jr., and other pioneer city plan­
ners saw the world in ethical terms. For them, the landscape encompassed a 
communal good that the speculative real estate market failed to value prop­
erly. The American city's haphazard expansion, sordid living conditions, in­
adequate public services, and lack of amenities were telling indictments 
against the laissez-faire approach. The planning profession wanted to replace 
America's chaotic method of city building with a planned land-use system. In 
1917 Olmsted defined city planning as "the attempt to exert a well-considered 
control on behalf of the people of a city, over the development of their physi­
cal environment as a whole."51 
The new profession expanded the urban vision of earlier reformers by wed­
ding beauty to utility. While they continued to emphasize civic responsibility, 
park planning, and formal design in their work, they also wanted to address a 
wider range of issues.52 "There is a danger in making city planning look like 
merely a 'city beautiful' scheme," Nolen warned the eminent British planning 
theorist Patrick Geddes in 1915, "instead of the practical, hard-headed rec­
ommendations for the permanent betterment of city life."53 But Nolen never 
sought to dismiss beauty from the city; instead he thought that comprehensive 
plans following natural lines would produce a more efficient urban system.54 
The planning profession promoted comprehensive planning as a systematic 
procedure that could guide urban expansion and curtail the excesses of free en­
terprise. Plans usually included both text and a land-use map that depicted an 
idealized conception of the city's future. "In a word, we should frame a concept, 
an ideal of what we wish the city to be," Nolen advised, "and then we should 
make it one of the controlling purposes in the development of the city plan."55 
The plan coordinated transportation systems, park systems, and the use of 
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land, while establishing the character of development, Olmsted explained, 
uin so far as it is practicable for the community to control or influence such 
developments."56 
The planners also sold their new idea as a means to improve the efficiency 
of the free-market system. Since the land-use plan reflected the "highest and 
best use" of urban property, entrepreneurs seeking to maximize land values 
would benefit from following it. At the same time, the plan's transportation 
network and schedule of improvements would make the inevitable public out­
lays more economical Planning also offered the means to improve the work­
ing classes' congested and insanitary living conditions by separating residences 
from factories and giving easy access to public parks and transit lines. For those 
questioning the legitimacy of public planning, reformers responded that the 
improved living conditions would foster a more productive work force and, in 
turn, higher profits.57 
In designing and implementing plans, planners had to work closely with 
municipal officials and city planning commissions, the quasi-governmental 
agencies that focused exclusively on issues surrounding city building. In the­
ory, their autonomy insulated members from the mundane affairs of municipal 
government and freed them to concentrate on the visionary aspects of city 
building. To maintain a measure of independence from elected officialdom 
and local political scheming, urban reformers wanted knowledgeable volun­
teers to sit on planning commissions. Often the planning commission hired a 
professional planner to prepare the plan, which was submitted to public re­
view. Once an elected body adopted the plan, the planning commission re­
viewed new building projects and coordinated expansion of improvements in 
the infrastructure. Although only an advisory board, the planning commission 
helped the city commission enforce the city's zoning code. 
While the comprehensive plan provided a conceptual design of the city's 
future mixture of land uses, zoning regulated the construction industry and the 
real estate market. The zoning code set the standards for the height and bulk 
of buildings and separated different land uses into a system of hierarchical ur­
ban cells, or zones. Height and bulk regulations gave municipalities a means to 
control population densities and protect property values. Citizens who wanted 
to change their property's zoning classification were required to seek a variance 
from the planning commission. The burden rested with the property owner to 
show that the proposed land use would not become a nuisance to the sur­
rounding properties or impair the intent of the plan. If the planning commis­
sion rejected the petitioner's plea, property owners could bring their case 
before the city commission.58 
The technical details of planning and zoning were by no means the plan­
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ner's most difficult task. In a society where property rights are preeminent, 
implementing a plan required the consultant—and the planning commis-
sion—to strike a balance between civic needs and market demands* Other­
wise, local governments could never enforce the land-use controls needed to 
implement the plan.59 
The idea of city planning was in tune with the political reforms that swept 
through the United States between the turn of the century and World War I.60 
"The promise of American city planning is bright," John Nolen proclaimed 
numerous times between 1909 and 1917, "because of this new spirit of democ­
racy .. * of which.. . city planning is only one meager expression*"61 The chaos 
of the land market, which lacked any controls, was ample justification for en­
listing the planner's aid. Between 1910 and 1920, 42 percent of the nation's 
fifty largest urban centers, and 13 percent of all cities over 25,000, turned to 
comprehensive planning.62 
While the planning profession managed to initiate the planning process 
and educate civic leaders, it generally failed to obtain backing for public hous­
ing, site planning, and residential design. In a speech at the 1919 National 
Planning Conference, Nolen stated that, aside from Chicago, no major city 
had seriously pursued planning. If the profession was to shape urban America, 
practitioners needed to lobby state legislatures and obtain legal standing for 
their plans.63 Nolen also felt that the profession needed to improve its record 
on plan implementation. To improve the existing procedure, he advocated us­
ing the right of eminent domain (although selectively), charging assessments 
for planned improvements, and issuing bonds for purchasing parks. For city 
planning really to advance, he concluded, planners needed "better ways of 
forming intelligent public opinion and of giving it effective expression."64 
John Nolen: Theorist and Practitioner 
Nolen worked tirelessly to promote city planning. By 1919 he stood at the 
apex of his profession. He had edited two books, written two more, and pub­
lished more thanfifty articles and plans. He was the sole proprietor of the na-
tion's largest planningfirm.NolenJs success arose from a blend of idealism and 
business acumen, which allowed his work to be both innovative and prag-
matic.65 
Nolen's books—New Ideals in the Planning of Cities, Towns, and Villages 
(1919) and New Towns for Old (1927)—owed a great deal to the opinions 
of his friend and confidant, the English planner Raymond Unwin. Nolen 
and Unwin first met in 1911, and soon became fast friends. Close in age and 
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interests, these two pioneer planners corresponded regularly for twenty-five 
years, exchanging social views and planning expertise as well as more personal 
information. Both men rose to the pinnacle of their profession, holding the 
presidency of their respective national planning associations. In 1931, Nolen 
replaced his close friend as president of the International Federation of Hous­
ing and Town Planning, a post Unwin had occupied since 1928. Nolen's last 
letter, written on his deathbed, went to Unwin.66 
Unwin's English garden cities at Hampstead and Letchworth, and his writ­
ings on town design, greatly influenced Nolen. Unwin advocated building 
clusters of garden cities connected by rail as an alternative to the "huge aggre­
gation of units ever spreading further and further from the original center.'* For 
Unwin, a disciple of Ebenezer Howard's garden city movement, planning al­
lowed local governments to allocate land for the various components of a city 
in accordance with the land's characteristics.67 Adherents of the garden city 
concept believed that planners could break down the complexities of urban 
life by designing communities around natural forms and at a human scale (de­
fined as no more than twelve units per acre). In contrast to the rectangular mo­
notony of the traditional checkerboard plan, Unwin's neighborhoods followed 
the contours of the land. He grouped residences, often garden apartments, on 
the land most suited for development. This allowed him to set aside the most 
fertile soils for agriculture and to preserve the more fragile lands for recreation 
68 or as common open space.
Nolen's New Ideals 
inNew Ideals in the Planning of Cities, Towns, and Villages, Nolen blended Un-
win's theories with his own experience to propose a new agenda for the Amer­
ican city. Besides analyzing planning procedures, Nolen made a strong plea for 
using urban planning as a tool to protect the natural environment. After a half 
century of urban development, Americans had finally started to realize, he 
wrote, "the necessity of respecting and conserving natural features, to which 
they owe not only their form, but often their very life."69 Americans wanted 
safe, healthy communities, but Nolen felt that this goal would be unattainable 
as long as cities continued to expand in a haphazard manner. According to 
him, imposing a plan to check "haphazard drift" was only part of the planning 
process. It was also imperative to work with municipal officials to create a com­
mon culture by designing a future city that maintained local traditions and the 
health of the landscape.70 
44 
A Laboratory for Urban Planning? 
Thefirst step in Nolen's idea of planning was to study the region's environ­
ment. This gave practitioners a base from which they could "unfold and per­
fect" a community's natural characteristics. Besides satisfying the "love of 
nature and the desire for outdoor life," a plan that more clearly echoed the 
landscape set the pattern for the city's future development.71 Analysis of soil, 
topography, and natural features determined the best sites for intense devel­
opment. By setting aside scenic areas unsuited for building—for example, 
floodplains and steep hillsides—a community could also protect important 
natural resources and make the urban fabric more aesthetically pleasing. 
Nolen recommended that a system of paths and parkways connect public lands 
so that urban dwellers could "enjoy the beauty and wonder of the nature [sic] 
world."72 
After laying out the park system, Nolen designated lands suited for indus­
trial, residential, business, and public uses, based on their function and subse­
quent use and maintenahce. In a section of the city dedicated to industrial 
uses, for instance, it was important to incorporate efficient transport for goods 
and workers. "Foremost among the functions of practical city planning," 
Nolen wrote, "is to arrange a city so that its citizens can live and do business 
there with the maximum of comfort and the minimum of cost."73 By planning 
the different components of an urban system around natural forms, he wrote, 
"It will invariably be found that utility and beauty go hand in hand and are 
virtually inseparable."74 
Nolen also wanted American cities to follow the European practice of pro­
viding municipal improvements to benefit the entire public, not just private 
investors. The Old World presented an impressive array of public buildings, 
city squares and plazas, playgrounds, parks, parkways and boulevards, art mu­
seums, and theaters, all available to the citizenry. Besides giving urban dwellers 
an escape from "the grind and fatigue of the day's work," Nolen believed that 
a beautiful and functional public realm helped expand civic consciousness.75 
Nolen's excursions to Europe convinced him that what he called "collec­
tivization" was an indomitable historical force that had arisen in response to 
the urban and industrial revolutions. In modern urban society, collectivization 
conferred the planning powers local governments needed to enhance the pub­
lic life and protect the common welfare. The striking contrast between cities 
on the two continents resultedfrom Europe'sfifty years of collectivized action 
"to meet the requirements of modern life." Since the 1870s, the collaborative 
efforts of private and public enterprise had furnished a wide array of improve­
ments that left citizens with "a more intimate knowledge of noble examples of 
human life and beautiful products of human work."76 
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Nolen believed that America stood at an important crossroads in the early 
1920s. The nation's technological acuity had revolutionized city building, 
but the forces transforming the country's once graceful agrarian landscape 
followed no guide but profit. Technology had accelerated the urbanization 
process to the point that it was no longer safe, Nolen believed, to leave the in­
tricate details surrounding city building "to chance or speculation or mere pri­
vate aggrandizement." While delegating collective powers to municipalities 
and experts represented a dramatic change of focus in American democracy, it 
was an inevitable response to the profound changes sweeping the nation. 
Planning gave municipal officials the means to educate and motivate people 
who, Nolen wrote, "have stood listless, without the business sense, skill or 
courage to begin a work that must sooner or later be done."77 If America's out­
dated system of urban governance—predicated on "selfish individualism"— 
were to continue, American life would hold little promise. Nolen's New Ideals 
concluded with a ringing denouncement of the country's urban ills, which to 
him clearly indicated the need for planning: "The faults of the street system, 
the ignorant and ugly conditions of waterfronts, the failure to link various 
agencies for transportation, the demoralizing influence of slums—these repre­
sent the neglect of any large planning authority to control and check rank 
individualism and to exercise collective power in the name of the entire 
community."78 
A Test Case in the "Eden of the South'* 
By 1921 Nolen had concluded that it was a hopeless task to replan the Amer­
ican city or alter the patterns of development. The nation's cities were cursed, 
he wrote, "with nearly insolvable social and political problems."79 He was also 
frustrated because most planners, instead of designing a new standard for ur­
ban living, spent their time drawing up zoning ordinances that ensured medi­
ocrity. Nolen had started to explore, he wrote Patrick Geddes, "the beginning 
of a much more hopeful character in the way of planning new communities."80 
After Annie McRae sent Nolen a telegram to retain his services in late 1921, 
he thought that St. Petersburg might be the proper laboratory in which to test 
his theories. 
In February 1922, Nolen signed a $6,500 contract to produce a compre­
hensive plan for St. Petersburg and its environs.81 He immediately hired Frank 
B. Williams, author of The Law of City Planning and Zoning (1922), America's 
first treatise on planning law. Nolen could put Williams's legal expertise to 
good use. He could write both a general enabling act for planning for the state 
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of Florida (which had none) and also legislation that would give St. Petersburg 
control over the platting and planning of the city and county lands slated for 
annexation* In March 1922, Nolen wrote Williams: "I am much pleased with 
this arrangement as an unusual opportunity for you to exercise a good influ­
ence on city planning legislation." "This seems," he confessed, "to be an op­
portunity to do rather more than we have ever been given the chance to do 
before."82 
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St. Petersburg Toddy, St. Petersburg Tomorrow: 
A Model Plan for the Modern City 
If w  e cannot create better urban conditions without changing our pre­
sent methods and instltuYions and controls, we must be prepared to 
change them: To hold that the present means are sacred and untouch­
able is to succumb to a superstitious taboo. 
Lewis Mumford, 1923 
In January 1923, John Nolen wrote Lewis Mumford: "I am enjoying and prof­
iting by The Story of Utopias" which was Mumford'sfirstbook.1 The book was 
especially helpful to Nolen's project in St. Petersburg because it justified the 
criteria he had employed in designing Florida'sfirst comprehensive city plan. 
Nolen's vision of a resort city that followed the lines of a "benevolent Nature" 
represented more than just a blueprint for development. It also incorporated, 
as Mumford noted of all designs for a better life, "a new set of habits, a fresh 
scale of values, and different set of relationships and institutions."2 For St. 
Petersburg to come close to the desirable future Nolen envisioned, the city-
building process would have to change. "One of the problems of the St. Pe­
tersburg of tomorrow," Nolen wrote, "is the adequate control of private 
development The future character of this larger city and its environs... is 
very much a question of what the present generation wishes it to become."3 
St* Petersburg: A Laboratory for Planning 
In the 1920s a tranquil alternation of land and water characterized St. Peters-
burg's subtropical landscape. Clear, temperate waters bounded the city to the 
east, while a mixture of live oaks, pines, palms, and citrus bordered the rest of 
the city. This sublime setting displayed, Nolen wrote, "much the same charac­
ter as that of southern France."4 
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Figure 6 The traditional Cracker frontier home was designed to accommodate St. Peters-
burg's hot, humid climate. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Historical Museum. 
Although it was hardly Nice or Cannes, by 1922 St. Petersburg was be­
coming one of America's favored resorts. An established town of nearly 
20,000, it radiated from a central urban core on Tampa Bay to cover eleven 
square miles. As a result of the land boom the city extended about a mile in­
land, in a progressively less linear and compact form. Thanks to the greater 
mobility made possible by the automobile, subdivisions were appearing next 
to new roads almost overnight. At the same time, the downtown was growing 
upward as two seven-story buildings, the Sumner Building and the Ponce de 
Le6n Hotel, neared completion. These landmarks were the beginning of St. 
Petersburg's skyline.5 
Interesting groupings of vernacular architecture covered the landscape sur­
rounding downtown. The Cracker-style home (figure 6) traced its origins to 
Pinellas's earliest pioneers. This simple, two-story frame house was designed 
for maximum comfort in Florida's hot climate. It sat on concrete blocks for bet­
ter air circulation and to minimize flood damage during the seasonal down­
pours. The wide front porch and many windows provided cross-ventilation, 
while the steep tin roof allowed hot air to be drawn upward. Although the 
Cracker home remained an option, in the 1920s St. Petersburg's prosperous 
middle-class citizens were more likely to build bungalows (figure 7). Larger and 
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Figure 7 The bungalow was part of the American Dream in pre-World War II St. Peters­
burg. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Historical Museum. 
more ornate than the Cracker home, the bungalow with its deep porch, wide 
eaves, and low, overhanging roof gave its residents both shade and ventilation. 
The many windows offered an entrance for winter sunlight, while its roof 
blocked the intense summer sun. Wood floors and stucco walls stood natural 
and unpainted, while the unplastered ceiling exposed structural beams for a 
decidedly different interior appearance.6 
The Mediterranean Revival style (figure 8) was the most elegant (and also 
the most expensive) adaptation to the region's environment. Open court­
yards, tiled roofs, stucco walls, high ceilings, and arched windows and door­
ways were the principal components of an architecture that combined practi­
cality and beauty. The grand homes and lavish hotels embellished with 
secluded gardens, iron gates and grills, open balconies, and hand-painted tiles 
marked the rise of an affluent class. The city's expanded housing stock hinted 
at St. Petersburg's potential, but, at the same time, new development was cre­
ating problems that required immediate attention.7 
When Nolen arrived in St. Petersburg in March 1922, he found a city in 
bloom. Hibiscus, azaleas, camellias, and dogwoods lent the town a special 
beauty, while vines grew, he wrote, "wherever opportunity is afforded and bril­
liant mats of color are produced by such climbers as the purple bougainvillea, 
orange and red trumpet flower, yellow and white jasmine and the golden alla-
manda."8 At the same time, the groves surrounding St. Petersburg permeated 
50 
SI. Petersburg Today, St. Petersburg Tomorrow 
Figure 8 The magnificence of the Soreno Hotel's Mediterranean Revival style captured 
the spirit of the boom years. The hotel was razed as part of the ill-fated Bay Plaza project. 
Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Historical Museum. 
the air with the scent of orange blossom. Besides citrus, Nolen encountered 
"on every hand the fruits of the tropics; mangoes, avocadoes, guavas, papayas, 
bananas and pineapple." 
On March 3, 1922, a crowd of approximately two hundred attended 
Nolen's presentation on city planning at the high school auditorium. The 
slight, mustachioed speaker began by defining his profession as "the substitu­
tion of art, scientific skill, and foresight for chance and a haphazard and piece­
meal procedure." Nolen explained that his plan for St. Petersburg would 
encompass the southern third of the peninsula, because this represented the 
city's "natural boundaries." Hisfirm would analyze the region's topography and 
environment, inventory the existing land uses, and then gather information 
from St. Petersburg's citizens to determine the plan's "controlling purpose." 
While the final product would "properly regulate" the city's growth, it would 
also reflect, Nolen concluded, "the people of St. Petersburg's best impulses and 
highest conceptions."9 
On March 4, 1922, Nolen flew over the Pinellas Peninsula to get a feel for 
the region. He emerged from the plane ecstatic: "What a site for a city!" With 
the peninsula's blend of land and water, there were "few if any situations like 
it in the world Waterfront, almost endless in extent and variety, lakes large 
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and small, with unspoiled tracts of tropical jungle and miles and miles of good 
building land give one the thrill of the possibilities.. . . There is a good rea­
son/* he wryly concluded, "for so many realtors." Since his contract with the 
St. Petersburg Planning Board called only for planning "greater St. Peters­
burg," Nolen asked for a meeting with the Pinellas County Commission to 
draw out a general conceptual plan for the peninsula. This exercise, Nolen 
wrote, would be "relatively inexpensive," and "the advantages in the future de­
velopment of the County and its property would be considerable." In Nolen's 
view, regional planning was the best investment the commission could make 
to ensure future prosperity.10 
The quickening pace of urbanization was closing the gap that had once sep­
arated urban areas from their hinterlands. "Where the country was once 
simply an agricultural region, producing food for cities," he wrote, "it has now 
become, through the use of motor transportation, part of the city." The in­
creasing commuter traffic between cities and suburbs corroborated his opinion 
that "the potential urban possibility is rapidly becoming a reality." Given these 
new circumstances, Nolen felt that regional planning offered the best means 
to design a city and its supporting lands as a single unit.11 
Shortly before Nolen left St. Petersburg, the county commission rejected 
his offer. The consultant, however, could not turn away from the promise the 
peninsula held for future business. In his plan for St. Petersburg he decided to 
include a regional study of planning issues, for example, road connections and 
the acquisition of park sites, that faced both the county and the city. 
Nolen returned to his Massachusetts office with a once-in-a-lifetime op­
portunity. In a profession that gave "too much attention to caring for the mere 
wreckage of society, and too little toward establishing a better social order," he 
could finally design a regionally scaled plan for a city with untold potential.12 
He brought back a cache of materials to work with: Chamber of Commerce 
pamphlets, Van Bibber's report from the Journal of the American Medical Asso­
ciation, the city's official directory, Sanborn maps, the county soil survey, and 
geological maps.13 
During his stay, Nolen had met with key community leaders: Mayor Frank 
Pulver, Herman Dann, president of the Chamber of Commerce, Roy Hanna, 
developer C. M. Roser, and J. R Lynch, president of the Board of Realtors. 
Only one influential figure, Lew Brown, editor of the St. Petersburg Indepen­
dent, chose not to meet with Nolen.14 Aside from Straub, Nolen learned the 
most about St. Petersburg from Perry Snell, a developer, Annie McRae, the 
planning board's secretary, and E. C. Garvin, the director of public works. 
Annie McRae, a quick-witted stenographer and notary public, was St. Pe-
tersburg's resident expert on municipal affairs. In 1915, McRae gained a seat 
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on the Advisory Committee for the National Municipal League. Her writing 
appeared in various magazines, including The American City and The National 
Municipal Review.15 As the planning board's secretary, she corresponded with 
Nolen regularly and also drafted pro-planning editorials for the St. Petersburg 
Times when Straub was out of town. 
While McRae lent her literary skills to the project, E. C. Garvin furnished 
Nolen with valuable technical advice and a list of the numerous problems that 
had accompanied the city's expansion to date. Garvin had found that private 
enterprise, when it had no plan to go by, created as many problems as profits* 
"There is an obvious need," Garvin wrote Nolen, for "the better control of 
property and subdivisions. The absence of control is apparent in many parts of 
St. Petersburg to the lasting detriment of the city."16 
The St. Petersburg Times also looked unfavorably on the way the city was 
growing. While land speculators argued that they could use their property as 
they wanted, Straub countered that the good of the community equaled that 
of any individual. Given St. Petersburg's chaotic expansion, city planning 
could only be an improvement on "the private undertakings being organized 
and put over us constantly."17 He urged citizens to assess the damage the com­
munity "had sustained and will sustain from the lack of a planning power so 
that the work of City Planner John Nolen will be approved and adopted."18 
Like Straub, Perry Snell had an idealistic vision of the city. In 1913 he had 
visited the French Riviera to add to his growing art collection. While there he 
became enamored of the idea of modeling St. Petersburg after Nice, a pleasing 
city of pastels and parkways along the C6te d'Azur. Snell thought the vista 
from Nice's coastal promenade was similar to the view from St. Petersburg's 
waterfront. While St. Petersburg had set aside about the same amount of land 
for beautification as the French city's waterfront park occupied, the scale of im­
provements differed dramatically. St. Petersburg offered a pleasant stroll; in 
Nice walkways curved through a shoreline park artistically landscaped and 
bounded by a broad promenade that ran to Monte Carlo. Designing St. Pe­
tersburg along the same lines as Nice, Snell thought, would make it the cen­
terpiece of an American Riviera.19 
After his return from France, Snell tried to imbue St. Petersburg with a 
subtle Mediterranean beauty. His early work on the municipal waterfront and 
his groundbreaking use of the Mediterranean Revival style made St. Peters­
burg a more interesting and gracious place. Snell had donated a mile of shore­
line to the city, and the elegance of his ongoing projects set a new standard 
for the Tampa Bay region. His plan for Snell Isle blended a Beaux Arts boule­
vard with winding residential streets to create a pleasing pattern for living 
(figure 9). Snell's site plan grouped neighborhoods around amenities, and his 
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Figure 9 During the 1920s, Perry Snell's designs for Snell Isle blended the classical Beaux 
Arts boulevard with curving natural lines. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Historical 
Museum. 
architectural controls and landscaping requirements infused his project with a 
special character. In the 1920s, the graceful contours, quality housing, and 
scenic vistas of Snell Isle testified to the benefits of urban design.20 
Although Straub and Snell dreamed that their city would come to rival the 
great Mediterranean resorts, little had been done to preserve the natural 
beauty that was the foundation for St. Petersburg's future. If citizens failed to 
protect a portion of the region's beaches, lakes, and forests, Straub feared that 
prospective visitors would go elsewhere "to find any semblance of Florida 
scenery in its natural state." "It was for guidance and instruction in these lines 
of beauty and economy," Straub wrote, "that John Nolen was employed."21 
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Designing a Model City 
In producing a plan, Nolen's office followed a well-thought-out process. Nolen 
devoted his time to coordinating the project, writing the text, consulting with 
clients, and promoting the finished product* Philip W. Foster, helped by Irving 
Root and Justin Hartzog, oversaw the design work. Once the members of the 
Nolen team completed their regional and general city plans, they collaborated 
on the more detailed site plans, which covered specific areas of interest. When 
local authorities requested it, Nolen also gave advice on utility placement, road 
grading and construction, architectural design, zoning, and planning law.22 
The Nolen firm devoted special attention to their first Florida plan. While 
Nolen was writing the text and keeping up a steady stream of correspondence 
with the planning board, public officials, and civic leaders, Foster analyzed the 
peninsula's natural environment and mapped a broad conceptual plan for the 
entire county The two collaborated on St. Petersburg's land-use map and on 
a park plan. Frank Williams drafted a platting ordinance, zoning code, and the 
enabling legislation which, if enacted, would grant St. Petersburg the author­
ity to implement Nolen's plan. 
In March 1923 the Nolen firm completed its ambitious project, which it 
called St. PetersburgToday} St. PetersburgTomorrow. In addition to thirty pages 
of text, the document contained zoning and platting ordinances and maps of 
the regional study, the land-use plan, the park plan, and improvements for 
Central Avenue. Although St. Petersburg contained only eleven square miles, 
"the southern end of the Pinellas Peninsula is in reality one topographical 
unit," Nolen wrote, "and could best be developed in that spirit by the adop­
tion of a comprehensive plan for the region."23 Nolen's comprehensive plan 
covered a fifty-five square-mile area that corresponded with the city's plans for 
annexation. 
The Nolen firm pictured the future St. Petersburg as a captivating place 
where urban and natural landscapes converged. The plan hinged on the 
"preservation of the natural advantages that belong to the St. Petersburg re­
gion," Nolen claimed, "and the enhancement of the beauty that already exists 
there." He thought St. Petersburg had the potential to "produce the sort of liv­
ing that will make the St. Petersburg of Tomorrow one of the truly great resort 
cities of our country." The people of St. Petersburg, however, were not moving 
toward this goal.24 
The haphazard outcropping of subdivisions spreading across the landscape 
demonstrated a "ruinous policy of drift with regard to the physical layout of St. 
Petersburg and the surrounding territory." Nolen urged the city to "grasp more 
securely its peculiar opportunity and to take such leadership among the Florida 
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resorts as nature has accorded it." Otherwise, the town would become like 
other resort cities where unplanned growth had "despoiled the natural sur­
roundings and turned what was once an attractive landscape into the most 
commonplace development."25 
For Nolen, the landscape set the parameters for any plan. "The closer a 
town plan adheres to the natural conditions," he believed, "the more original 
and attractive it will be."26 Given St. Petersburg's dependence on tourism, the 
city's need to develop along natural lines represented more than an aesthetic 
yearning; it was a necessity. "Man," Nolen warned, "is the only animal who 
desecrates the surroundings of his habitation."27 
The Regional Study 
Nolen. devoted thefirst section of his plan to the regional study. This work pro­
vided "farsighted planning for a long time ahead," Nolen wrote, "representing 
improvements that will require, perhaps decades for full realization."28 Foster 
used a county soils map to determine which sites were suitable for nature pre­
serves and which for building (figure 10). Soil is a limiting factor for natural 
vegetation. From a soil's characteristics one can draw assumptions about an 
area's drainage capabilities and about the flora it can support. In a swampy, 
coastal area like Pinellas, tropical storms and occasional hurricanes have made 
land with poor drainage and high water tables unfit for intensive building.29 
The regional study map listed seven soil classifications: coastal beach, Nor­
folk Sand, Loam Sand, Parkwood Sandy Loam, muck and swamp, Plummer 
Sand, and tidal marsh. The large concentrations of well-drained, sandy soils in 
the central upland area and near Tampa Bay provided the best lands for urban 
uses. The rest of greater St. Petersburg, about 60 percent of the lower third of 
the peninsula, consisted of swampy lands with poorly drained soils that were 
prone to flooding and erosion. 
As for nature preserves, prices were still low enough, Nolen wrote, for the 
city to purchase properties "peculiarly suited for recreation and at the same 
time not of such a character as to be valuable for building property."30 Most of 
the proposed reserves surrounded wetlands (identified on the regional study 
map as coastal beach, tidal marshes, and swamps) because they had the high­
est water tables and the greatest potential for severe flooding. If the proposed 
nature preserves were placed in the public domain, a greenbelt circling the 
lower third of Pinellas would furnish a natural boundary for Nolen's "St. Pe­
tersburg of Tomorrow." 
The largely vacant barrier islands that bounded Boca Ciega Bay from 
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Figure 10 The Nolen firm's 1923 regional plan used a soil 
analysis to propose preserving flood-prone wetlands and cre­
ating a system of interconnected parks and nature preserves. 
Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collec­
tions, Cornell University Library. 
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Figure 11 Computer projections indicate that when a hurricane descends on the low-lying 
Pinellas Peninsula, damages will be greater than anywhere else in Florida. Courtesy of the 
St. Petersburg Historical Museum. 
Indian Rocks Beach south to Pass-a-Grille especially interested Nolen. While 
Boca Ciega Bay offered the city "wild natural unspoiled beauty," the appeal of 
the beaches was quite different. The offshore isles' great beauty was the result 
of a "long unbroken curve of white sand contrasting strongly with the deep 
color of the waters of the Gulf." In 1923, local builders considered the beaches 
unsafe for permanent residences because of the region's frequent storms. Only 
two years before, a hurricane had leveled beach homes and destroyed the ex­
isting bridge to the mainland (figure 11). Nolen wanted St. Petersburg and the 
other Pinellas municipalities to make the offshore isles public preserves. Once 
residents and tourists were drawn "to the unique and attractive character of 
these islands," Nolen believed, the peninsula would become the eastern 
United States' prime tourist destination.31 
The Comprehensive City Plan 
In Nolen's view the regional study framed the setting, while the more specific 
components (park plan, land-use map, and Central Avenue study) of the com­
prehensive plan established the future city's living patterns.'2 In the park plan 
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Figure 12 In Nolen's plan, a system of parks, parkways, and boulevards provided easy ac­
cess to both recreational and natural areas. Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript 
Collections, Cornell University Library. 
(figure 12), an interconnected series of parks and parkways joined the ring of 
nature preserves encircling the lower peninsula. The proposed park system 
formed a green rectangle of about thirty square miles that ran across the town 
for two miles north and south of Central Avenue. Nolen believed that this 
would encompass the range of development and public improvements. 
The parkways included a series of pleasure drives that bordered the parks 
(which Nolen wanted landscaped with native trees and shrubs) and green cor­
ridors that followed meandering creeks and the Cross Bayou drainage canal. 
Nolen also recommended establishing a series of green squares, similar to Sa-
vannah's park blocks, that would stretch across the city. If the city imple­
mented the proposed park system, all residents would live within half a mile of 
a natural escape. 
Nolen used a mixture of street patterns. A series of axial boulevards led to 
the downtown, which was laid out on a grid. In outlying sections, curvilinear 
roads shaped new neighborhoods around natural contours. Nolen also recom­
mended broadening the intersections of main thoroughfares with green areas 
to improve traffic safety and alleviate the dreariness of continual pavement. At 
major intersections, he envisioned a collection of traffic squares, plazas, and 
small greens. Besides enlivening the urban environment, Nolen thought these 
improvements would make right-angle crossings less dangerous. 
Nolen and Foster made a special study of Central Avenue, the city's princi­
pal east-west connector, and the focal point of retail and commercial activity. 
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Figure 13 Nolen wanted to encourage social interaction and business by giving Central 
Avenue a strong pedestrian orientation. Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript 
Collections, Cornell University Library. 
According to Nolen, Central Avenue set the "straight lines of communica­
tion" for the downtown's heavy pedestrian traffic. "The many seats along the 
street where thousands of people congregate and enjoy the activity of the 
crowd without actually being a moving part of it," Nolen wrote, "is unique and 
one of the distinctive features of the city."33 He wanted to enhance this effect 
by making the avenue more appealing to pedestrians and retailers. Foster de­
picted an improved Central Avenue (figure 13) replete with arcades, plant­
ings, sidewalk seats, balconies, and an excellent view. 
To foster pedestrian traffic, Nolen recommended covering a twelve-foot 
walk with arcades. He also encouraged setting back some new buildings to pro­
vide balconies for outdoor cafe's, businesses that he thought would immedi­
ately prosper. A n eight-foot sidewalk, placed between the street and trees and 
the arcades, would give strollers a pleasant promenade for viewing the boule-
vard's sights. 
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Figure 14 In Nolen's 1923 comprehensive plan, the existing urban areas followed a tradi­
tional grid, but the new suburbs were to follow natural contours. Courtesy of the Division 
of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library. 
While Central Avenue received special treatment, the land-use map (fig­
ure 14) showed what Nolen had in mind for the remainder of the city. "Every­
thing in the proposals for St. Petersburg," he wrote, "is in keeping with the 
character of the topography and environment of the city."34 The proposed 
mixture of urban uses, natural areas, and parks sought to foster congenial rela­
tions, improve recreational opportunities, and minimize land-use conflicts. 
The land-use map depicted three different zoning categories: industrial, busi­
ness, and residential. The accompanying zoning ordinance placed limitations 
on the height, bulk, and setback of buildings in each classification. 
Nolen felt that the placement of businesses played a key role in designing 
any city. In St. Petersburg, it would be possible to concentrate the most inten­
sive commercial activities in the downtown area, just off Tampa Bay, where 
buildings could reach eight stories. A second commercial category was located 
immediately to the west of the downtown retail section and in two other shop­
ping districts. There buildings could reach a maximum of three stories. Sup­
port storage and warehouses would occupy most of the land zoned for 
industrial uses, and Nolen planned that these areas would lie along the rail­
road and near the terminal at Bayboro Harbor. 
The placement of neighborhood commercial centers particularly con­
cerned Nolen. "St. Petersburg has a wonderful opportunity," he wrote, "to 
make this side of civic development as it should be." If clustered at nonresi­
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dential-street intersections, within half a mile of all residences, "these local 
centers with their store groups, churches, clubs, and sometimes schools should 
be the real center of neighborhood activities and should be expressive of the 
life of the people in the surrounding sections."35 On the other hand, if the city 
failed to structure neighborhood centers around focal points, commercial uses 
would sprawl out along the principal streets and create grave traffic and land-
use problems. 
Nolen placed a mixture of apartments and green spaces around the neigh­
borhood centers, except near Boca Ciega Bay and Tampa Bay, where tourist 
apartments and hotels bounded the proposed shopping centers. Nolen be­
lieved St. Petersburg's future as a resort required a special zoning category to 
accommodate tourists and seasonal visitors. He also thought that concentra­
tions of tourist housing would shield single-family homes from commercial 
properties. 
The land set aside for single-family homes covered about half the city. The 
proposed design would ensure that new subdivisions would, Nolen wrote, "es­
cape from the monotony and commonplace character of the gridiron plan." 
He derided the city's existing checkerboard layout as "having all the dreariness 
of the Midwest industrial town."36 He found this especially troublesome be­
cause the city's flat landscape demanded that "variety and distinctiveness be 
injected to break the monotony."37 In the undeveloped sections of St. Peters­
burg, Nolen broke up the grid plan with diagonal and broadly curving streets 
that followed the outline of natural features. He hoped this organic pattern 
would provide the "basefrom which to carry out the more elastic, freer method 
of subdivision" that could transform St. Petersburg into a model city. 
The plan allowed for a variety of lot sizes ranging from quarter-acre to ten-
acre holdings. Nolen placed one-acre estates behind the shoreline preserves to 
enhance property values and provide a verdant buffer. In the territory outside 
the thirty square miles slated for development, the plan allowed for ten-acre 
farms to cultivate "subtropical delicacies such as oranges, guavas, lemons, 
mangoes, and avocados." 
Land-Use Controls 
Nolen anticipated objections to his proposals from subdividers who would de­
mand rectangular blocks because his design did "not produce as many lots to 
the acre and is more difficult to plan and lay out." But a city with St. Peters-
burg's potential "should be less interested in the number of lots it is producing" 
and more attuned to creating "attractive, convenient, well-planned places." 
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The sale of lots or homes in a planned community offered realtors ample op­
portunities; they just needed to change their pitch. Salesmen would have to 
"devote their energies more profitably to the selling of location, than merely to 
the selling of so many feet of property."38 
For Nolen, the ultimate return of the planning process was to give a site 
"location." The value of a lot depended less on its size and more on its sur­
roundings and its relationship to streets, parks, and scenic sites. The plan's 
combination of parks and natural preserves offered countless opportunities for 
developers to create subdivisions where property values would escalate over 
time. Nolen also designed neighborhoods convenient for pedestrians by posi­
tioning parks, playgrounds, schools, and shopping centers within walking dis­
tance of all residences. 
A special section of the plan was devoted to the subdivision issue. Nolen re­
alized that forcing subdividers to follow the plan's guidelines would generate 
controversy, but the public welfare required "some control of private enter­
prises." Many subdividers would undoubtedly try to circumvent the plan, lay­
ing out projects that altered "the lines of travel, the logical flow of traffic, and 
park locations for their own gain." Nolen predicted that subdividers would do 
their best to influence the city commission to pave streets in outlying districts, 
where they owned property, before paving proposed thoroughfares (figure 15). 
This would create "adverse conditions that the purchasers and residents of the 
section would have to contend with probably as long as the city exists."39 
To prevent such abuses, the city planning board would have to monitor the 
city's expansion. While this group's powers would remain purely advisory, 
Nolen wanted the board to make a "rigid examination of (subdivision) plats 
before their acceptance." In addition, the board needed to review requests for 
public improvements or the expansion of utilities. If the board refused a prop­
erty owner's request, individuals could seek remedy from the city commission. 
Nolen also wanted to give E. C. Garvin, the director of public works, addi­
tional leverage in managing the city's expansion. The platting ordinance 
drawn up by Frank Williams installed the director of public works as the su­
pervisor of plats and gave him a seat on the planning board. Although the city 
commission could override Garvin, he would review all proposed plats and 
public improvements. "This proposal," Nolen wrote, "cannot be too strongly 
emphasized."40 The platting ordinance established minimum street widths, 
procedures for street and alley alignment, minimum lot sizes, and easement re­
quirements. It also reinforced Nolen's proposals for preserving natural areas by 
recommending the dedication of properties (swamps, lakes, ponds, and creek 
bottoms) not suited for development. 
The zoning ordinance provided the means to enforce the plan. The 
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Figure 15 Nolen warned that developers would try to alter "lines of travel,. . . logical flow 
of traffic, and park locations for their own gain." This street sign in an orange grove shows 
how accurate his prediction was. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Historical Museum. 
proposed ordinance came from the guidelines set forth in the Standard Zon­
ing Enabling Act, which Frank Williams obtained from the U.S. Department 
of Commerce. Williams converted the Commerce Department's guidelines for 
state legislatures into a special enabling act for St. Petersburg. The New York 
attorney also suggested that a county commissioner sit on the planning board, 
because the plan incorporated county land set for annexation at a uniform dis­
tance of five miles from St. Petersburg's 1922 boundaries.41 
The enabling legislation that Williams drafted for St. Petersburg became 
known as the Planning Law. Since St. Petersburg was not vested with home 
rule, the city commission needed a special act from the state legislature to es­
tablish a planning and zoning ordinance. If the legislature passed this act, a 
majority vote by the city commission would give the city the power to enforce 
a zoning ordinance.42 
The passage of the Planning Law would also abet the city's policy of racial 
segregation. "Like all southern cities," the plan read, "St. Petersburg has its 
colored sections."43 The planning board had received strong direction from 
the city commission to restrict black homes, 17.1 percent of the city's residents 
in 1920, to the southern portion of town. In January 1923, Straub wrote 
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Nolen: "We do not want to zone the colored people by law, we are hoping by 
persuasion and suitable arrangement for them to bring about such corrections 
in their locations as may be found possible*"44 A relieved Nolen replied: "I am 
quite in agreement with your statement about racial zoning." He had recently 
been embroiled in a debacle in Palm Beach, where the desire to establish racial 
zoning was the sole reason that a consultant was contacted. If possible, this was 
one controversy he wished to avoid.45 Although the St. Petersburg plan con­
tained no de facto racial zoning, the proposed industrial districts running along 
the railroad would effectively separate the black neighborhood from the rest 
of the community. 
Selling the Plan 
Nolen anticipated that the city's powerful lobby of realtors and subdividers 
would label the plan impractical and harmful to business. To preempt these at' 
tacks, he explained that the plan would enforce a "businesslike public policy" 
to replace the "haphazard and piecemeal fashion" in which the city furnished 
urban services. Once there was a plan, the Department of Public Works could 
schedule improvements in a way that would reduce costs and confusion.46 By 
dividing the city into land-use districts, the plan would give realtors a better 
idea of a particular property's potential earnings. And the extreme highs and 
lows of the speculative cycle would even out as the land market stabilized and 
began to reflect "genuine real estate values."47 
Nolen also assured the people of St. Petersburg that the adoption of a plan 
would not endanger the city's way of life. "The business of the city," Nolen 
wrote, "isfirst of all to supply the wants and needs of the thousands of visitors 
who come each winter."48 The plan outlined a rational procedure for public in­
vestments in tourism well into the future. As the number of Americans search­
ing for vacation destinations continued to increase, Nolen felt that a city with 
striking subtropical beauty and abundant recreational opportunities could 
only prosper. 
Nolen was eloquent in support of his plan, but the onus of selling it rested 
with the planning board. For city planning to work in St. Petersburg, elected 
officials and civic organizations needed, Straub wrote Nolen, "to work in the 
most complete harmony and agreement possible."49 Straub's most influential 
ally in this project was Frank Pulver, the city's eccentric unmarried mayor. The 
mayor's lifestyle raised a few eyebrows, but his business acumen was invaluable 
to the city. Pulver had made a small fortune in retail merchandising and, un­
like most of the city commission, he had refused the favors tendered by land 
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speculators. A strong mayor, Pulver did not hesitate to push Straub's agenda 
through the ranks of a reluctant group of commissioners.50 
With Pulverfirmly committed to planning, Straub spent most of his time 
lobbying the Chamber of Commerce and other civic clubs with roles in for­
mulating municipal policy.51 Herman Dann, the president of the Chamber of 
Commerce, owned the city's largest building supply store, and he had worked 
closely with the town's leading builders and Straub.52 In November 1922, 
Dann acceded to the editor's persistent badgering and appointed him to head 
a Chamber of Commerce subcommittee to promote city planning. While the 
Chamber could raise thousands for advertising, it allocated no funds for this 
effort, and when Nolen completed his work the group had already disbanded.53 
On March 7, 1923, Nolen informed the planning board that he had com­
pleted his plan for St. Petersburg. A week later, Straub wrote Nolen that he 
had arranged "a large public meeting" for March 29.54 Straub could not have 
had a better person present Florida'sfirst comprehensive plan. Nolen was "un­
surpassed at promoting and producing plans," according to his fellow planner 
Earle Draper.55 After many years in the public spotlight, Nolen had become 
adept at reading an audience. Depending on the circumstances, his message 
might be caustic or inspirational, simple or analytical. His goal, however, al­
ways remained the same: to inspire in his audience the civic spirit needed to 
implement any plan.56 
"A very large and enthusiastic audience greeted John Nolen's lecture," the 
St. Petersburg Times reported, "on the planning to fulfill St. Petersburg's nat­
ural mission to be the greatest tourist city of all the South throughout all 
time."57 Nolen's rhetorical dash, incisive appraisal, and visual aids played well, 
and energetic rounds of applause accompanied his presentation. St. Petersburg 
was unlike most cities, "where the door is closed to city planning." Instead, he 
told his listeners, south Pinellas's vast stretches of vacant land provided a clean 
slate for the construction of a model city. 
The plan for the "St. Petersburg of Tomorrow" surpassed his audience's ex­
pectations. Nolen acknowledged that he had already received some com­
plaints that his vision was too grandiose for St. Petersburg. "But the issues are 
large," Nolen stated, "the population is large and growing, and the wealth in­
volved is large." He explained that the plan's broad regional conception 
sought to accommodate growth while still preserving vital natural resources. 
Maps and drawings depicted a future city where residents enjoyed outdoor ac­
tivities and had convenient access to the services they needed. Although the 
nature preserves limited the amount of land open to development, they con­
tributed to the beauty of the city's setting. To help the audience understand his 
vision better, Nolen showed slides of residential and recreational develop­
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merits in the coastal resort cities of California, Italy, and the French Riviera. 
Because the Pinellas Peninsula's environs equaled—and in some ways sur-
passed—those of such cities, Nolen told the crowd, "Each of the views carry a 
suggestion of the beauty that could easily be achieved in St. Petersburg." 
St. Petersburg had enormous potential, but aside from the waterfront, it had 
as yet few attractions—as soon became evident when Nolen asked the audi­
ence to list the city's features. The community's principal recreational area, 
Williams Park, was overtaxed by the growing populace. Nolen said that, by 
pointing out its shortcomings, he did not mean to "knock the city, but to find 
honestly where we stand. It is no use trying to deceive ourselves. We cannot 
deceive the tourists and visitors who come here."58 
In presenting the regional study, Nolen took special care to emphasize the 
importance of restricting development and preserving lands on the outlying 
barrier islands. He felt that "the lack of control and planning was already de­
tracting from the city's gulf beaches."59 He also advised that the city purchase 
additional public lands in lieu of a proposal by Lew Brown, owner and editor 
of the St. Petersburg Independent, to build a giant pier.60 
Nolen believed that the best investment for attracting tourists was to es­
tablish a system of public preserves, especially on the beaches. To prove his 
point, he included among his slides some of shoreline parks in Monte Carlo, 
Nice, and Santa Barbara. If St. Petersburg followed the example of these suc­
cessful resort communities, Nolen assured his listeners, the community would 
not need a million-dollar pier to draw visitors. His proposal also made eco­
nomic sense because the real estate boom had missed the beaches. In 1922 St. 
Petersburg Beach, a two-mile long barrier island, had been sold for $750,000.61 
After explaining the mechanics of the adoption process and the details of 
the zoning ordinance, Nolen closed his presentation with a familiar charge: 
"The plan must be given the whole-hearted support even of those whom it 
may not immediately benefit. Everyone must cooperate to put it across." 
While it would take years of hard work to implement the plan, Nolen re­
minded listeners that its potential return was extraordinary. He concluded his 
presentation to thunderous applause.62 
Straub was unprepared for the rousing reception that Nolen's presentation 
received. It was "much more than many have suspected." After two decades of 
continual prodding, he thought that the people of St. Petersburg had finally 
grasped the significance of city planning. Nolen's expertise "in this great mod­
ern specialty" could not have come at a more opportune time; in "no city in 
the world can such work be more useful." Straub made a special plea for the 
city's realtors to study the plan closely because they were in the position to reap 
the greatest rewards.63 
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Annie McRae could not match Straub's enthusiasm, as Nolen had admit­
ted to her his disappointment with the plan's reception. Shortly after Nolen 
left, McRae wrote to him: "More perhaps than you are aware, I realized some 
of the difficulties which you have encountered, particularly in presenting the 
plan. I believe your work was thorough, honest, disinterested and sincere all 
through."64 
The audience had not fully understood Nolen's message. When the St. Pe­
tersburg Times published the plan's text and asked for ideas and criticism, there 
was only one response, from C. M. Roser, an influential builder. Roser criti­
cized the plan for failing to address adequately the "disposition of the colored 
population." He wanted a corporation of businessmen to secure a large tract of 
land and supervise the building of "a colored section with schools, churches, 
theaters, good roads, and easy transportation to the business section."65 
Despite Nolen's foreboding, St. Petersburg's civic leaders seemed pleased 
with the vision of a city designed for comfort, leisure, and health. Of course, 
this was the same theme that was given constant play in local newspapers, 
Chamber of Commerce brochures, advertisements, and realtors' promotional 
material Straub and his supporters still needed to persuade residents that plan­
ning offered the means to build the city everyone desired. 
Nolen was well acquainted with advertising and public relations. Two 
weeks after his departure, he wrote to Straub asking him to exhibit St. Peters-
burg's plan at the National Planning Conference (which Baltimore was host­
ing to promote city planning in southern cities). Nolen felt that this plan 
represented an "especially interesting proposal" that "would give wide adver­
tisement to St. Petersburg and its progressive policy for the future."66 A month 
later, however, a disappointed Nolen wrote to McRae asking about St. Peters-
burg's failure to exhibit the plan in Baltimore and the city's inability to meet 
its schedule of payments. Even with the loss of revenue, Nolen could still "take 
satisfaction," he stated, "in the character of the work and in the belief that it 
will benefit St. Petersburg."67 
While McRae understood the need to promote the plan, the planning 
board's energies were focused on getting the Planning Law over the necessary 
legislative hurdles. Despite much grumbling, in early May the city commission 
approved Mayor Pulver's request that Straub lobby the State Legislature for 
passage of the Planning Law. After a three-week absence, the editor returned 
from Tallahassee with Chapter 9915 of The Laws of Florida, the St. Petersburg 
Planning Law.68 
For a local government to impose land-use controls, it had to obtain en­
abling legislation to delegate the legislative or policy-making power the 
Constitution grants each state to establish laws and ordinances that preserve 
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public order and promote a community's general welfare.69 Chapter 9915 
granted these powers to the St. Petersburg City Commission for the expressed 
purpose of "promoting the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the 
community" through the institution of a zoning ordinance. The act also al­
lowed the city commission to regulate development both in St. Petersburg and 
in the land bordering it at a uniform distance of five miles.70 
In early June the city commission approved the bill, but the legislature 
added another hurdle. Tallahassee decided that Florida'sfirst attempt at com­
prehensive planning required a referendum. The city commission set the Plan­
ning Law referendum for the middle of August.71 
Shortly after the city commission's approval of the Planning Law, Nolen 
notified Frank Williams that St. Petersburg's payments were late and that the 
planning board had failed to publish the plan. But Williams, like Nolen, was 
more concerned with the printing of the plan than with badgering the plan­
ning board for payment. He generously forgave the debt and urged the plan­
ning board to use the monies owed him to publish the plan.72 
The city commission never gave the planning board funds to print copies 
of the plan for public review, but on June 10 the Planning Law did appear in 
the St. Petersburg Times. An accompanying editorial urged all citizens to make 
a careful study of the measure as a piece of legislation drafted expressly for St. 
Petersburg. Although the plan would not be published, Straub offered the 
newspaper as an open forum for discussion.73 
Ten days later, Straub resigned from the planning board because he did not 
want the new planning legislation to be perceived as another one of his 
quixotic quests. For the Planning Law to pass the referendum, Straub needed 
more support than he could gain through the St. Petersburg Times. In Frank 
Jonsberg, a gifted local architect, described as a "scholar and artist, and practi­
cal businessman," he found an able successor on the planning board. It also 
helped that Jonsberg was a personal friend of John Nolen's.74 
The Planning Law referendum placed St. Petersburg at a crossroads. After 
three decades, a prospering city had emerged from the Florida wilds. Straub 
and his supporters wanted to temper the pioneering tradition that was build­
ing St. Petersburg. Although portions of the city showed significant improve­
ment, a growing number of ill-conceived projects threatened the community's 
general welfare. Nolen's plan offered the means to deal with these problems 
and build a nonpareil resort city. His supporters, however, faced the unenvi­
able task of trying to sell a system of land-use controls in a town where the al­
lure of quick riches from land speculation ruled over all. 
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The city planning election referendum was as abusive as any ever held 
in St. Petersburg, and that is saying a great deal. 
St. Petersburg Times, 1929 
The power of the so-called Planning Board will be exercised over your 
streets and parks and playgrounds; over all buildings; over all exten­
sions and services: lights, water, gas, sewers, street cars—everything 
affecting your home life. . . , You had better get busy and protect your 
home and your liberty. 
St. Petersburg Independent, 1923 
Despite the support of leading citizens, among them Frank Pulver, Perry Snell, 
and Herman Dann, the Planning Law met stiff resistance from A. P. Avery, the 
city's political power broker. Avery was the president of the American Trust 
Bank and the majority shareholder in the city's largest paving company. He 
feared that adoption of a comprehensive plan would threaten his lucrative 
paving contracts, because the planning board would structure the city com-
mission's outlays on capital improvements. With the aid of Lew Brown, editor 
of the St. Petersburg Independent, Avery's campaign against the Planning Law 
quickly gained the backing of St. Petersburg's powerful caste of realtors. Like 
Nolen, these enterprising salesmen had a vision of the future, although it dif­
fered from his. In their vision of the ideal city, realtors did not sell lots, but pro­
vided admission through the gates of Eden.1 Their paradise, in contrast to 
Nolen's, was based on unbounded growth, not on control. They dreamed of an 
ever-expanding city where profit always followed speculation. 
Regulation and Conflict 
Less than a month after the state legislature approved the Planning Law, St. 
Petersburg faced a major crisis. In late June 1923, word leaked out that the city 
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commission intended tofire E. C. Garvin, the director of public works. Garvin 
had angered the commission by canceling a three-million-dollar paving proj­
ect in an outlying section of the city. He believed it would jeopardize the city's 
finances. The commissioners disagreed and asserted that Garvin had gained 
"too much independence."2 
Garvin retorted that the commissioners wanted him removed because he 
had refused to alter paving specifications for the powerful banker A. P. Avery. 
If he werefired, Garvin claimed in the St. Petersburg Times, the city's paving 
costs would double. The day after his assertion was published, the city com­
mission terminated Garvin's contract.3 
Straub immediately fired off an editorial proclaiming that Garvin's dis­
missal was not just a personal injustice, but a disastrous financial decision. 
Garvin's review of public projects was the taxpayers' only insurance against 
corruption, and his work, as even the city commission admitted, was proficient 
and punctual. But the commissioners did not present any justification for hav­
ingfired Garvin, nor did they explain how a replacement could perform in a 
more professional manner.4 
Frank Jonsberg, the new chairman of the planning board, moved to save 
Garvin's job. He realized that implementing the new plan would be nearly 
impossible without a sympathetic and competent director of public works. 
Jonsberg formed a group that petitioned the city commission to reinstate 
Garvin and secure St. Petersburg'sfiscal health. "Any change in this impor­
tant position," he contended, "would be to the utmost disadvantage of the 
community."5 
Straub and Jonsberg's efforts proved futile. On July 6, 1923, the city com­
mission fired both Garvin and C. C. Brown, the city's second most knowl­
edgeable engineer. E. G. Cunningham, one of the commissioners and an 
influential realtor, took the lead in getting rid of these two men, but refused to 
comment on the proceedings. For Straub, the reason behind thefirings was ob­
vious: Garvin and Brown stood in the way of local businessmen's profiteering. 
"Nothing would or could have come of the Commission's objections," Straub 
contended, "if Garvin had not refused to put aside his own judgment to serve 
the wishes of special interests."6 
The city commission had chosen their time well. Mayor Pulver, Garvin's 
chief supporter, was embroiled in a recall battle and wasfighting for his polit­
ical life. Those who wanted to recall him claimed that the mayor lacked the 
moral fortitude to enforce Prohibition. While this pretext went over well in 
the parlors of St. Petersburg, the real reason behind the recall was protecting 
A. P. Avery's interests. Pulver supported Garvin's efforts to regulate the city's 
expansion, and Avery saw any regulation as a threat to his lucrative paving 
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business. In late 1922 Pulver had survived afirst recall—as he did this one— 
but his political capital was exhausted, and he was unable to save Garvin.7 
Avery was a formidable opponent. Cunning, resourceful, and ambitious, he 
was the consummate politician. He had first come to St. Petersburg in 1892 
and found employment as a baker. With his regal bearing and commanding 
profile, he soon became a powerful figure in thefledgling community. Within 
a few years, Avery moved from baking to a more profitable career in real estate. 
In 1899 he was elected to the city council, and five years later he headed the 
board of trade. After he founded the American Trust Bank in 1910, his polit­
ical star was in the ascendant. Although he served as a city commissioner from 
1916 to 1919 and from 1928 to 1930, his real power rested on his position as 
broker for the local Democratic political machine.8 
The St. Petersburg Times called Avery St. Petersburg's political boss—and 
more than once charged him with instigating "Tammany Hall rule."9 His al­
leged takes from "honest graft" were legendary. During the boom years of the 
early 1920s, Avery worked in collusion with bond houses to pirate funds from 
the city's municipal bond program. He also controlled or influenced most of 
the paving contracts the city awarded. Between 1923 and 1927, Florida's av­
erage cost for paving a one-mile length of road ranged from $8,000 to $47,000. 
In Miami the cost was higher—$95,000— but in St. Petersburg the "Avery 
additive" raised the average cost per mile of pavement to $185,000.10 
Lew Brown, the editor of the St. Petersburglndependent, was in Avery's cor­
ner. Brown had started his career in Louisville, and he came to St. Petersburg 
in 1908 as owner and editor of the Independent. Major Brown (the title he pre­
ferred after organizing a local militia unit during World War I) favored blue 
laws, red-blooded American values, and white Anglo-Saxons. In 1916, he 
earned the title "father of the white primary" after he championed the exclu­
sion of black voters. "When Lew Brown stands up for righteousness," the St. 
Petersburg Times reported at the time, "he strikes out with a force so strong and 
an aim so sure that escape is seldom possible, and he has never struck harder 
than when championing the white primary." When dealing with controver­
sial issues, he constantly reminded the people of St. Petersburg just how far the 
bounds of Christian morality, good business sense, and tradition could, in his 
mind, be stretched. Since his newspaper also served as a voice for A. P. Avery, 
it played a special role in municipal affairs.11 
Avery's chances of making money from his dealings with the city commis­
sion received a huge boost in June 1923, when the state legislature passed a law 
that made it easier for elected officials to provide urban services. The new act 
allowed municipalities to finance sewers, water lines, and paving projects by 
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assessing adjacent land owners. Liens were imposed on the properties that 
stood to benefit, and special assessment bonds (SAB) were issued against those 
liens. The bonds were of particular importance to the myriad subdividers clam­
oring for public improvements, because St. Petersburg had reached its ten per­
cent limit for bonded indebtedness early in the year. The city commission had 
immediately doubled the assessed value of all property to raise revenues, but 
this was only a stopgap measure.12 
The city commission immediately endorsed issuing SAB on the premises 
that the city would continue to show unprecedented rates of growth, and that 
the property owners benefiting from the new infrastructure would pay off the 
bonds. Avery's influence-peddling also persuaded the city commissioners to 
sell SAB. While the American Trust Bank worked in collusion with the bond 
houses, the commission issued thousands of dollars worth of SAB to fund Av-
ery's paving projects. In return for their compliance, Avery paid kickbacks to 
the commissioners. The system was running along smoothly until the Garvin 
episode, which showed Avery that he needed to bring the public works de-
partment's procedures in line with his business practices.13 
In late July 1923, after Mayor Pulver left town for a four-week promotional 
junket in the Northeast, Avery, Lew Brown, and the city commission insti­
gated a coup. The commissioners voted unanimously for Avery and Brown to 
co-chair a committee that would amend the city charter and limit the powers 
of the mayor and his staff. Although St. Petersburg lacked home rule, in 1913 
the state legislature had passed a bill that allowed the city to amend the city 
charter through referenda, provided the city commission format remained in­
tact. The commission set the charter for mid-August, pushing the Planning 
Law referendum back two weeks. 
The charter committee received its strongest endorsement from St. Peters-
burg's staunch anti-Pulver faction, the Prohibitionists. Besides Brown, Avery, 
and four Prohibitionists, the group included three key members of the Avery 
machine: T. J. Heller, the lone realtor on the planning board, James Bussey, 
Avery's attorney, and W. J. Overman, the front man in Avery's paving business. 
On August 12, the committee completed its task, after working "night after 
night," Bussey declared, "without compensation or complaint endeavoring to 
work out a system of laws as would enable this city to keep pace with her rapid 
and remarkable development."14 
Avery's design in altering the charter was to ensure that the professional 
staff, on whom Pulver relied to run the city, would not interfere in his dealings 
with the city commissioners. Under the amended charter, city depart­
ment heads would report to the commission instead of the mayor, and the 
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commission would assume the responsibility for appointing members to auxil­
iary boards. The charter committee also sought to undermine Pulver's position 
by giving the commissioners—not the voters—the right to elect the mayor.15 
The St. Petersburg Times had already warned readers that the proposed 
amendments were a brazen attempt to institute "Tammany Hall Rule." If the 
mayor and the professional staff no longer had much say over spending the 
millions of dollars handled by city hall, the controls on corruption would be 
gone. When a true professional like Garvin had a reasonable amount of inde­
pendence and responsibility in his job, Straub felt, he could resist the effects 
of influence-peddling, minimize wasteful expenditures, and give the people of 
St. Petersburg a better place to live. The proposed amendments to the city 
charter, if passed, would allow "political bosses to gain a greater clinch on 
power in the government of St. Petersburg," Straub wrote, "than Boss Murphy 
of Tammany Hall has in the government of New York."16 
On August 15,1923, however, the amendments passed with 55 percent of 
the vote. Avery had won the stronger position in city affairs that he coveted. 
The Planning Law was now the only obstacle between him and the city trea­
sury. If the Planning Law passed, the city commission's questionable business 
practices would be scrutinized by the planning board. And Avery knew that 
the board would diminish—if not cut off altogether—the steady stream of 
money flowing from the municipal coffers into the American Trust Bank.17 
The Planning Controversy 
On August 21, 1923, eight days before the Planning Law referendum, Lew 
Brown issued an attack (see figure 16) that sparked an internecine political 
struggle. He claimed that the Planning Law imperiled St. Petersburg's version 
of the American Dream by threatening citizens' most sacred rights. "Have you 
read through this act which was slipped through the Legislature?" the St. Pe­
tersburg Independent asked its readers, "If you have not you had better get busy 
and protect your home and your liberty." "The Law of the Czars," a blaring 
headline read, "would be a better name for this proposed measure." Brown por­
trayed the Planning Law as an arbitrary measure that put "despotic power over 
some of the most sacred rights of citizens" into the hands of appointed officials 
who would control "everything affecting your home life." 
Brown believed that government existed to foster the expansion of enter­
prise, and that giving regulatory powers to an advisory board would hinder 
progress. Such a transfer of power seemed especially out of place in a middle-
class haven like St. Petersburg. While "despotic powers" might be necessary 
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THE LAW OF THE CZARS

Would Be a Better Name For This Proposed 
Measure Which You Are Called Upon 
To Vote Next Tuesday. 
Have You Read This Act Which Was Slipped 
Through the Legislature? If You Have Not 
You Had Better Get Busy and Protect 
Your Home and Your Liberty 
Figure 16 The anti-planning forces, supported by the St. Petersburg Independent, realized 
that a city plan would prevent the city from underwriting their outrageous speculations. 
August 1923, St. Petersburg Independent 
"in a big city with its tenement life," he claimed, "in beautiful, happy far-flung 
St. Petersburg it is neither necessary nor advisable to use the lash on the 
people/'18 
Brown's attacks went down especially well with St. Petersburg's realtors and 
subdivides Selling real estate would be close to impossible, Brown claimed, 
"with an autocratic board of snoopers to tell every man just how he must build 
his home, how he can use it and how many people can live in a district." Forc­
ing subdividers to follow a plan would also endanger the real estate market: 
"What red-blooded American citizen would want to buy real estate in St. Pe­
tersburg," Brown asked, "and submit to such dictation?" The editor doubted 
that any "self-respecting man or woman will want to make a home here under 
such surveillance and dictation." According to one realtor, the Planning Law 
was not a question for the voters, but the courts: "We had just about as well 
quit trying to sell property until the court declares null and void this proposed 
law of supervision and dictation."19 
Brown's crusade gained an important ally when T. J. Heller spoke out 
against the Planning Law. The popular realtor, who sat on both the planning 
board and the charter committee, called the Planning Law "so drastic and con­
ferring] such autocratic powers upon the appointed Planning Board that it is 
dangerous to the future welfare of the city." Heller pleaded that he was "not 
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responsible in any manner or form for having this act passed by the Legisla­
ture" and vowed to resign from the planning board if the Planning Law passed. 
Heller's denunciation seemed to corroborate Brown's assertion that the 
Planning Law was the tool of a "vicious and dangerous political junta" aided 
by outside forces. In a xenophobic diatribe, Brown reminded voters that 
the Planning Law's "drastic powers" were "drawn by a New York lawyer [Wil­
liams]," and that Nolen had received $8,000 for drawing up a plan that "no 
sane person would expect to be carried out." The planning board intended to 
retain these outsiders, Brown warned, to "make and change rules and regula­
tions, hold trials, keep records, and control all city development." "In short," 
the St. Petersburg Independent charged, "it creates a political junta of dictators 
with state law authority over the city." The prospect of a New York lawyer and 
a Boston planner running the Florida city's affairs was even more appalling, 
according to Brown, because Straub had left town before the election.20 
Exactly why Straub chose to leave at such a crucial time is uncertain, al­
though poor health is the most plausible reason. In the humid summer 
months, the bronchial condition that had threatened his life twenty years be­
fore troubled him anew. He usually escaped to the upper Midwest in the sum­
mer, but in 1923 he was scheduled to make a trip to southern California in 
mid-August, immediately after the original date of the referendum. Because 
the city commission did not change the date of the referendum until late July, 
there was little time for Straub to change plans.21 
Straub, however, did not retire from the field until he had laid the ground­
work for the Planning Law's defense. The St. Petersburg Times printed the 
Planning Law during the summer, and Straub wrote editorials explaining both 
the plan and the accompanying legislation. He made it especially clear that 
the Planning Law did not endow the planning board with drastic, sweeping 
powers. "It gives the city plan board," he wrote in June, "power only to com­
pel the observance of city planning ordinances, after their enactment by the 
City Commission." He also noted that the official plan and the zoning code re­
quired public review and approval from the city commission.22 
Besides providing a public forum for discussion of Nolen's work, Straub also 
kept in touch with the plan's supporters. When opposition intensified, the St. 
Petersburg Times published an editorial that Straub had written in California, 
while "recuperating from his daily work." The only way for the planning board 
to wield "any 'drastic' powers," Straub contended, was for the city commission 
to enact "'drastic' ordinances for the board's guidance." The Planning Law 
specified that elected officials, not advisory board members, were the final ar­
biters in the planning process. Taking the proposed legislation "for what it is, 
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and not what the uninformed or prejudiced may say it is/' Straub concluded, 
"there is no reason in the world why any good citizen should oppose it."23 
Annie McRae, meanwhile, continued to work for passage of the law. On 
August 4, she wrote Nolen that while only a "few, small derogatory criticisms" 
had been leveled against the proposal, she expected much worse to come. "I 
want to ask you quite urgently," she wrote, "to give me some assistance in the 
way of suitable printed matter to bring the advantages of planning before 
the citizens." She would edit anything he sent her for the St. Petersburg 
Times, "whose columns are entirely openfor anything I wish published." With 
Nolen's help, McRae vowed to make sure the Planning Law received a fair 
hearing: "I hope you see, Mr. Nolen, that I am writing you frankly, and that you 
will be quite as frank replying. I am not interested in this matter except that, 
as one citizen, I hope our townspeople may realize what this opportunity 
means to them and will have the good judgement to avail themselves to it."24 
Nolen was attending an international planning conference in Sweden, so 
his young associate, Justin Hartzog, responded. He sent eight articles for 
McRae to use in her editorials: "The Expense of City Planning," "Cooperation 
Essential to City Planning," "The Relation of City Planning to the Man in the 
Street," "The Scope of City Planning," "The Need of a City Plan," "The Pur­
pose of a City Plan," "Public Opinion and City Planning Progress and Legisla­
tion," and "City Planning Authorities." Within a week, Frank Williams also 
forwarded a report describing the origins and makeup of St. Petersburg's plan­
ning and zoning legislation.25 
McRae countered her foes' attacks by portraying the planning referendum 
as a contest between pragmatic moderns and outdated reactionaries. "There 
are individuals who absolutely do not believe in the modern movement called 
city planning," McRae asserted, "just as there are those who do not believe in 
the new theology, or modern government methods, or that civilization has 
made any progress in the last few generations."26 She cited a recent govern­
ment report, which had found that more than fifteen million people in the 
United States were living in planned cities. Sadly, too many cities had plan­
ning forced upon them, McRae wrote, "because they found themselves mired 
in a swamp of perplexity from which they could only be delivered by sane zone 
laws." As a young city, St. Petersburg could escape the fate of other cities; but 
because of its rapid growth, there was little room for error. No city was grow­
ing faster than St. Petersburg, and according to McRae, if Nolen's work were 
rejected, "no city faces a greater confusion and disorder." She foresaw immi­
nent disaster if some means were "not adopted to forestall the chaos which 
poorly planned developments are leading us into."27 
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If the proposed legislation passed, McRae believed, the planning board 
would be able to limit the corruption and waste that had vitiated the city-
building process. With Nolen's plan in hand, the board could guide St. Peters-
burg's expansion in a more efficient pattern by serving as a clearinghouse when 
it came to spending public funds.28 To help voters understand the origins of the 
Planning Law, the St. Petersburg Times reprinted the federal government's 
guidelines that Frank Williams had followed in drawing up St. Petersburg's 
planning legislation. McRae explained that the Planning Law resembled laws 
in effect in Atlanta, Washington, New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, but 
she wondered whether St. Petersburg would take its place among the "pro­
gressive cities of the nation or delay."29 
Other voices spoke up as well. Garvin argued that the Planning Law offered 
the only means to help St. Petersburg rectify its chaotic municipal affairs. 
"Civilization imposes limits to property rights of the individual for the protec­
tion of the whole." Unfortunately, Garvin had learned the hard way that civ­
ilized behavior and rapacious subdividers were incompatible. "The Planning 
Board will need considerable moral courage," he warned, "when trying to show 
a prospecting subdivider the wisdom of building after a plan."30 
On August 28, the day of the referendum, the Kiwanis Club sponsored a de­
bate on the merits of city planning between A. P. Avery and Roy Hanna, 
Straub's longtime ally. Hanna argued that a comprehensive system of land-use 
controls provided the only method for the "intelligent guidance" of the city's 
expansion. Avery did not bother to show up.31 
Although Avery never engaged in debate, his views received ample play in 
the St. Petersburg Independent. On referendum day, Brown alerted readers: "If 
you have not done your duty as citizens, do it now." The Independent's devo­
tion to exposing the purported Machiavellian schemes of the pro-planning 
forces was, Brown wrote, "a matter of duty." He called on the people of St. Pe­
tersburg to protect "the future welfare of the city." "If you have not yet voted, 
do your duty before the day's sun has set."32 
Voters followed Brown's directive and sent the Planning Law down to a 
crushing defeat. Out of 1,072 ballots, the Planning Law received only 138 
(12.9 percent). The St. Petersburg Independent thanked voters for their "noble" 
performance. "There can be no mistaking the fact that the people of this city," 
Brown wrote, "can recognize a dangerous political scheme even when it is well 
disguised." To Brown, the result of the referendum proved that "autocratic and 
arbitrary rule" was "contrary to the free-spirited sentiment of the Sunshine 
City."33 It also guaranteed that the city commission would continue to line Av-
ery's pockets. 
After surveying the wreckage, planning advocates were able to salvage 
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some hope. Despite the reversal, "those seeking some measure to control un­
scrupulous builders and developers and to provide some machinery to beautify 
the city and its natural environs," McRae wrote, "were not totally disheart­
ened." She attributed the loss to her opponents' "personal prejudices and 
ignorance," not to any fundamental error in the Planning Law. She recom­
mended that the St. Petersburg Times initiate a new campaign of "reconcilia­
tion and education" to prepare citizens for the eventual adoption of a city 
plan.34 
Straub had a more difficult time reconciling himself to the outcome. The 
travel-weary editor returned within a week after the election. The vote, he 
sadly noted, "was the loss of the city and it was a serious loss," because St. Pe-
tersburg's chaotic growth demanded "intelligent and systematic control and 
guidance." Those responsible for the Planning Law's defeat had won a Pyrrhic 
victory, postponing the inevitable to their own detriment. Eventually St. 
Petersburg would have to "meet and solve," Straub predicted, "the more im­
portant civic problems the city planning law would have enabled it to under­
take now."35 
Despite the loss of this golden opportunity, experience had taught the cru­
sading editor that to achieve anything worthwhile meant working through op­
position, delays, and setbacks. Straub had encountered this cycle of events in 
his recent trip to Los Angeles: "Los Angeles grew into a sizeable city before 
'finding herself and she is afflicted with many ugly mistakes St. Petersburg can 
avoid."36 Despite the Planning Law's defeat, St. Petersburg could still escape 
the problems that plagued Los Angeles—if citizens reformed the city-building 
process. But before too much time passed, the people of St. Petersburg must, 
Straub wrote, "turn their thoughts from groundless alarms to the inception and 
the encouragement of plans that will hasten the day of the great city."37 
While Straub continued to write about the urgent need for planning, the 
idea remained foreign to most. Although some of the city's leading citizens 
were in favor of it, the planning campaign never gained broad community sup­
port. As Pulver explained to Nolen, "The planning proposition goes over 
heads of the people." Pulver urged Nolen not to take the loss personally; the 
referendum disaster was typical of citizens' response to progressive initiatives. 
Pointing to himself as an example, Pulver lamented, "I am on my third re­
call. .. by the same bunch fostered by Brown and their political henchmen."38 
The enthusiasm for the Nolen plan evaporated once realtors and subdi­
viders realized that a comprehensive plan meant a regulated real estate mar­
ket. Turning against the Planning Law, they became its most vocal critics, and 
their power in city affairs ensured the initiative's defeat.39 While members of 
St. Petersburg's various civic clubs deliberated "gravely upon an unending 
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number of transitory, incidental, and trivial matters," Straub wrote, they shut 
"their eyes to the basic fundamental conditions and problems." This was espe­
cially difficult for Straub to accept, because the Rotary Club had first placed 
city planning on the public agenda in 1921. In 1923, however, the Rotarians 
did not even address the issue.40 The Chamber of Commerce showed "no more 
interest in the whole matter," the St. Petersburg Times reported, "than [in] 
shooting a rocket to the moon."41 
The planning board's inability to publish Nolen's plan hurt the Planning 
Law's chances in the referendum. Without a document to study—a document 
whose publication should have been funded by the city commission or the 
Chamber of Commerce—it was hardly surprising that the townspeople "fell so 
readily," Straub wrote, "for the atrociously false political campaign."42 
Even if the plan had been published, it probably would not have convinced 
enough voters. Brown's demagoguery was tailored to his audience, which was 
bedazzled by new riches. The huge profits they were reaping from land sales 
made the dream of an unregulated, ever-expanding city perfectly credible to 
many. Adopting a plan to deal with dangers in the distant future offered noth­
ing to speculators making easy money in the here and now. When the major­
ity is content with the status quo, Americans typically refuse to face problems 
with alarming long-term consequences.43 
During the boom years, St. Petersburg's developers and promoters were loud 
in their praise of the promises of growth, prosperity, and profit—all of which 
they believed would be unending. With thousands of dollars being made buy­
ing and selling vacant land, only a courageous soul would advocate regulation. 
"The subdividers and promoters had more or less power and authority," Jons­
berg, the planning board chairman, wrote Nolen, "which would have had a se­
rious influence in any attempt which I might make to put the plan through in 
its entirety."44 In St. Petersburg, supporting the Planning Law constituted 
heresy: "I would have been deemed a traitor to both city and state had I in any 
way indicated my position on the matter."45 
The Expansive City 
City planning ran counter to the assumptions on which St. Petersburg's new 
prosperity was based, namely, that property rights were sacrosanct, that land 
served the individual owner's economic interests, and that government ex­
isted to further—not inhibit—free enterprise. Most citizens were too busy 
angling for returns on their investments to care much about corruption or ex­
travagant government expenditures. Unhampered by planning regulations, 
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speculators heaped up riches, denying that there were limits to growth. The 
city's horde of realtors and subdividers believed that the real estate boom 
marked the beginning of everlasting prosperity, and that St. Petersburg would 
inevitably become one of the world's great resorts. For those who were uncer­
tain about the future, it was comforting to know that "the so-called 'boom,'" 
as one journalist, Charles D. Fox, wrote, "will last forever, for there can be no 
let-up to the development of a state which offers so much to so many classes of 
people."46 The future was bound to be prosperous, so there was no reason to 
plan: One only needed to believe. "St. Petersburg is the tale of a magic 
Utopia," one booster claimed, "a city of magic growth and immeasurable rich­
ness of future. The Florida foundations were already there... . Faith was the 
only requirement."47 
Well-advertised building projects helped further the Utopian vision of St. 
Petersburg. In 1923 the city's first million-dollar hotel, the Vinoy, opened to 
an astounded audience. This exclusive establishment occupied twelve acres of 
waterfront property in the heart of downtown. The Vinoy's lavish architecture 
included Moorish arches, tiled cupolas, and Georgian ballrooms, and the ho­
tel was host to such varied celebrities as Calvin Coolidge, Babe Ruth, and 
H. L. Mencken.48 The response to the Vinoy's opening seemed to justify St. 
Petersburg's almost mystical financial optimism: "What does this era of mil­
lions mean to St. Petersburg? Simply St. Petersburg is no longer a gamble, a 
speculation or a vision unrealized. Today St. Petersburg is a reality and the 
reality is dreaming a new dream with an almost certainty of realization."49 
Although substantial building took place in downtown St. Petersburg, the 
real estate boom as a whole rested on a fragile foundation of promotion, spec­
ulation, and myth. Speculation fueled real estate sales; the belief in an unend­
ing boom fueled speculation. The boom was "unexpected and unrelated to 
anything," John Rothchild writes, "an Orphic delirium that swept across the 
state, entrancing the people, forcing them to speculate wildly in real estate and 
to buy swampland."50 Neither good sense nor large amounts of cash in hand 
were prerequisites for buying land. Thousands across the state mortgaged the 
future to profit in the present. Investors approached "speculative mysticism" as 
they ignored reality and bought property solely in the belief that its value was 
predestined to increase. "Money was so easy to come by" for the St. Petersburg 
developer Walter Fuller and other investors, "that no one saved... everybody 
was spending—why worry?" "It became an accepted fact that all one had to do 
to make money was to buy land . . . and you could double your money in 
a year."51 
Florida laws encouraged speculation, and buying and selling land, with its 
get-rich-quick allure, dominated state affairs. During the 1920s, enough land 
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was subdivided in Florida to rehouse the entire population of the United 
States. This occurred at least in part because title searches and the recording 
of deeds were considered formalities and often postponed. In addition, option 
buying, through "binders," fueled tremendous increases in the price of land. A 
binder—five percent of the selling price—held a piece of property for thirty 
days, with no restrictions on the number of times it might be resold. In a 
month, dozens of transactions might take place on a single binder, yielding a 
profit to each investor. Although little cash changed hands, such deals pro­
duced a speculative profit- that inflated property values far beyond what the 
market could actually bear.52 
The realty business was a game of financial legerdemain. Most investors 
were not interested in developing land, but in turning it over for quick profit. 
Investors purchased binders for immediate sale; the last buyer was responsible 
for future payments. People rushed to profit now by ignoring tomorrow in a 
gamble that almost everyone in St. Petersburg seemed willing to take. 
In 1925, six thousand real estate agents were registered in St. Petersburg. 
Binder holders, or "binder boys," waited in droves at train stations, ready to sell 
their services. An Illinois journalist wrote that everyone "want[ed] to get in 
the game and buy something and take a chance on the future, along with other 
boosters." Even retirees became "inoculated and succumb[ed] to the urge for 
activity."53 Buying and selling went on at such a frantic pace that, "salesmen 
nearly ran over each other in their mad efforts to sell lots." According to Wal­
ter Fuller, "The Boom was not an urge to retire to a pleasant cottage or bask in 
luxurious villas or seaside hotels. It was a greedy delirium to acquire riches 
overnight without benefit or effort, brains or services rendered."54 
Throughout the state journalists, public officials, and business leaders 
worked to transform the speculation into reality.55 St. Petersburg's Chamber of 
Commerce assured newcomers that they would experience the "promise of 
prosperity and growth."56 One booster claimed that the dream of the Sunshine 
City was "coming true because the city of sunshine and birds andflowers has 
chosen to be clean of heart."57 Perriton Maxwell was even more effusive, link­
ing Florida's newfound prosperity to the myth of Aryan superiority: "The 
movement is no boom; never forget that. It is no bubble, to swell and gleam 
for an instant and then burst and vanish. It is a manifestation, a recurrence of 
the racial instinct to migrate, to penetrate new frontiers. Mountains and rivers 
and endless prairies never have halted the migrations of the Aryan races in the 
past.. . and will not halt this latest migration."58 
St. Petersburg's boosters preached a civic religion that proclaimed the won­
ders of Florida generally—and their hometown specifically. But unlike true re­
ligions, this one had no eschatological aspect: With the riches funneling into 
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St. Petersburg, the city's boosters were already experiencing heaven on earth. 
All they needed to make their heaven last was to lead others there.59 
Like other communities committed to boosting, St. Petersburg based its im­
portant communal decisions more on wishful thinking than on reality—and 
more on conviction than on reason.60 The diligence with which St. Petersburg 
was boosted as the "Sunshine City," the "Tourist Metropolis," or "Florida's Best 
City" was an attempt on the part of the business community to attract in­
vestors and make money. But individuals' fervor and unquestioning commit­
ment to their city showed that more was at stake here than profit. Local 
enthusiasts, like Lew Brown, historian Ray Arsenault writes, "devoted their 
lives to the cause of boosterism."61 If you were a St. Petersburg booster, Brown 
would remind his readers, "You will have to be up before 7 a.m. and here is your 
program for the rest of the week.. ,"62 
Citizens' perseverance in boosting St. Petersburg brought the real estate 
market into the city's public, private, and religious institutions. No matter the 
setting, the message was always the same: Growth and expansion were ab­
solute goods, because they generated prosperity. Religious leaders equated a 
church's physical expansion with its spiritual growth. Under pretext of pro­
viding winter tourists with a place to worship, churches went far beyond their 
means in building impressive new structures.63 
Fearing that his congregation was sliding into apostasy, because it lacked a 
commanding edifice, the Reverend W. A. Hobson, the minister of Grace Bap­
tist Church, the city's largest, exhorted his congregation to display its faith by 
building a larger temple. Hobson, who was president of the Florida Baptist 
Convention, used the Old Testament to legitimize his call for city building and 
preached a message offire and brimstone. He took Isaiah 54:2 as his text: "En­
large the place of thy tent, and let them stretch forth the curtains of thine 
habitations; spare not, lengthen thy cords, and strengthen thy stakes." Hob-
son announced that the church had not kept pace with the city's growth. 
Grace Baptist was "out of harmony with its environment" and faced "the ne­
cessity of readjustment."64 
Hobson pleaded with the faithful to contribute to the building fund in or­
der to keep from backsliding. "A backward church had no place in a progres­
sive city; unless it is awakened and becomes alert it will be eliminated by the 
momentum of progress." Institutions, he believed, were the expressions of 
ideals, and he warned parishioners that if they fell behind the "progressive 
movements in the growth of the city," their church would become "an incubus 
on the community and a burden to the commonwealth." To prevent this ca­
tastrophe, Hobson invoked "sound business judgment and a spiritual vision." 
In his peroration, he echoed the boosters' theme: "Since this church was 
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erected St. Petersburg has grown by leaps and bounds and property values have 
multiplied into the millions. No man need come to this land of Flowers, this 
paradise of leisure, of beauty, of natural resources, and financial opportunity 
and go away any poorer in health and wealth."65 
Hobson's homage to the sales pitch exemplified the kind of faith that bound 
the people of St. Petersburg. Although he paid lip service to ideals, what Hob-
son really wanted was a large, modern church building. Such a building would 
prove beyond a doubt that Grace Baptist Church was a dynamic and progres­
sive force in St. Petersburg. The physical building—quite aside from any ques­
tion of what went on inside it—would affirm the sacrifice made by the 
Reverend W. A. Hobson and hisflock to St. Petersburg's most cherished belief. 
The people of St. Petersburg were rarely affronted by such blatant appeals. 
Instead, they felt that their desire to build a new Eden bound them together. 
The community's unprecedented growth had created a void between tradition 
and modernity. The community's continual self-glorification depicted the 
land boom as the outcome of a rational series of events that would lead to an 
even more prosperous future. However hollow St. Petersburg's zealous boost­
ing may appear now, such behavior was hardly out of the ordinary. During the 
1920s Americans went to great lengths to recapture the sense of community 
that mass culture was systematically destroying.66 
During the 1920s, Americans enjoyed the rewards of prosperity, but they 
were searching for more. As the role of church, school, and family in forming 
values weakened, individuals increasingly turned to the mass media, consum­
erism, and boosterism for emotional nurture. Whether in St. Petersburg or in 
Middletown (1929), a seminal study of Muncie, Indiana, during the 1920s, 
people were trying to cope with a new set of values. In both places, compulsive 
club-joining, boosterism, and an insistence on conformity marked attempts to 
establish an equilibrium between the communal rites of the past and the com­
bination of freedom and homogeneity that defines modern life.67 
In Middletown, Robert and Helen Lynd described an "increasing sense of 
strain and perplexity" as the populace saw their "ideals and behavior patterns 
collapse."68 Unlike their counterparts in Indiana, the people of St. Petersburg 
seemed immune to this modern uncertainty. The communal perspective in St. 
Petersburg was one of irrepressible self-confidence. Whether it was because of 
the voluminous advertising in the city's newspapers, the threefold population 
increase infive years, the plethora of million-dollar real estate deals, or Mayor 
Frank R Pulver parading down New York's Broadway during midwinter dressed 
in white from straw hat to vanilla oxfords, it seemed that the Sunshine City 
had solved the cultural dilemma of the 1920s. In an anxiety-ridden age, St. Pe­
tersburg claimed that it was an outpost of tranquility, a place where people 
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knew "the Secret of getting the most out of life." Life was "more than drudgery 
and existence," the Chamber of Commerce contended. "Here men have 
learned how to combine healthful living conditions with rare advantages for 
material advancement and mental and spiritual enrichment."69 
Blessed by Providence and the powers of nature, the people of St. Peters­
burg believed they were chosen people* They could, as they thought, hold to 
their laissez-faire beliefs and still enjoy a life of wealth and leisure. A city of 
dreams in the heart of Eden did not need to plan for the future; its destiny was 
certain. A prosperous future merely depended on "the touch," as one subdi­
vider put it, "of the magic wand of capitalism and enterprise."70 
The End of a Dream, the Institution of Planning 
The child of St. Petersburg remembers a wilderness of scrub pine and 
palmetto brush at the edge of town. There were rusted fire hydrants, 
ornate streetlights overgrown with vines, old brick streets half sunk in 
sandy soil, some railroad tracks, as if the area had been prepared for 
civilization and then abandoned quickly, as the Maya had abandoned 
their temples. This was not a ruin of the Spaniards, but of the earliest 
developers. 
John Rothchild, 1985 
William Straub refused to be deterred by the disastrous results of the Planning 
Law referendum. In the St. Petersburg Times, he ran a series of editorials ex­
tolling the virtues of city planning, on subjects ranging from women's impor­
tant role in the process to how a comprehensive plan would enhance property 
values. Other editorials illustrated the pitfalls and nuisances that could have 
been avoided with a city plan. Streets failed to intersect, roads were paved at 
different grades, important natural features were lost, and two houses were 
built on one lot—and these were just some of the problems besetting the city.1 
Straub described the planning referendum as "a public calamity, the most 
unintelligent vote ever known in St. Petersburg." The Department of Public 
Works, proceeding according to no plan, was plagued by cost overruns, delays, 
and inefficiencies. The disbursement of public funds was speculative at best 
and corrupt at worst. In 1924 alone, the sale of SAB (Special Assessment 
Bonds) nearly doubled the bonded public debt, which went from $3.8 million 
to $7.5 million. Straub feared that the city would bankrupt itself unless a plan 
was adopted.2 
Planning was, to Straub, the only means to bring order to St. Petersburg's 
chaotic finances. Aesthetics was no longer his watchword; instead, the incen­
tive became good business sense. "City planning," he wrote, carried a "degree 
of commercial success and profit that makes it in reality a * business proposi-
tion/"3 Slowly, this pragmatic approach began to draw supporters. 
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The work of Frank Jonsberg, the former chairman of the planning board, 
aided Straub's endeavor. In August 1924, Straub persuaded the Chamber of 
Commerce to form a city planning committee. The group elected Jonsberg 
chairman and Walter Fuller vice chairman, and the two worked diligently to 
educate the community about the merits of planning. 
By November the new committee had begun to have some success. Election 
Day brought in new city commissioners who were ready to revisit the planning 
issue. Although Pulver was no longer mayor (Brown's third recall was at last 
successful), the city commissioners who had thwarted him either declined to 
run or lost. In December the new commission appointed Commissioners Reed 
and Snyder to study the feasibility of implementing a city plan. They returned 
a favorable verdict, and in May 1925 the city commission appointed Straub to 
lobby the state legislature for another planning act.4 
By 1924 Florida had awakened to the idea of city planning. After Sarasota, 
Clearwater, Jacksonville, St. Augustine, Gainesville, and Fort Myers had 
signed contracts with hisfirm, Nolen opened a branch office in Jacksonville.5 
These municipal governments hired Nolen because their planning commis­
sions lacked both expertise and resources. And without a general state en­
abling act, each city had to get its own planning law from the legislature. This 
process proved especially troublesome, so Straub helped out by forming the 
Florida City Planning Association. The group elected him chairman of the 
legislative committee, and he coordinated the drafting of a general state plan­
ning act that went to the legislature in 1925. Rural legislators killed the ini­
tiative in committee, but Straub immediately organized committees to write 
bills for each city interested in planning—including St. Petersburg. All of the 
measures passed.6 
St. Petersburg's new legislation, like the 1923 Planning Law, allowed the 
planning board to design a comprehensive plan for the "conservation and 
preservation of the public, health, safety and general welfare." An amendment 
stated that the city could hire consultants as needed. In contrast to the 1923 
legislation, which had to be put to a referendum, the new act could be ratified 
by a majority vote of the city commission. In June the city commission voted 
unanimously for the act, and a month later it appointed afive-member plan­
ning board that included Jonsberg, Straub, and Fuller. At the planning board's 
first meeting the members voted to rehire John Nolen.7 
In August 1925, John Nolen received the following telegram from Straub: 
"Political problems smoothed out and administration behind us. Public inter­
est at this time requires your personal presence."8 Nolen signed a $6,500 con­
tract to draw up a comprehensive plan and a zoning ordinance. At the same 
time, he informed the planning board that he could not devote his personal 
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attention to St. Petersburg, because his firm held contracts with more than 
thirty municipalities across the state.9 Nolen was also president of the Ameri­
can City Planning Institute (ACPI), a position that came to occupy a good 
portion of his time.10 
Justin Hartzog, a junior planner in the Nolen firm, received the St. Peters­
burg assignment. After discussions with the planning board, Hartzog agreed to 
update Nolen's earlier plan. On August 21, 1925, Hartzog wrote Nolen that 
"work was progressing" and that he was "receiving cooperation from practi­
cally everyone in St. Petersburg." After the 1925 elections, however, this spirit 
of harmony died. One of the new commissioners, Scott Serviss, wanted to 
break with Nolen because he feared that adopting a plan would depress the 
real estate market. He asserted that planning hardly constituted a science. 
With the city's rapid growth, "If we make a plan today," he reasoned, "it will 
be no good tomorrow."11 
Serviss was voicing the sentiments of A. P. Avery. "Our friend [Avery]," 
Straub wrote Nolen, "is of course putting everything in our way he can and has 
one member of the city commission with him who causes endless delays."12 
Avery vowed that he would remove from office any commissioner who voted 
to execute the agreement with Nolen.13 
Cowed by Avery's threats, the city commission pressed the planning board 
to ask for a less ambitious plan than Nolen's. Shortly after the November elec­
tion, the planning board informed Hartzog that he should not update Nolen's 
earlier plan. Instead, they requested that he draw up a plan with "simpler pro­
portions," analyzing no more than the land within the existing city bound­
aries. In addition, the board wanted Hartzog's analysis to focus only on the 
physical mistakes that impaired city building.14 
Before the city commission's capitulation to Avery, Nolen had intended to 
exhibit Hartzog's plan at the National Planning Conference, scheduled in St. 
Petersburg for spring 1926. Nolen decided to bring the nation's planners to the 
Sunshine City, he wrote Straub, "because of the leadership St. Petersburg has 
among Florida cities in city planning matters."15 Not only was he seeking to 
stimulate interest in planning in St. Petersburg and throughout Florida; he 
also wanted to announce his new vision for the state.16 
The 1926 National Conference on City Planning 
Nolen realized, as city planning historian Mel Scott wrote, "that if ever a state 
needed help in avoiding mistakes and profiting by the experience of areas with 
some history of planning, it was Florida."17 Instead of serving as a model for ur­
The End of a Dream, the Institution of Planning 
ban America, Florida had become an epitome of bad taste. Without a system 
of land-use controls, a crowd of disconnected subdivisions cluttered the land­
scape, and the state's natural resources had suffered from wholesale destruc­
tion. After working in Florida for four years, Nolen believed that Florida 
needed to install a comprehensive system of planning more than any other 
state.18 
In late March 1926, two hundred planners arrived in St. Petersburg—in-
cluding Nolen, Olmsted, Unwin, Harland Bartholomew (a leader in the new 
field of traffic engineering), and Robert Whitnall (the chief planner for Los 
Angeles). St. Petersburg had changed dramatically since Nolen's first visit 
four years earlier. The population had doubled, to 40,000, and although 
countless lots were being sold in the hinterlands, the most intense building 
had been downtown.19 The Snell Arcade, Perry Snell's monument to the 
Mediterranean Revival movement, anchored the developing skyline. St. Pe­
tersburg had also expanded into Tampa Bay after voters approved a million-
dollar bond to build the giant pier of Lew Brown's dream, now approaching 
completion. At the head of the pier stood the Casino, a two-story architec­
tural wonder distinguished by a large central atrium and an open-air ballroom. 
The Casino, together with the Soreno and Vinoy Hotels, gave the St. Peters­
burg waterfront an elegance unimaginable a decade earlier. A monumental 
skyline, two grand hotels, a booming real estate market, and an unmatched 
spirit of boosterism furnished an interesting backdrop for a meeting of Amer-
ica's city planners.20 
Frank Jonsberg opened the proceedings with a warm welcome. For years he 
had revered city planners "for the way in which with a few lines of pen and a 
few deft strokes of a brush they can transform a 'just-growed' Topsy town into 
a superlative quintessence of metropolitan perfection." Local planning com­
missions, however, remained responsible for "effecting the miracle as best they 
can." While they were armed with a plan, they lacked "the blandishments of 
counsel and advice of city planners." He urged his listeners to help their clients 
learn the trick of striking a compromise between those looking to the past and 
"visionaries who cherished fondly fluttering hopes of a civic perfection that 
could only be attainable through Divine inspiration." In their task, planners 
needed to proceed "if not with wisdom, at least with common sense." 
Jonsberg also furnished a few hints on how to deal with the locals. He 
warned anyone considering the purchase of "one of our wonderful sand lots, 
teeming as they are with humus, nitrates, phosphates and red bugs," that 
St. Petersburg's realtors were unequaled in their powers of persuasion. For 
those "walking in the darkness of ignorance regarding lots there is always a 
real estate man ready to take him by the hand and lead him into the light of 
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understanding." "Like the lion and the lamb, they will lie down together— 
and in a little while one of them will get up and go to work again."21 
Olmsted spoke on the planning of resort communities, calling on planners 
to assess carefully the relationship between the natural environment and 
tourism. He recounted how many once fashionable resort cities "were stran­
gled by the results of their own popularity." Their pleasing character stimu­
lated a growth "so rapid and so unregulated that it ran wild destroying the 
qualities that originally made the resorts attractive." Olmsted stressed pre­
serving unique natural features "for the maintenance of pleasurable qualities." 
While providing open space and public landscaping would create beauty, the 
planner's real task was to create a good working relationship with the private 
sector. Olmsted encouraged planning commissions to oversee the approval of 
building plans through property covenants. Such covenants would ensure that 
both the developer and the public agreed to incorporate beauty in new pro­
jects. Olmsted also thought that covenants would benefit the public by pre­
venting the issuance of zoning variances.22 
In his presidential address, "New Communities to Meet New Conditions," 
Nolen delivered the outline for his forthcoming treatise, New Towns for Old. 
Because America lacked any meaningful urban models, he wanted the United 
States to construct planned new towns similar to English garden cities. "The 
old simplicity and charm of American villages and towns have largely disap­
peared," he told his colleagues, "but a new form of urban beauty has not yet 
taken its place." The construction of new towns could also guide America by 
making certain that modern city-building techniques respected the beauty of 
the landscape. Despite Florida's many faults, Nolen still clung to the hope that 
the state could serve as a showcase for urban planning.23 
The new era of leisure had pushed Florida's economy to record heights, but 
the accompanying wave of urban expansion did not have to ravage the land­
scape. The success of Coral Gables was an excellent example, Nolen noted, 
"that beauty draws more than oxen." George Merrick had proven that strict 
architectural controls and site planning could create pleasing living environ-
ments—and healthy profits. While many subdivisions offered facades that 
simulated the feeling of Coral Gables, few developers followed a plan. Nolen 
proposed that local and state officials should work with the private sector to 
build an interconnected system of new towns. Florida could channel its 
growth into "an harmonious expression of new city ideals" by designing urban 
environments that reflected "topographical and climatic conditions." 
But before such an enterprise could proceed, the state government needed 
to regulate the location of future towns and cities. To Nolen, "the uncon­
trolled growth of cities is the problem that gives gravest concern today." He 
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wanted the legislature to adopt a plan for the state that would set guidelines 
for regional and city plans. With the aid of the state, local governments could 
then guide their own growth, and the private sector could invest in building 
new towns.24 
Mrs. Robert Seymourfleshed out Nolen's proposal in her address, "A State 
Plan for Florida." Mrs. Seymour, a resident of Miami, had worked with both 
John Nolen and Patrick Geddes. In 1923, after having been elected president 
of Florida's Federation of Women's Clubs, she organized a conservation pro­
gram to promote state-mandated planning at the county level She wanted 
county seats to serve as centers for a radial system of parks and highways that 
local planning commissions would design. Such a radial system could connect 
the state. Once this process was initiated, she felt citizens would find innova­
tive ways to enhance their locality's "heritage, landscape, and character." Play­
ing to her audience, she claimed that Florida was "a place that cries aloud for 
engineers and artists and landscape architects who will work together." She 
challenged the convention to pass a resolution calling for mandatory planning 
in Florida. If "we have the recognition," she concluded, "then we can go to our 
men of wealth in our organizations and get support."25 
Gordon Whitnall, the director of the Los Angeles Planning Commission, 
commented that "through the idealism that has been expressed by Mrs. Sey­
mour," Florida held the "germ of an idea which must come to fruition."26 Sey­
mour, however, failed to get the endorsement she wanted. Instead a general 
resolution was passed encouraging all states interested in planning to consult 
the standard planning and zoning enabling act prepared by the U.S. Depart­
ment of Commerce.27 
While a directive to promote a special agendafor Florida never passed, the 
conference did help to lessen St. Petersburg's antipathy toward planning.28 
The conference had covered a range of issues that might help "the rapidly 
growing cities of Florida avoid the mistakes and profit by the city planning ex­
periences of municipalities elsewhere."29 This assemblage of "erudite, aloof, 
exalted, campus-looking personages," as one reporter described the planners, 
looked quite respectable, and hardly seemed the type to perpetrate any rabid 
governmental excesses—in spite of Lew Brown's claim to the contrary.30 
The developer Walter P. Fuller, the planning board's effusive vice chair­
man, also used the conference to help calm fears. Fuller, a local hero and for­
mer star athlete at the University of North Carolina, was trusted by many 
realtors. In a special meeting with the Realty Board, he assured those as­
sembled that the planning board did not possess any "mysterious power." As 
an advisory board, it could only review land-use issues and make recommen­
dations. According to Fuller, his board wanted to prevent the numerous 
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"physical mistakes that impaired the welfare of both builders and the commu­
nity." At his urging, the Realty Board passed a resolution supporting the plan­
ning board.31 
With the publicity gained from the National Planning Conference and the 
support of the Realty Board, St. Petersburgfinally seemed ready to experiment 
with city planning. But all talk of planning was abandoned when Florida's 
great real estate boom collapsed. 
The Bust 
By 1924, the heavy speculation in Florida real estate had drawn the attention 
of the leaders of America's financial institutions. Eastern and Midwestern 
bankers became concerned when depositors started withdrawing their savings 
to buy land in Florida. Although prominent banks in Ohio issued dire warnings 
about the dangers of "wildcat land speculation," customers continued to chan­
nel their funds into Florida real estate. In Cleveland, after banks reported that 
clients had transferred over $80 million to Florida, the director of the state's 
Department of Commerce, Cyrus Locher, went south to investigate. On his re­
turn, he advised outlawing the sale of Florida property in Ohio. He alleged that 
Florida's development was a farce: "They are only building a few houses and a 
few roads and the whole population seems to be engaged in subdividing land 
into lots and selling them." Shortly thereafter, Ohio enacted "blue sky" laws, 
which prohibited certainfirmsfrom selling Florida real estate in Ohio.32 
By mid-1925, the national press had begun a campaign of Florida-bashing. 
Journalists and businessmen on both coasts—and in the middle of the coun­
try as well—produced a steady stream of criticism. Some of their accusations 
were legitimate. Investigations by the National Better Business Bureau turned 
up a number of fraudulent land schemes and illegalities in the sale of bonds. 
But Los Angeles journalists' claims that life in Florida was only a pale imita­
tion of the good life enjoyed along the Pacific Coast were born of jealousy, not 
concern.33 Regardless of the motives behind it, however, anti-Florida rhetoric 
appealed to a public tired of hearing about the state's wonders. People stood 
back to await Florida's downfall34 
Governor John W. Martin tried to reverse the anti-Florida trend by calling 
a meeting in New York to discuss the "Truth about Florida" with America's 
leading publishers. An impressive entourage of the state's city builders and land 
barons, including George Merrick, Blanton Collier, and Paris Singer, accom­
panied the governor. Afterward Martin called the meeting an unqualified suc­
cess and encouraged similar endeavors to counteract "scurrilous propaganda."35 
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Figure 17 Even when the boom turned to bust, the people of St. Peters­
burg believed a lecherous Uncle Sam would always court the beautiful 
Miss Florida. Note the flower denoting Miss Florida and the "1926 Build­
ing Program" in the swirl of her skirts. March 1926, St. Petersburg Times. 
Florida's editors, bankers, realtors, and public officials hastened to assure 
America that the state's economy was still strong. Although the frenzied pace 
of buying and selling land was undoubtedly slowing, the state's growing tnu* 
nicipalities, they said, had laid the foundation for long-term prosperity.36 Now 
that modern technology had put Florida in touch with the rest of the nation, 
the state had begun "sowing the seed," the New South journalist Richard Ed' 
monds wrote, "for a great harvest in the future."37 
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This campaign to maintain Florida's image was not limited to oratory. The 
state moved to end fraudulent speculation by licensing realtors and restricted 
the sale of the binders that had helped fuel the real estate frenzy. The state cut 
the life span of a binder from thirty to ten days, increased their cost, and re­
quired public officials rather than investors to update title abstracts. A Better 
Business Bureau was set up to field complaints and track false advertising in 
out-of-state newspapers. The state also started to regulate prices of hotel 
rooms, which fluctuated wildly during the winter season. These efforts proved 
quite successful, and by early 1926 Florida was receiving considerably less bad 
press. But, at the same time, real estate sales remained sluggish.38 
In late summer and autumn 1925, a series of setbacks had a crushing effect 
on the state's economy. The East Coast Line dramatically cut service in Au­
gust to repair damaged track, and only food, livestock, and perishables were al­
lowed into Florida. By late October, every rail line in the state had followed 
the East Coast Line's example. Builders, unable to secure necessary materials, 
had to make immediate layoffs. Many projects were left unfinished; others 
never even got started. When the slowdown ended the following April, 
Florida's building industry was in a severe depression.39 
The threat of investigation by the Internal Revenue Service also discour­
aged speculation in land. During late summer 1926, rumors began circulating 
that agents planned to audit returns showing profits from real estate. The pos­
sibility of a tax reduction in 1927 also pushed some investors to push property 
sales to the new year. After the stock market dipped in February and March, 
speculation in Florida real estate dropped precipitously, and by July the great 
Florida land boom had ended. "The world's greatest poker game, played with 
building lots instead of chips," Stella Crosley wrote in The Nation, "is over."40 
While the rest of America accepted the demise of Florida's real estate mar­
ket, the people of St. Petersburg could not. A. R Avery even assured citizens 
that St. Petersburg was embarking on a new and more orderly period of ex­
pansion and prosperity. "St. Petersburg," he told the community in March 
1926, "is rushing into its greatest period of abundance." The "boom hysteria" 
was over; the city's financial institutions would continue to exhibit the "sound 
and conservative judgment," he maintained, "that had built St. Petersburg."41 
In mid-March 1926, the Realty Board announced that St. Petersburg was 
still safe for investors. According to the board, realtors' interest in community 
affairs outweighed their desire to make a sale. As proof, they were buying prop­
erty in order to spark a new era of "prosperity and stable investment."42 Ac­
cording to the board's president, N- G. Pearce, the market was entering an 
even more prosperous phase, as the closing of less reputable operations gave 
"real buyers" better opportunities "to make real profits."43 
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Throughout 1926, the city's newspapers gave running accounts of the 
record activity in private and public building. Headlines announcing big real 
estate deals made it seem that the market was as healthy as ever, but this was 
an illusion. Investors who had bought real estate between 1922 and 1924 made 
their final payments in 1926. All these final payments created a flood of con-
veyances—and a spurious impression of vitality. "The distressed purchaser 
knew in his heart he was sunk," Walter Fuller wrote, "but hoped a brave front 
would bring a buyer."44 Properties were not now being sold to eager northern 
speculators, but to local citizens who purchased them at record high prices. 
These investments demonstrated the triumph of faith over logic. As Fuller ad­
mitted, "We became the suckers."45 
The vast public works program rested on an equally shaky foundation. 
Since the majority of municipal projects were financed through SAB, the mil­
lions of dollars going into paving, street lights, and sewers in no way reflected 
the city's economic health. Improvements continued regardless of the prop­
erty owner's ability to pay, because municipal officials had signed contracts 
with bond houses and with Avery's bank.46 Despite a mushrooming public 
debt, realtors depicted the municipal improvements as a sign of St. Peters-
burg's economic vitality. In spring 1926, realtors used the 122 miles of new 
streets under construction and the $25 million building program to assure in­
vestors "that every dollar here is worth 100 cents and that the growth of the 
city has only fairly begun."47 Throughout 1926 and into 1927, the city com­
mission spent millions of dollars building public improvements in outlying ar­
eas. By the end of 1927, the city had a road system capable of serving a 
metropolis six times its size.48 
This tremendous feat in city building rested on the premise that an influx 
of tax-paying property owners would come to St. Petersburg, build homes, and 
pay off the municipal debt. The construction of sewers, roads, and sidewalks in 
the hinterlands was also promoted by a very few, who became very rich. In 
mid-1927, "when the economy was as dead as a salted mackerel," according to 
Fuller, Avery started paving streets to open up thousands of lots for develop­
ment. This scheme was "about as useful as a pair of skates would be to a legless 
man," Fuller wrote.49 
Despite all the optimistic predictions, in late spring 1927, St. Petersburg 
was a harbinger of the nation's approaching economic collapse. After mort­
gaging their future to build a great city, the city's inhabitants stood on the 
verge of ruin. In 1923 the city had a bonded indebtedness of $3.8 million; four 
years later, it had soared to $23.7 million—and the interest on it was a high 6 
percent. SAB constituted more than $12 million of the debt, and any hope 
that it might be retired ended when the bottom dropped out of the real estate 
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market. Not only had land values plummeted; the liens on the hundreds of va­
cant properties that benefited from the improvements were worthless. When 
the SAB matured, the city was stuck with these liens. During the next three 
years, St. Petersburg had the second highest per capita debt in the nation— 
Atlantic City held the dubious distinction of being first—but St. Petersburg's 
taxpayers were far less able to assume the burden.50 
In the spring of 1927, an investigation by the Realty Board found city hall 
sunk in corruption. The board's report condemned the paving awards as "the 
greatest source of public waste and extravagance." The municipal government 
had wasted huge amounts of money on " Avery additives." It had also signally 
failed to coordinate the work of its departments, resulting in duplication of 
work and useless expenditures.51 
After the Realty Board released its report, Straub argued that St. Peters-
burg's runaway debt and Avery's piracy called for major reforms. "How much 
longer," he asked, "are the taxpayers of St. Petersburg going to pay tribute to 
the paving combines?" He proposed the adoption of a new charter that would 
put a city manager in place. Then a professional could work with elected offi­
cials to solve the city's problems.52 
Straub's challenge went unheeded. The people of St. Petersburg were still 
too dazed from the economic collapse to plan constructively. Their earlier self-
confidence and assurance had been replaced by confusion and disorder. While 
Avery and his cronies were making the most of the situation by raiding the 
municipal treasury, the newly impoverished were stealing sidewalk tiles from 
abandoned subdivisions to make a living. Walter Fuller, who had made and 
lost a fortune during the boom years, survived for the summer from "the flower 
pots I dug up from my own abandoned nursery and sold at $2.00 a thousand."53 
On the outskirts of town, deserted homes, unfinished subdivisions, and roads 
leading nowhere were stark reminders of people's mindless pursuit of wealth. 
Without a common goal, the community began to splinter. Most of the 
leading go-getters had to borrow money to get out of town. By the end of 1927, 
15,000 people hadfled St. Petersburg.54 The realtors who remained were sub­
ject to almost constant ridicule. The Realty Board pleaded that they should 
"no longer be made the 'butt of jokes' and saddled with all blame for the ills of 
the county, state and city."55 While the blame for the city's woes was fixed, 
civic leaders continued toflounder as they tried to stabilize affairs. 
In 1927, the city's financial woes snowballed. In an effort to escape paying 
taxes, outlying neighborhoods decided that they wanted to invalidate St. 
Petersburg's annexation. Other citizens simply refused—or were unable—to 
pay.56 In spite of the threat of a tax revolt, Avery's machine held its grip on city 
hall. After milking the city treasury for twenty years, Avery was not about to 
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surrender without a fight.57 But even during this inauspicious time, Frank Jons­
berg was trying to convince property owners that they needed a comprehen­
sive plan. 
The Hartzog Report 
After a year and a half of countless meetings, the planning board was still at an 
impasse. In January 1927, Jonsberg apologized to Nolen for not having sent 
Hartzog the data he needed to draw up a zoning plan. Practically every subdi­
vision contained a large business section, because lots zoned for business com­
manded the highest prices. Although the chance that these business sections 
would succeed—or even be built—was almost nil, lot owners wanted to hold 
on to their precious commercial classification. St. Petersburg had enough com­
mercial areas, Jonsberg wrote Nolen, "to accommodate the entire Union, in­
cluding Alaska and our possessions in the South Sea Islands."58 
In late January, Jonsberg informed Nolen that the planning board could not 
even reach a tentative agreement with landowners. Jonsberg wanted to ignore 
the zoning issue and just present the city plan for adoption. Although he re­
gretted having to make such a decision, Nolen concurred: "The Zone Plan can 
wait," he informed Jonsberg.59 But after conferring with Whitnall, the Los An­
geles planner, Nolen wrote to Jonsberg again in March. Nolen now believed 
that, unless many of the city's proposed business sites were eliminated, the plan 
would offer little. "I don't know how far you and I," he confided, "can save the 
situation."60 
In early April 1927, Jonsberg received a forty-page report, a platting ordi­
nance, a minimum housing code, and a land-use map from Hartzog. A zoning 
ordinance was also included in case the commercial zoning issue was resolved. 
This plan paled in comparison to Nolen's 1923 work, but the planning board 
had asked for a less ambitious work, and Hartzog complied. It was a superficial 
endeavor that offered sound advice but little vision. Even the plan's title was 
changed to indicate the shift in emphasis. St. Petersburg Today, St. Petersburg 
Tomorrow had given way to A Report on City Planning Proposals for St. Peters­
burg} Florida,61 Hartzog recommended that it was time for a "firm belief in 
sound public finance and timely action." His report provided solutions either 
to solve or to prevent problems, and afforded the opportunity "for the public 
to take an account of stock, to unhurriedly and wisely plan ahead, to acquire 
the land necessary for public improvements and municipal projects, and to be­
gin with confidence the systematic execution of the city planning proposals." 
Hartzog concentrated on solving existing problems and improving the 
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city's layout. He proposed removing eyesores like the downtown railroad and 
undertaking new civic projects, including an expanded airport and a new civic 
center. He also included the code for minimum housing standards and a plat­
ting ordinance to improve building practices. Traffic planning was a major pri­
ority, and Hartzog set up a road system with three classifications: main arteries, 
intermediate thoroughfares, and local streets. The system would funnel traffic 
from narrow local streets into the wider intermediate and arterial thorough-, 
fares. The secondary thoroughfares were undivided roads between 80 and 100 
feet wide; arteries were divided roads between 100 and 120 feet wide, includ­
ing a planted median. Hartzog recommended that the city concentrate com­
mercial properties in shopping centers on principal arteries, locate apartments 
on secondary roads, and place single-family houses along the tertiary streets. 
The beaches created particular problems for transportation. The 1927 plan 
differed from its predecessor, which had recommended preserving the barrier 
islands for public use. Hartzog found that the "great difficulty of the beaches" 
lay in their inaccessibility. To remedy this situation, he recommended con­
structing a new causeway and running an electric trolley to the beaches. The 
report, however, failed to mention the most appropriate land uses along the 
Gulf, an area still largely undeveloped. 
Hartzog reiterated Nolen's earlier recommendation to create a comprehen­
sive park system. Given St. Petersburg's reliance on tourism, "Much contro­
versy and waste of enthusiasm and energy can be avoided," he wrote, "if a 
policy of park acquisition and maintenance is adopted." In determining the 
best use for the city's land, the preservation of "an interesting bit of woodland, 
lake, or lake country" was often the "most economic means." Hartzog felt that 
the city needed at least two large parks, at Saw Grass Lake and Papy's Bayou, 
and a parkway system to connect them to the waterfront. A parkway system 
could be built without significant expense if the city commission gained title 
or easements to the floodplains surrounding drainage canals and creeks. Hart­
zog also proposed a "bulkhead line" specifying the boundaries for coastal fills. 
This boundary would limit dredge-and-fill operations to areas contiguous to 
the existing coastline. If reclamation were not confined, it would cause "an un­
happy situation on the shore line through the excessive and illogical building 
out into the water." 
One portion of the plan received much more attention than its predeces-
sor—citizen participation. Although St. Petersburg was in possession of the 
necessary enabling legislation, the city commission would not adopt Hartzog's 
report until the planning board convinced skeptics that the new plan would 
not hinder property investments. But Jonsberg had already been trying to 
reach a consensus with property owners contesting land-use designations for 
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more than a year, without success. Hartzog recommended that the city hire a 
full-time planner. Otherwise, "the plan is likely to be pigeon-holed, and the 
time and money put into the first degree stages of the work wasted."62 
Building a New Consensus 
Nolen asked Jonsberg to have the Hartzog report printed so that he could ex­
hibit it at the National Planning Conference in Washington. He wanted St. 
Petersburg's plan to back up the regional plan his office had drawn up for 
Tampa Bay. Such a study had been "needed for some time, because growth has 
been taking place in an unguided manner." Nolen had undertaken this work 
on his own, and he thought that the region's cities would support it. Nolen also 
wanted Jonsberg to critique this project before the Washington meeting.63 
The beleaguered Jonsberg had no time to spend on another planning pro­
ject. The city commission owed Nolen's firm $1,000, and it refused to release 
funds for printing the plan, especially as, at this low point in the city's history, 
the public was hostile to almost any government action. "We are all familiar 
with the political situation in St. Petersburg and are particularly anxious," 
Jonsberg wrote Nolen in June, "to avoid furnishing any ammo for any possible 
enemy of the city plan to use for the possible destruction of all our work by an 
appeal to the thoughtless voter along the lines of 'economy.'" Lew Brown had 
taken special offense because he believed that" 'Mr. Nolen was trying to make 
a job for himself for life.'"64 
The planning board decided to manage the planning process on its own. 
While he understood Nolen's desire to see the plan implemented, "We who 
are in the first line trenches and continually on the defensive," Jonsberg ex­
plained, "feel that we are right in our contention that the best way to escape 
trouble is to side step it whenever possible."65 Nolen appreciated Jonsberg's 
honesty and he thought that "a frank statement of the necessity for city plan­
ning" would appeal to residents' common sense. In July 1927, Hartzog con­
tacted Jonsberg and was shocked to find that further agitation over politics and 
retrenchments had jeopardized the plan. "It seems like a perilous time to sub­
mit any new ideas, but we have perfect confidence in your diplomatic skill to 
guide the planning program through successfully."66 
In mid-August, Nolen returned from an extended visit to England and the 
Mediterranean coast with a new outlook on the situation in St. Petersburg. 
"All the world wants more comfort and beauty and pleasure," he wrote Jons­
berg, "and an escape from the harshness of modern cities and cold climates." 
Nolen assured his friend that St. Petersburg could "help supply what the world 
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wants, and could profit greatly by it." After having revisited the English gar­
den cities and the French Riviera, Nolen was distressed to see S t Petersburg 
squandering its potential "City planning has got to be prosecuted by the 
people of the city and the whole city government with more vigor and gen­
erosity." It might be "alright [sic] to pray for guidance, but we must do more/1 
" Trust the Lord/ " Nolen advised his friend, "but don't fool with him."67 
Jonsberg replied at once. He had taken Nolen's advice to heart, but he could 
not act on it at this time. "Our citizens and city commission are faced with so 
many concerns and perplexities," he wrote, that, "for me to attempt to project 
our city plan into this atmosphere would spell disaster." Once the city had ac­
quired a degree of stability, he promised to pursue a more aggressive policy. He 
reassured Nolen that the city would adopt a plan— "provided we do not be­
come too urgent."68 
Although it was a painfully slow process, Jonsberg felt that the people of St. 
Petersburg werefinally seeing the need for city planning. "You may think that 
I am slow in putting forward our city plan but there were reasons which I 
hardly dare[d] give utterance to sooner."69 During the furor over thefirst plan, 
Jonsberg feared that he would have been permanently ostracized if he had 
strongly supported Nolen's work. Now, however, the "overlords of the Boom" 
were subjected to ridicule, and the time was ripe for a plan. "The vaporings of 
such of these men as are left among us could have no possible effect," Jonsberg 
noted, "and to my mind this relieves me of the more serious antagonistic as­
pect which I felt we had to combat."70 
While Jonsberg was writing to Nolen, Straub was describing the new dis­
position of the populace in his newspaper. The demise of the "orgy of unre­
strained greed and speculation" had brought, he wrote, a "new spirit of 
thoughtful restraint." Citizens seemed to realize that fantasy could not build a 
city. "It would be well for St. Petersburg folks to forget for a few years their 
dreams" and discard their "fictitious values based upon speculative greed." 
Straub claimed that those not willing to disown the "Golden Calf," were "trai­
tors to the community."71 To build a stable foundation for the future, residents 
would have to acquire a "respect for those things of life which are not bartered 
for by money."72 
Straub's idealism had a strong appeal, because the bill for the city commis-
sion's profligate spending had at length come due. By the end of 1928 St. Pe-
tersburg's bonded debt had reached $28 million, and the city had suffered its 
first bank closing—with more to come. Audits found that various banks had 
had questionable dealings with the city commission, and people's trust in their 
municipal government decreased daily. The growing financial distress illus­
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trated "the utter folly of neighborhood and crony government," Fuller wrote, 
"by a hit and miss group of councilmen."73 
As the struggle over governmental reform continued, Nolen became more 
and more bewildered. He returned from Europe, anxious to revisit St. Peters-
burg—yet the city seemed so backward. He wrote Jonsberg, "Whenever we 
think of the planning work done for St. Petersburg, we always think of the 
understanding of yourself, Walter Fuller and several others; but at once comes 
the reaction that there are hundreds of others who don't have that under­
standing. . .  . That situation disturbs us. Can't something be done about it?"74 
St. Petersburg reached a turning point in spring 1929. On March 31, the 
city commission unanimously adopted Hartzog's plan, but without a zoning or­
dinance the plan was no more than good intentions.75 Although the Nolen 
firm had sent the planning board a zoning ordinance, any hopes of passing it 
vanished when A. P. Avery announced his candidacy for the city commission. 
If elected, Avery could be expected "to thwart and kill the plan."76 
Avery's candidacy—he had not run for office for thirteen years—was a last-
ditch attempt to hold onto power. "I do not need a platform," he claimed, "the 
people know that I stand for the best interest of St. Petersburgfirst, last and al­
ways." He announced that he would straighten out civic affairs and return St. 
Petersburg "to economical and sane growth."77 The St. Petersburg Independent 
was quick to sound the praises of its favorite son: "The election of A. P. Avery 
will insure a sound and efficient administration, an improved moral condition 
that will not permit freedom to con men, booze-dealers and other criminal 
characters and also insure the open transaction of the people's business so the 
people may know what is being done."78 
The St. Petersburg Times responded by attacking Avery's candidacy as a "re­
turn to the old story of political machinations in city hall."79 Although Avery 
breezed into office, he no longer had enough political clout to rescind the city 
plan, and shortly after the election, his bank folded. When the auditors fin­
ished their report in August 1929, Avery's public career was at an end. The au­
dit showed that the bank lacked sufficient collateral to cover its loans, and that 
its owner had been falsifying records for years.80 
With the express purpose of recalling Avery from office, two LaFollette Pro­
gressives, F. S. Hammond and S. V. McCleary, formed the Progressive Club. 
Hammond, once an Avery supporter, was dumbfounded by what had hap­
pened. "Mr. Avery fooled me," he stated, "Mr. Avery's the only man who ever 
fooled me." Avery's efforts to tie up the recall election in court only prolonged 
his sentencing. A new era was dawning. "As soon as we get rid of Avery," Mc-
Cleary announced at a Progressive Club rally on the day of the recall election: 
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"We want to take hold of the political situation in the city and clean it up. We 
are tired of ring rule and we want you people to rid the city of this rule and in 
voting out A. P. Avery today you are destroying the head of the ring who has 
ruled for more than a quarter of a century."81 
On December 30, 1929, Avery was recalled from office. He showed little 
remorse; in fact, the longtime power broker seemed glad that it was over. "He 
had nothing to worry about," the St. Petersburg Independent reported, "since 
(he had not spent a nickel' on election day in any attempt to get out a vote 
for himself," With his thrifty career in politics over, Avery moved to Panama 
City, where he soon regained his Midas touch and made a small fortune in real 
estate.82 
Avery may have managed to prosper, but St. Petersburg went into default 
when it failed to meet bond obligations in May 1930. With Avery gone, and 
the cityfinances in ruin, the city commission established a committee to reor­
ganize the municipal government. The group, led by Straub,finally drafted the 
new charter, instituting a city council/city manager form of government, that 
he had been asking for for years. The state legislature endorsed the bill in 
spring 1931, and the city's voters approved it in July. 
Wilbur Cotton, the new city manager, came in under almost the worst 
imaginable circumstances. In 1925, St. Petersburg had had ten banks with 
over $46 million in deposits, but by June 1932 there was a single bank—with 
$116,749.83 Cotton was dumbstruck by what the bonds had financed: "The 
city had been expanded in area so that the present city could easily care for a 
population ten times its present size of 40,000. Many improvements cost more 
than the reasonable value of all the properties that benefited from these 
investments."84 
Nolen, meanwhile, was baffled by the city's failure to print the planning re­
port. Planning would never get anywhere if it could not even take this first 
step. St. Petersburg had "halted at the brink twice," he wrote Jonsberg. "Let's 
go over it now if we can."85 On May 31,1930, the day St. Petersburg defaulted 
on its loans, Jonsberg informed Nolen that the city was on the verge of col­
lapse. With St. Petersburg's dismalfinancial situation, "it would be inadvisable 
to spend money or give any opportunity for argument among the thousands of 
distressed citizens who are walking around with a chip on their shoulders."86 
In 1931, both the economy and the chances of city planning seemed to 
have died in St. Petersburg. No zoning ordinance was adopted, and the plan­
ning board had ceased meeting. Without a planner or an actively engaged 
planning board, the city plan, as Hartzog had predicted, was pigeonholed in-
definitely.87 
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The New Deal: Catalyst for Planning 
The New Deal revived city planning in St. Petersburg. The federal govern-
ment's use of planning to solve social ills—ranging from public housing to 
land conservation—gave the profession a new respectability. Nolen felt that 
planning "advanced more rapidly in importance in the United States in the 
two years from the spring of 1933 to the spring of 1935, than in two decades 
prior to 1933."88 In early 1933 St. Petersburg's planning board began to meet 
again, and in July the city council finally adopted the zoning ordinance 
prepared by the Nolen firm in 1927. The city plan was overloaded with com­
mercial areas, but since it reflected the desires of the most vocal property own­
ers, only one person objected when the city council moved to accept the 
89 measure.
Although St. Petersburg's plan lacked balance, it did give municipal offi­
cials some leverage when they applied for federal funds. The New Deal pro­
grams were largely unconcerned with reforming the economic or physical 
makeup of urban America, but they did reward cities that had comprehensive 
plans tied to capital budgets. In addition, business leaders found that more fed­
eral grant money came to their cities when they worked in concert with mu­
nicipal officials and planners.90 
With the aid of their new plan, St. Petersburg received a generous cut of 
federally funded projects. Throughout the depression, the Pinellas economy 
was heavily dependent on jobs created by such federal programs as the Works 
Progress Administration and Public Works Administration. Between 1933 
and 1941 the federal government allocated over $ 10 million for St. Petersburg, 
an unusually high figure for a city of its size.91 
In the mid-1930s, the city began work on the projects Hartzog had enu­
merated. The railroad terminal was removed from downtown; a new airfield 
was built; and a comprehensive drainage system was started. The city also 
adopted a platting ordinance, and Hartzog's recommendation for minimum 
housing standards led to St. Petersburg'sfirst building code.92 
In 1935 the Florida legislature established a state planning board and passed 
a bill that allowed counties to form their own advisory planning boards. Un­
der this act, the Pinellas Planning Board was formed; Straub was elected chair­
man. Although no powers were vested in it, the Pinellas Planning Board 
followed St. Petersburg's example and made such public projects as erosion 
control on the beaches and the expansion of sewer and water lines a priority. 
As these projects were funded, the region's economy slowly recovered. Pinel­
las residents began to appreciate the government's expanded role.93 
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St. Petersburg weathered the Great Depression better than most cities. Al­
though conditions were far from ideal, the town was relatively well off, and the 
plant closings, droughts, bitter winters, and labor unrest that plagued other 
cities were largely absent. While the rest of the nation experienced the severe 
chill of winter during the mid-1930s, Florida's unusually mild weather spurred 
tourists to go south.94 
St. Petersburg began to move toward financial stability after the state leg­
islature passed the Murphy Act in 1935. This bill sought to lighten the debt 
burden of municipalities, handing properties whose owners were delinquent 
in paying taxes over to the state for sale at public auction. The proceeds were 
used to pay off municipal debts. Although the real estate market was still too 
flat for the state to hope to sell these lands, city officialsfinally had the means 
to solve the debt problem. St. Petersburg's economy turned a corner between 
1935 and 1940. Housing starts and tax revenues showed a steady increase. In 
1937, the city was no longer a defaulter, and by 1940 its debt had dropped to 
$19 million.95 
In 1936, an upsurge in tourism and the building industry made zoning once 
more a point of controversy. In response to the improving economy, almost a 
hundred residential property ownersfiled to have their lands rezoned for com­
mercial use. After the planning board and the city council turned down some 
of these requests, the Realty Board pushed for a revision of the city plan. 
Straub immediately replied that the abundance of vacant land marked for 
business left "no market or little value in any of [these properties]."96 Straub 
felt citizens should work to beautify the city, not turn it into one huge business 
district. During the boom years many natural assets had been "despoiled by 
private interests and lost to the public and there are not so many now," he 
lamented. Despite these irretrievable losses, the city had done nothing to pre­
vent similar abuses in the future. For example, aside from the downtown wa­
terfront, St. Petersburg owned no shoreline parks or sizable nature preserves.97 
Straub had suffered a series of strokes. He realized that his role in civic af­
fairs had almost run its course. In one of his last editorials, he regretted that 
John Nolen's original vision for St. Petersburg had fallen by the wayside. If 
"someone like John Nolen" returned to St. Petersburg, Straub urged, organi­
zations should meet him "and learn something from him about a new meaning 
of those saddest of all words—* It might have been.' "98 
In fall 1936, John Nolen made his own last public presentation, delivering 
a speech in Miami on the benefits of regional planning in south Florida. As 
usual, he received positive reviews but little follow-up, and in February 1937 
he passed away.99 Two years later, Straub died as well. These two pioneer plan­
ners left the lasting legacy of a more rational procedure for city building in St. 
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Petersburg and throughout Florida. Their efforts, though often treated with 
contempt in their time, were not forgotten* St. Petersburg's waterfront park 
bears Straub's name, and a park in Venice is home to a plaque honoring Nolen. 
At the time of their deaths, Nolen and Straub's ideal of a resort city that 
combined natural beauty and economic opportunity was a fading memory. 
But St. Petersburg had at least adopted a plan, and there was reason for opti­
mism in this city that had teetered on the brink of catastrophe. Unlike most 
Americans, the people of St. Petersburg had the chance to build a model city, 
but they turned away from this vision in a frenzy of speculation and banal 
boosting. The people of St. Petersburg squandered their opportunities be­
cause they failed to understand the nature of true liberty. Liberty without 
virtue or common sense is a recipe for disaster, for it is ludicrous to assume 
that people will sacrifice for a common goal when they are locked into the 
licentious pursuit of happiness. Although greed did not destroy the promise 
of building a new Eden, the people of St. Petersburg had only taken a small 
step toward that elusive goal. 
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The Bartholomew Plan: A Formula for Efficiency 
This research has as its purpose the determination of the requirements 
of the American city as to land areas used for various purposes, ratios 
of these areas to a given population unit, and analogous statistical in­
formation that will be an aid to more scientific zoning practice. 
Harland Bartholomew, 1932 
Planners are the cause of our urban and suburban ills. Once they threw 
out the body of knowledge that was their heritage of 3 ,00 0 years, they 
were left with nothing but statistics. 
Andres Duany, 1989 
by fall 1938, the municipal government's finances had finally stabilized. The 
city debt was still heavy, almost $20 million, but it no longer had to default on 
payments. Population had grown by 20,000 since 1930, and the economy was 
advancing at a slow but steady rate. Once the real estate market began to show 
signs of life, investors overwhelmed the planning board with petitions to have 
properties rezoned. With Straub dead and Walter Fuller in the state legislature, 
there was no member of the board who could discern where the comprehen­
sive plan stopped and the zoning code took over. The board amended the land-
use plan at the whim of property owners, and the planning process soon fell 
into disarray. Between 1934 and 1938, the planning board considered 800 
cases; it granted the exceptions requested 90 percent of the time. Many of 
these changes pushed residential properties into business categories—in a city 
already grossly overzoned for commercial uses. As a result, the zoning map bore 
little relation to existing uses.1 
The city council dismissed the members of the planning board and estab­
lished a blue-ribbon committee tofinda solution to the "planning crisis." The 
committee recommended that the city council establish a new planning 
board and give it a "broad scope of authority."2 The planning board was not, 
however, given any additional powers, although on October 5, 1938, Mayor 
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Vernon Agee appointed a new five-member group that would "make for an 
aggressive and efficient board."3 
The realtor John Wallace, brother of the New Dealer Henry Wallace, 
headed the new planning board, and Walter Fuller was vice chairman. Wal­
lace belonged to a new generation of leadership that promoted planning as an 
important tool for meeting the demands of growth. At the opening meeting, 
he announced that St. Petersburg needed to join the "ranks of the intelligently 
planned American cities." Unlike earlier planning boards, the board he 
chaired enjoyed the support and cooperation of civic leaders. This was a defi­
nite improvement, but Wallace and his colleagues were "feeling [their] way in 
the dark." Although they had a copy of Nolen'sfirst plan and a land-use map, 
the Hartzog report and the minutes of previous planning boards' meetings 
were missing. Despite these impediments, the board persevered in its quest to 
set guidelines for, as the St. Petersburg Times put it, "the ideal plan."4 
The planning board soon realized the gargantuan nature of its task. The ex­
isting plan was a disaster, but the board had neither the expertise nor the re­
sources to replan the city. In early 1940, the city council hired the firm of 
Harland Bartholomew and Associates to design a new comprehensive city 
plan. Ronald E. Riley, an associate of Bartholomew's since 1929, headed the 
project team. 
In the early 1940s, Harland Bartholomew specialized in analyzing the fi­
nancial consequences of unbalanced urban growth. Hisfirm concentrated on 
designing plans that stressed the efficient provision of urban services while 
maintaining the integrity of older urban centers. "His intent was that city 
planning be used to contain," Christopher Silver writes in his analysis of 
Bartholomew's work in Richmond, "rather than unleash the forces of urban 
growth."5 
The Bartholomew Plan 
In October 1943, the St. Petersburg Planning Board received a 300-page plan 
from the Bartholomew firm.6 The work started from the premise that a more 
efficient infrastructure would improve the city's economic health and, in turn, 
make it a more appealing place for tourists. The planners compared St. Pe­
tersburg to a machine, the car, that could be regulated to run at prime effi­
ciency. "No matter how well or carefully the auto is driven it will not give 
maximum pleasure or economy if the motor and chassis are obsolete and in 
poor condition." With its $19 million of bonded debt and overextended ser­
vices, St. Petersburg was considerably more like a dilapidated jalopy than a 
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well-tended luxury automobile* The city needed "a sound, adequate physical 
structure" to spur economic activity and once again run at full speed. Unless 
changes were made, the economy would stagnate, and St. Petersburg would 
never be "a desirable place in which to live." 
The planners thought the municipal government could provide urban ser­
vices more efficiently—and at the same time increase the tax base—by con­
centrating new development around a central urban core. The recent trend 
had been for the population to scatter away from the downtown area. If this 
continued, public improvements would increasingly be made at the expense of 
the city's older districts. With 78 percent of the city'sfifty-three square miles 
vacant, the community'sfiscal health remained in jeopardy, because only one 
section of the city—the area between 16th Street and Tampa Bay and North 
and South 22nd Avenue—contained the "proper balance" of building density 
(eight units per acre) and city services. Furnishing services to the rest of St. Pe­
tersburg would be prohibitively expensive. "A more compact development 
must be provided for the future," the consultants warned. Otherwise the con­
tinued dispersal of growth would drive up tax rates, impair the provision of mu­
nicipal services, and cause the decline of older districts. 
The Bartholomew planners limited future development to a 17,500-acre, or 
about twenty-seven-square-mile, area to solve St. Petersburg's infrastructure 
problem. The urban boundary's configuration (figure 18) took into account 
both existing improvements (paved streets, sewers, and water lines) and the 
demand for future urban services, based on a projected population of 120,000. 
St. Petersburg's population had almost tripled during the 1920s—from 14,237 
to 40,083—but in the 1930s it grew by only 50 percent. (The entire country 
experienced its slowest urban growth rate of the twentieth century during 
these years.) Extrapolating from these trends, the consultants predicted that 
St. Petersburg's growth rate would continue to decrease, and that by 1960, the 
population would stabilize at 120,000. A community of this size, according to 
thefirm's standards, should occupy 17,500 acres; the city's remaining 16,000 
acres would "never be needed for urban purposes." 
To keep development within the prescribed urban zone, municipal agencies 
would have to clamp down on the extension of utilities. Because the existing 
infrastructure would meet projected growth demands for another two decades, 
Bartholomew and Associates felt that the city could take a hard line on this 
policy. Property owners would undoubtedly demand water and sewer connec­
tions, "but if these arefirmly resisted, new development will gradually locate 
within the proper sections." 
Land lying outside the urban zone was designated rural, with no more than 
one residential unit per three acres. The plan called for a series of "farm­
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Figure 18 Under the Bartholomew plan, urban land use was limited to 17,500 acres, based 
on an analysis showing that St. Petersburg's population would never pass 120,000. Courtesy 
of the St. Petersburg Department of Planning. 
ettes"—with truck gardens and citrus groves—that would form a greenbelt 
around the city. Land speculators might demand rezonings, but because the 
new plan provided "a reasonable use for property owners in this district," the 
city would have the support of the law. 
The planners also recommended that the city council lower the assessed 
valuations for rural land; with fewer tax dollars at stake, there would be less 
pressure to run services into this area. In addition, these lands were hardly lu­
crative investments. Almost all of the city's 16,500 tax-delinquent parcels 
were in the rural district; many of these properties had reverted to state hands 
after passage of the Murphy Act in 1935.7 The city council could either buy 
this land at a discounted rate or establish a partnership with the state to lease 
it to farming or lumber interests. 
Of course, if the municipal government wanted to restrict property rights in 
half the city, it needed to enhance opportunities for development within the 
urban zone. The first priority was additional park land. The city's ratio of 0.42 
acres of park land per 100 inhabitants was well below the national standard of 
one acre. While the existing 120 acres of parks met most adult recreational 
needs, adequate play areas for children were sorely needed, and apart from the 
municipal waterfront, there were no large expanses of open space. 
109 
Chapter 6 
T H E P R O P O M . D P A R R S Y S T E M 
Figure 19 In contrast to the Nolen plan, under the Bartholomew plan 
parks did not follow the natural contours of the land but were rigidly geo­
metrical. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Department of Planning. 
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Bartholomew'sfirm prepared a park plan (figure 19) that would add another 
240 acres to the existing system. Despite the lack of large parks, the planners 
thought that the close proximity of the beaches precluded the need to estab­
lish nature preserves. Instead, they placed twenty neighborhood parks through­
out the city, within a half-mile walk of all residences, to provide a mixture of 
recreational uses and open space. The plan also included two community parks 
previously proposed by Nolen. One would encircle Lake Maggiore, while the 
other covered forty-seven acres on the southeast shore of Boca Ciega Bay. 
The park plan also set aside 2,300 acres in four "forest preserves" that con­
tained mostly poorly drained pine flatwoods. Although these sites were mostly 
inaccessible and offered little in the way of scenery or recreational value, they 
were cheap, ridden with tax-delinquent properties, and good for logging. In 
addition, the proposed preserves lay on the periphery of the city and were 
prime locations for a city dump. The four parcels were: Maximo Point on the 
city's extreme southwest corner (this was also the location for Van Bibber's 
Health City); Toy town, on the north side of St. Petersburg; the long-forgotten 
Florida Riviera development to the northeast of the city; and a 1,085-acre site 
on the city's northwest border. 
The Bartholomew Formula 
Harland Bartholomew (1889-1989) reached the top of his profession by pro­
moting city planning as a scientific field of study that used economic and sta­
tistical analyses to provide practical solutions.8 In an era when the "word 
'planner' conjured visions of a long-haired, dreary-eyed, visionary who never 
had to 'meet a payroll,' Bartholomew presented the image of a serious and 
practical man of experience who would give you realistic advice on 'how to get 
great things done.' "9 Unlike Nolen and Olmsted, Bartholomew never found 
European planning philosophies or design concepts to his liking. Instead, his 
pragmatic approach to planning reflected a purely American experience.10 In 
his quest to solve the United States' urban problems, Bartholomew had no pa­
tience with plans based on Utopian notions or aesthetic forms. When the 1909 
Planning Conference emphasized "the economic rather than the aesthetic," 
Bartholomew wrote, it "marked an important turning point in planning."11 
After studying civil engineering for two years at Rutgers University, 
Bartholomew encountered two divergent views of city planning on hisfirst job 
in 1912. The young assistant engineer worked under George Ford and E. R 
Goodrich. Ford wanted the Newark City Planning Commission to concen­
trate on housing and "the aesthetic aspects of city planning," Bartholomew 
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wrote, "whereas Mr. Goodrich's interest ran to streets, traffic and transporta-
tion/'12 Ford worried that planners were developing such a fixation on effi­
ciency that they were reducing the city to a "soulless machine,"13 but his plan 
for Newark was judged unrealistic, and the planning commission dismissed 
him. Bartholomew stepped into the breach and completed the project ac­
cording to Goodrich's specifications. From this experience, the young consul­
tant learned that traffic engineers could produce quantitative data that would 
make city planning acceptable to its many doubters. Over the next decade, 
Bartholomew emerged as one of the profession's most successful practitioners, 
because he could sell planning as a scientific procedure for managing a city's 
complex urban infrastructure with machinelike efficiency.14 
Like Nolen and Olmsted, Bartholomew condemned the intense specula­
tion that was driving the expansion of America's cities. The nation's urban ills, 
he wrote in 1932, stemmed from "a deep-seated malady whose origin can be 
found in excessive real-estate speculation." Bartholomew's prescription, how­
ever, separated him from planners who emphasized the environment and aes­
thetics in their work. His plans rested on the presentation of precise analytical 
data to verify what he called "scientific zoning practice." Bartholomew's un­
derstanding of zoning, the editors at Harvard University Press wrote, helped 
make the planning profession more "rationalized and related to sound eco­
nomic policy."15 
Bartholomew's firm began work by surveying existing land uses. After 
breaking down the survey information into acreage-to-population ratios, the 
staff compared these data with national averages. From this analysis it was pos­
sible to create a "satisfactory norm for the future growth of the city." By incor­
porating national standards into local plans, Bartholomew's firm provided 
municipal governments with a reasonable assessment of the land required for 
a particular zoning category. Whether a city needed more parks or fewer com­
mercial designations, a bevy of statistical standards allowed planners to foster 
"the development of comprehensively conceived and economically organized 
cities."16 
Bartholomew also believed that zoning ordinances based on functional 
standards would carry more weight in court. If planners were able to assign 
numbers to "the actual urban requirements," land speculators and their attor­
neys would have more difficulty setting aside a plan. When deliberating over 
the enforcement of land use controls, judges who had a quantified, systematic 
planning method before them would find it easier to rule consistently.17 
Bartholomew considered the environment and the promotion of an urban 
aesthetic secondary. While cities needed beautification, he believed that a 
preoccupation with aesthetics doomed the planning effort. "The value of 
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landscape and architectural features is admitted," Bartholomew wrote in 1914, 
"yet they must not be made the sole consideration, for we are living in an age 
of commercialism and it is feared we know too little of the value of art."18 For 
a society that idolized engineering and efficiency, Bartholomew's plans were a 
rational, if not always comprehensive, solution to the problems of urbaniza-
tion.19 
The Failure of the Bartholomew Plan 
St. Petersburg presented a new challenge to the Bartholomewfirm. Perhaps no 
city in the nation had suffered more from a lack of planning than St. Peters­
burg. The size of its debt and its unpaid taxes were symptoms of this malaise. 
Bartholomew and Associates proposed a logical way to solve the city's finan­
cial problems: channeling development around the urban core. Critics of the 
plan, however, argued that thefirm's efficiency model, appropriate for indus­
trial cities, needed adjustment for a resort city like St. Petersburg. During the 
winter, tourists inundated the city, and they wanted to spend time outdoors. 
Yet the plan was relatively unconcerned with protecting the peninsula's nat­
ural features—its calling card for tourism. 
Although the Pinellas Peninsula was hardly virgin territory in 1940, it was 
still one of the most unusual and biologically diverse natural environments in 
the United States. The region had experienced only limited building since the 
1920s, and the landscape contained a mixture of natural areas, cultivated land, 
and distinctive communities.20 The surrounding bays were clear and teeming 
with marine life, which attracted both commercial and sport fishermen. For 
the most part, buildings were concentrated on higher, more stable land, and 
the system of inland wetlands was largely intact (see figure 20). William 
Straub's description of Pinellas, written ten years before, was still true: "The 
ogres of destruction have not yet come into our garden. It stands here with 
open gates, an Eden guarded by no fearsome angel withflaming sword. What 
shall remain of it is merely the guess of the pen that writes these lines. Greed, 
the neglect of beauty, the ravage of uselessfire—all these are to come and press 
down heavily upon the loveliness of this day."21 
The Bartholomew planners, instead of addressing the ideals Straub and 
Nolen had found so compelling, dismissed Nolen's work as "the optimistic 
opinions of what the ideal city should be." Instead of wasting their time on 
Utopian forms, the team designed a more efficient city based on a "thorough 
analysis of facts." "To intelligently plan," their work read, "it is essential to 
know approximately how many people will need improvements and where 
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RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN 
DEVELOPMENT 
PATTERNS AND 
TOPOGRAPHY 
IN 
PINELLAS COUNTY 
lor,d Abor. 30' 
Figure 20 In Pinellas County, development gradually over­
took the wetlands. As these were drained for construction, 
the peninsula's environmental problems accelerated at an 
alarming rate. Courtesy of Pinellas County Department of 
Planning. 
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they will live." Of course, if their population projections wereflawed, or their 
quantitative techniques failed to appraise the land adequately, their plan was 
useless. 
Walter Fuller, the planning board's vice chairman, took a keen interest in 
the Bartholomew plan. While its length "discouraged anybody from reading 
it," he managed to find some "sound, hard-hitting points." But before any pub­
lic discussion could take place, the St. Petersburg Independent blasted the work 
as a waste of the city's scant resources. After the St. Petersburg Times devoted 
only a short paragraph to the plan, Fuller wrote to its publisher, Nelson Poyn­
ter, who was working in Washington.22 
As a New Deal Democrat in a conservative town, Poynter used the St. Pe­
tersburg Times to prod residents with provocative editorials and proposals for 
reform. Like Straub, Poynter grew especially passionate on the topic of pro­
tecting Pinellas's "natural gifts" from haphazard development and wasteful 
commercial practices.23 In October 1943, Poynter had paid Fuller $750 to 
write a proposal that the city council could use to acquire tax-delinquent prop­
ertiesfrom the state. With these properties, the city could establish a system of 
parks and small farms on the outskirts of St. Petersburg.24 Two weeks later, 
Fuller apologized to Poynter for not having written earlier. He had reviewed 
the Bartholomew plan, "things are now crystallizing in my own mind and mak­
ing sense." Despite the preponderance of "lofty and double-jointed words," 
Fuller informed Poynter, "there's gold in them thar 276 pages."25 
Fuller felt that the Bartholomew firm's assessment of the city's past mis­
takes, financial difficulties, and overextended infrastructure could help the St. 
Petersburg Times encourage "a wide and deep educational campaign." The 
plan held a wealth of facts, but Fuller disagreed "completely with the philos­
ophy of the report"—and also with its population projections. Fuller sent 
Poynter and the other planning board members a twenty-page critique of the 
Bartholomew plan. 
The planners' assumption that St. Petersburg's population would follow a 
declining national trend especially baffled Fuller. With the advent of Social 
Security and the eventual return of military personnel (120,000 soldiers had 
trained in Pinellas and a million in Florida) to civilian life, he doubted that 
the city would "gradually and painfully increase to a city of 100,000 as the sta­
tistical planners say." He thought that St. Petersburg could anticipate the ar­
rival of 100,000 new residents over the next decade. As Fuller wrote, the new 
immigrants would be looking for "the spirit of Florida living—the outdoors." 
In their assumption that St. Petersburg would be like the "average commercial 
city," the planners had missed this point. 
The Bartholomew planners also failed to realize that St. Petersburg "was in 
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the entertainment business/' and that the city needed to attract wealth, not 
manufacture it. If St. Petersburg imitated the design of cities "built before 
horse cars, much less automobiles and airplanes, then it has thrown away all 
that it professes to be," Fuller wrote, "a place where life can be enjoyed all year 
in the open." The consultants compounded this mistake by their failure to rec­
ognize the economic value of "beauty and nature" and St. Petersburg's "almost 
exaggerated need of public lands." Fuller wanted to raise the city park standard 
from 0.42 acres to 1.5 acres per 100 residents. The city and the county could 
reach this goal, if they pooled their funds and bought inexpensive, bankrupt 
properties. Such land could then be reforested to create a string of scenic 
wildlife refuges that would oifer hiking, camping, and improved flood control 
Fuller also wanted the city to acquire sites on the beaches and make them the 
cornerstone of an expanded park system. But before St. Petersburg could even 
think of a plan that would "beautifully house 150,000 people," civic leaders 
needed "to shatter the spirit of defeatism and acceptance of smallness and 
mediocrity." 
The Bartholomew plan's mechanical prose and limited vision offered little 
inspiration; it sought only "to coax another 60,000 people into this area" and 
retire the municipal debt. Fuller wanted a plan with greater vision. Some plan­
ning issues, such as the acquisition of park sites, affected the entire peninsula. 
Fuller also encouraged the county commission to adopt a plan that set a high 
priority on public investment and instituted a system of unified land-use con­
trols. "Such a bold and revolutionary approach... will never happen, unless a 
small group of men, with sufficient and enlightened self interest does the pre­
liminary study and missionary work."26 
Poynter agreed with Fuller's assessment and immediately wrote, "We must 
get out the heavy artillery to get the sights of the whole town lifted." He agreed 
that the population projections were ludicrous. The city's future population 
growth had "no more to do with the population curve of the United States 
than that of an oil-boom town." Poynter also believed that the principal issue 
facing St. Petersburg was how to plan adequately for the crush of postwar im-
migrants.27 In the next two weeks, the St. Petersburg Times ran two articles 
summarizing the plan, and on Sunday, November 28, 1943, Fuller consoli­
dated his report into a full-page editorial. 
In his piece for the St. Petersburg Times, Fuller exposed the Bartholomew 
plan's chief flaw: "It does not sufficiently visualize a major replanning and re­
building of this community as an ideal tourist and residential Florida City." Af­
ter discussing how to accomplish this task, Fuller challenged readers to move 
beyond the consultants' narrow vision and invest in a "bold over-all Plan" that 
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required moving beyond the "restricted mental horizons of the past." Citizens 
would have to "unite, plan boldly, and act with vigor." 
Fuller's plea fell on deaf ears. Although the city council adopted the 
Bartholomew plan in late 1944, the concept of a county plan never moved 
beyond the pages of the St. Petersburg Times. The city council asked the plan­
ning board to use the new plan to rezone the city after the war, but even be­
fore the war ended the plan's credibility was next to nil. A mid-decade census 
revealed that, in contrast to the Bartholomew firm's prediction, St. Peters-
burg's population had grown 40 percent in five years. This surge in popula­
tion, coupled with wartime restrictions, made it impossible to provide enough 
housing. The shortage intensified when postwar immigrants flocked to the 
city. Developers demanded that the state return tax-delinquent properties to 
private ownership. Tallahassee quickly complied, and the pressure of land 
sales forced the planning board to jettison any notion of confining new build­
ing to the urban core. 
In 1946 and 1947, the state sold off thousands of parcels to builders and 
speculators at bargain rates. Auctioneers held sales on the steps of city hall and 
the county courthouse, where canny investors could pick up lots in posh 
neighborhoods for only ten dollars. The sale of abandoned properties helped 
St. Petersburg pay off its bonded debt in 1947.28 
In 1950, St. Petersburg's population passed 100,000; in the next two years, 
it rocketed over the Bartholomewfirm's anticipated cap of 120,000. By 1960 
St. Petersburg had 181,200 inhabitants. The population had almost doubled 
in ten years—and tripled in twenty. Since the Bartholomew plan had assumed 
a declining population rate, it offered little guidance for municipal officials fac­
ing the demands of growth. To make matters worse, the Bartholomew staff had 
made no adequate provision either for changing the plan or rezoning the city. 
Although the plan contained a recommendation for hiring planning staff, the 
consultants had assured city officials that the plan would require only few and 
simple changes. The planning board quickly learned that without experienced 
staff to revise the plan, informed decisions about land use were impossible.29 
Although the land-use plan proved unworkable, the planners' analysis of 
the city's traffic system provided the basis for restructuring the transit system. 
In 1947, the city council voted to phase out the thirty miles of trolley lines on 
the recommendation that a bus system would be more cost-effective. The last 
trolley line ended service on May 7, 1949. Three years later, the city hired 
Walter Drucker to serve as St. Petersburg'sfirst full-time traffic engineer. The 
city already had a more than adequate supply of streets, which allowed 
Drucker to concentrate on expanding parking and road capacities according 
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to Bartholomew and Associates' specifications. City hall devoted its resources 
to projects that would enhance auto mobility, but as the pace of building con­
tinued at breakneck speed throughout the 1950s, many other planning prob­
lems were becoming acute.30 
St. Petersburg's Postwar Expansion: Planned Sprawl 
The postwar building boom was entirely different from the speculative whirl­
wind that had swept through the city in the 1920s.31 As Fuller and Poynter had 
predicted, returning soldiers, retirees, and those just seeking the Florida 
lifestyle came in droves to St. Petersburg. Subdivisions that had lain dormant 
for two decades sprang to life, and a suburban landscape splayed across the 
peninsula (figure 21). Between 1940 and 1960, the number of housing units in 
Pinellas County increased by more than 400 percent, jumping from 40,525 to 
165,823. Three-fourths of all units were built in the 1950s, and 37,636 (40.4 
percent) of the 93,141 new units were built in St. Petersburg.32 
Figure 21 After World War II, subdivisions blanketed the landscape with their efficient, 
yet monotonous, form. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Historical Museum. 
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The thousands of people moving to St. Petersburg found the American 
Dream in its affordable housing, sunshine, and good jobs. By the mid-1950s, an 
aggressive campaign to attract industry to Pinellas had garnered four giants of 
the defense industry, Honeywell, Electronic Communications, General Elec­
tric, and Sperry Rand. These firms, with their heavy payrolls, well-educated 
employees, and contracts for businesses, brought a new and different kind of life 
to the city's economy. Manufacturing as a percentage of county employment 
jumped from 2 percent in 1940 to 14 percent in 1960. As a result of diversi­
fication, St. Petersburg began—at least economically—to resemble the typical 
American city.33 
The 1960 census revealed the remarkable transformation that St. Peters­
burg and Florida had undergone since the turn of the century. In 1900, St. Pe­
tersburg was a small unincorporated village, and Florida was one of the poorest 
and most isolated states in the Union. By 1960, the median family income of 
$4,700 was the highest in the South and stood at 92 percent of the national 
average. Although St. Petersburg's median family income was only $4,200, 
this was due in part to the high number of single retirees. In 1960,27.4 percent 
of the population was over sixty-five. Although St. Petersburg residents had 
less disposable income, they did have more invested income. The median 
value of a house in St. Petersburg was $12,000, compared to a statefigure of 
$11,800, and a national one of $11,900. As tourism moved increasingly to the 
beaches, the city was becoming more suburban and more stable. Almost 75 
percent of the city's residences were owner-occupied. The national average 
was only 61.9 percent.34 
While St. Petersburg was becoming more prosperous, its landscape was los­
ing its uniqueness. The suburban subdivision epitomized middle-class life both 
in St. Petersburg and in the United States at large. The eclectic mixture of pre­
war housing styles gave way to vast tracts of nearly identical houses. Air con­
ditioners, pesticides, heavy machinery, and concrete blocks all contributed in 
their different ways to the mass production of single-story homes with small 
windows and attached garages. Only pink flamingos and blue porpoises differ­
entiated the thousands of new white and pastel block homes. Builders could 
put in air conditioners, which counted as a luxury, then cut costs and save time 
by reducing the size of windows and porches. And, as elsewhere across Amer­
ica, people moved from their porches to sit in front of their televisions, seem­
ingly finding the new mass medium a satisfactory replacement for the 
neighborliness of the past.35 
Suburban expansion also mercilessly reconfigured the landscape. Before 
grading and road construction, developers stripped sites of all vegetation. They 
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filled wetlands and shunted streams into culverts to increase the number of 
building lots. The city offered some parks, but developers seldom dedicated 
land for recreation or open space. By the time thefirst residents arrived, their 
only clues to the original landscape came from the subdivisions' names: "Or­
ange Estates," "Oakview Estates" "Eaglecrest," "Pelican Creek." While the 
larger front yards were excellent places for children's games and casual meet­
ings, the opportunity to explore "Old Florida" was quickly disappearing. Before 
the war forests covered 95,000 acres on the peninsula; by 1959, there were only 
57,000 acres left. Over the same period, citrus acreage dropped by 50 percent.36 
By 1960, a standardized suburban fabric covered the Pinellas landscape. 
Each municipality merged into the next without noticeable landmarks or 
hints of different street layouts, architectural types, or land-use patterns. The 
new subdivisions provided more living space, greenery, and convenience for 
auto users than their prewar counterparts, but they drained the landscape of 
vitality and distinctiveness. Auto use was on the rise, and homeowners' fre­
quent trips took them past an unending string of commercial strip centers and 
run-on subdivisions* From the car, the landscape was little more than a blur— 
except for the blaring signs.37 
The sprawl also abetted traffic congestion. Before World War II, building 
densities, which averaged about eight units per acre, supported a transporta­
tion system that allowed residents to choose between a trolley, a car, a bus, or 
walking (figure 22). In the postwar era, because more and more people owned 
cars, developers could build subdivisions at lower densities (four to six units 
per acre) on cheaper, outlying land. In these settings home buyers could in­
dulge their desire for more space. As new residents thronged to tract housing, 
mass transit use plummeted. The new subdivisions were too sparsely settled to 
support a bus system. Walking was no longer preferred nor practical. The sub­
divisions' wide streets, minimal street plantings, and lack of sidewalks were for 
the driver, not the pedestrian.38 But whether they were commuting to work, 
driving to the beach, or dropping children off at school, residents soon realized 
that south Pinellas's roadways were the most congested in Florida.39 
In 1955 U.S. 19, a four-lane highway running the length of the county, was 
completed, but it gave little relief from the chronic traffic congestion. To gen­
erate more tax revenues, the St. Petersburg Planning Board allowed a contin­
uous belt of land along the highway to be zoned commercial. Soon a multitude 
of signs, motels, restaurants, and strip shopping centers cluttered the highway. 
In addition, a series of busy connectors from the new subdivisions dumped 
thousands of drivers onto Pineilas's only north-south arterial road. The prolif­
eration of crossings and business access points made more traffic lights neces­
sary, and by 1960, U.S. 19 was a tangle of stop^and-go traffic.40 
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Figure 22 Prewar development followed trolley lines as well as new roads. Courtesy of the 
St. Petersburg Historical Museum. 
As the building boom spread across Pinellas, the quality of the natural en­
vironment suffered. Before World War II, mules and labor crews had to clear 
land, and building could take place only at higher elevations (see figure 20).41 
But the bulldozer and sophisticated machinery for draining wetlands allowed 
developers to open up land once impossible to build on. The building industry 
was a dynamic force in the local economy, but development also inflicted a 
heavy cost. The draining of the peninsula's interior wetlands exposed residents 
to greater risk during the tropical storm season. Marshes and swamps act like 
sponges; they soak up large amounts of rainfall, then slowly release the water, 
protecting surrounding lands from flooding. In Florida, if 10 percent of the 
landscape is wetland, flooding is reduced by 60 percent; with 20 percent cov­
erage, it drops off by 90 percent. Besides regulating the quantity of water flow­
ing through a system, wetlands also improve water quality. These swampy 
areas filter pollutants from agricultural and urban runoff and keep the under­
lying aquifer or the surrounding bays clean.42 
But even building on the uplands affected the surrounding wetlands. The 
nonporous surfaces that had replaced the vegetation accelerated the rate of 
stormwater flow into the low-lying swampland during the rainy season. The 
reduction of rainwater seeping through the uplands' sandy soil also created 
problems during the dry months. As the groundwater level dropped, saltwater 
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moved into the aquifer. The wetlands could not get enough groundwater 
recharge, and hundreds of acres dried out. As the pressure to develop in­
creased, the alteration of the "hydroiogic regime" intensified. Environmental 
problems reached an unforeseen extent.43 
The Tyrone Boulevard area is typical of the marginal lands developed dur­
ing the 1950s. Before the war, the land in this section of northwest St. Peters­
burg (between 66th and 58th Streets North and 38th Avenues and Tyrone 
Boulevard) was mostly wet and vacant. By 1960 the area contained the city's 
largest shopping mall and a series of subdivisions that brought thousands of ad­
ditional cars to the primary roadways. When the rains came, stormwaters that 
these low-lying lands had once captured flowed into Boca Ciega Bay. The 
stormwater carried pollutants from roads, parking lots, and driveways, as well 
as fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, and pesticides from suburban lawns. Par­
tially treated sewage from the new subdivisions also oozed into Boca Ciega 
Bay. As the once clear lagoon turned a murky green, residents could see the 
once hidden costs of development.44 
As the quality of the environment declined and commuting times in­
creased, there was a call for better planning. While conservationists protested 
the loss of natural areas, the executives of large national corporations, which 
had invested millions in the region, wanted to make sure that St. Petersburg 
offered an appropriate quality of life. C. W. Skinner, a Honeywell executive, 
stated in 1956, "We are very concerned whether this community is going to be 
able to grow gracefully and beautifully with well-planned neighborhoods, 
streets, schools, businesses, recreational areas; or whether the extremely rapid 
rate of growth which appears to be coming over the horizon is going to result 
in the community ending up by being a congested mess of hodge-podge build­
ings; roads and streets; poorly planned commercial areas; inescapable traffic 
congestion."45 
In 1955, in response to the mounting problems, the city council hired its 
first full-time planner, John Harvey. After reviewing the existing city plan, 
Harvey thought he had read a "horror story." There was enough land zoned for 
shopping centers to serve a city of 300,000. This seemed especially inappro­
priate since many districts zoned commercial and industrial remained empty. 
Harvey wanted to initiate the rezoning process, which had languished for a 
decade, but he had neither the resources nor the experience to confront St. Pe-
tersburg's most powerful stakeholders. At Harvey's urgent plea, the city coun­
cil hired Fred Bair, Florida's most accomplished planning consultant, and in 
1956, the two took on the unenviable task of trying to regulate the city's lead­
ing industry.46 
Since the war, St. Petersburg's economic base had shifted from tourism to 
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city building. The numerous firms (contracting, development, real estate, en­
gineering, architecture, legal, and mortgage and lending) and public utilities 
that profited from the hectic pace of construction and house sales had a strong 
hold on both the local economy and civic affairs.47 The most vocal opposition 
to Harvey's undertaking came from the commercial realtors, the group with 
the most to lose. Walter Ramseur, a spokesman for the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Realty Board, argued that the rezoning process should promote, rather 
than limit, commercial and industrial enterprise. He complained that, while 
realtors in other cities were extremely prosperous, the "average real estate man 
in St. Petersburg is barely eking out an existence due to the restrictive zoning 
of the city." Ramseur found this especially disturbing because, in his view, his 
profession had done more than any other business to build St. Petersburg and 
make it "known throughout the United States." Yet the city's leading entre­
preneurs were now trapped "in a zoning straitjacket" and enduring "severe fi­
nancial distress." The planning board could rectify this problem and bolster 
the city's tax rolls, Ramseur claimed, if outlying agricultural and single-family 
residential areas were rezoned for business and industrial uses.48 
Fred Bair wrote off these assertions as a "fascinating romance," replete with 
"erroneous conclusions and mistaken facts." In a city overrun with vacant 
commercial properties, Bair chided Ramseur for claiming that businesses 
would appear just because a parcel of land received a commercial zoning des­
ignation. "If zoning would create what it permits, the logical course would be 
to go whole-hog," Bair concluded, "and zone the entire city for oil wells or ura­
nium extraction, thus raining prosperity on everybody."49 
Rezoning the city proved to be a three-year ordeal. Harvey, Bair, and the 
planning board held numerous meetings with property owners before reaching 
any consensus. Even though the planning board shifted commercial designa­
tions interspersed throughout residential districts to major shopping and busi­
ness districts, it was unable to reduce the amount of land zoned for commercial 
building. In 1960, commercial properties covered three percent of the city, and 
industrial uses one percent. The new zoning map set aside eight percent of the 
city's land for commercial uses—twice the national average—and four per­
cent for industrial development. The surplus in these categories was offset by 
a deficit in parkland. More than anything else, this discrepancy between St. 
Petersburg's land classification scheme and national planning standards re­
flected the degree to which commercial realtors dictated public policy.50 
Between 1954 and 1958, however, the long-running feud over zoning 
paled in comparison to another conflict pitting regulators against speculators: 
turning water into land. The extensive dredging and filling of Boca Ciega Bay 
for new homesites pushed one citizen to declare that, if local officials kept 
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Figure 23 The dredging of Boca Ciega Bay by the "Progress Boys" created 
waterfront homes—and ecological disaster. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg 
Times. 
"explaining away the dangers of dredge and fill, St. Petersburg will become an 
inland city." In 1957, after surveying the countless fills in Boca Ciega Bay, 
Governor LeRoy Collins commented, "Pretty soon we are going to have to 
drill to find water there."51 
As the giant dredges filled Boca Ciega Bay's vast meadows of turtle grass 
with mud and sand, the dark side of progress became all too evident (figure 23). 
"We have been chopping down the trees,filling up bays, that gleam just never 
died in the 'Progress Boys' eyes," one resident wrote in 1957. "Why must we 
destroy these very assets that are the siren call to the fine people who choose 
124 
The Bartholomew Plan 
our environment?"52 Representatives of conservation groups and homeown­
ers* associations were appalled to find that the existing city plan did not ad­
dress the dredge-and-fill issue. "The problem with the Bartholomew Plan," 
John Harvey claimed, "was that it was too practical of a plan."53 The failure of 
the Bartholomew firm to identify a strategy for regulating coastal building, a 
task the Nolen firm had performed thirty years before, left municipal officials 
with a perplexing problem. While the dredge-and-fill projects yielded huge 
profits for developers, they were threatening the public welfare. The degrada­
tion of Boca Ciega Bay sparked a movement not only to protect St. Peters-
burg's most important natural resource, but to restrict the property rights of the 
city's most powerful caste. 
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There is no shortage of land to cause the panic to dredge bays and 
bayous. What is needed is good city planning. It is not good business 
to not plan and spoil our most important assets. 
St. Petersburg Times, 1957 
The whole Bay has been raped. 
Dorothy Sample, 1984 
Bartholomew and Associates' failure to include a plan for protecting St. Pe-
tersburg's coastal environment contributed to the indiscriminate dredging and 
filling of Boca Ciega Bay, a beautiful coastal lagoon that contained one of 
Florida's most abundantfisheries. The lagoon's condition provoked a twenty-
year-long political controversy. Elected officials, courts, and agencies from the 
local to the federal level were entangled in legalities and politics as they tried 
to find a solution agreeable to both developers and conservation groups. The 
effort to protect Boca Ciega Bay also forced municipal officials to reevaluate 
the planning process. It was obvious that the giant machines rearranging the 
landscape were diminishing the bay's aesthetic appeal, but a study by state bi­
ologists revealed that dredging and filling were also destroying the marine 
ecosystem. This study, which introduced ecology into the decision-making 
process in 1956, ensured that city building in St. Petersburg—and the rest of 
Florida—would never be the same. 
Ecology, the Subversive Science 
By the mid-1950s, grassroots opposition to projects that threatened America's 
scenic natural areas had become increasingly vocal. Although movements 
against overdevelopment were spontaneous and often occurred without a cen­
tral organization or a coordinated plan of action, they expressed a strong com­
mon desire. Whether they werefighting dams in the Southwest, clear-cutting 
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in the Northwest, or dredging projects in Florida, conservationists battled for 
a new set of public priorities. Previously Americans had viewed the natural 
world as a commodity to exploit as efficiently as possible. Now they wanted 
protection for the scenic lands and waters that played such an integral role in 
their quality of life.1 When its leaders, reasoning from that nascent science, 
ecology, challenged traditional notions of property rights and progress, the 
budding environmental movement introduced a radical concept into the 
mainstream of American thought.2 
Although the roots of ecology go back to the work of eighteenth-century 
naturalists, it did not become a seriousfield of study until the postwar years. A 
major breakthrough had occurred in the 1930s, when the botanist Frederick 
Clements demonstrated that natural systems, or ecosystems, evolve. Clements 
found that ecological communities originate during the "pioneer stage," when 
plantsfirst take hold on virgin soil. Eventually they reach a climax, or mature 
juncture, where a stable, self-sustaining ecosystem exists. The barrier islands 
off the Pinellas coast exemplified Clements^ pioneer-to-climax model. Over 
time, this watery habitat evolved from sandbars into a stable, yet fragile, fab­
ric of land that supported a wide diversity of terrestrial plants and marine life. 
According to Clements, such a system maintained an ideal balance with the 
forces of nature and could continually reproduce itself—unless altered by cli­
matic changes or invading organisms. 
By the 1950s ecology had moved beyond Clements's prototype of the stable 
climax community. Although this model remained important, ecologists 
found the study of ecosystems more pertinent. By analyzing the relationship 
between flora and fauna in a continuous range of environments, ecologists 
could explain both the self-regulating aspects of a natural system and the 
changes that alter that system. When concerned citizens began to find their 
surroundings degraded, ecology—because it stressed the interconnectedness 
of humans and their environment—furnished the ideal source of information. 
The term subversive science defined ecology once activists started using its 
theories to challenge the idea of progress. The ecological hypothesis—that 
natural communities evolve towards an efficient point of equilibrium—goes 
against the capitalist ethos of endless growth and ever increasing consump­
tion. By bringing ecology into the debate about the preservation of natural 
resources, conservationists moved beyond questions of aesthetics. By 1970, 
ecologists were contending that maintaining the health of the ecosystem was 
crucial to sustaining human life. A society predicated on growth and con­
sumption could be at least as destructive as it was creative.3 Boca Ciega Bay 
proved to be an important test case for a nation wrestling with the issue of en­
vironmental protection. 
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Boca Ciega Bay: Destruction, Profits, and Controversy 
By the mid-1950s, Boca Ciega Bay was hardly a pristine body of water. During 
the depression, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had tied the coastal lagoon 
into the Intercoastal Waterway by dredging afifteen-foot-deep channel. The 
Corps deposited the bay bottom in large piles that formed "spoil islands." Sev­
eral hundred acres of bountiful marine habitat were covered with dredged mud 
and sand, and the grasses that had held the sandy bottom material could not 
grow in the deep channels, which led to increased levels of turbidity. The flow 
of partially treated sewage and the stormwater runoff inadvertently generated 
by the new developments also lowered the bay's water quality. 
Despite these problems, Boca Ciega Bay managed to remain one of the 
state's most prolific marine systems. Mangroves dotted its shores, and vast ex­
panses of turtle grass covered the southern half of the bay. The largest con­
centration of turtle grass, and one of Tampa Bay's most fertilefisheries, lay off 
Cat's Blank Point in southwest St. Petersburg. In 1953, in excess of four mil­
lion pounds of fish were taken in Pinellas—more than any other county in 
Florida. Forty percent of this haul came from Boca Ciega Bay. Hundreds of 
tourists and residents enjoyed shellfishing along the mudflats, and there was 
also a viable shrimping industry.4 
In 1953 Albert Furen, a local developer who owned six acres of shoreline 
property at Cat's Blank Point, purchased the rights tofill 504 acres of bay bot­
tom adjoining his holdings (figure 24) from the Trustees for the Internal Im­
provement Fund (TIIF). The TIIF, a commission chaired by the governor and 
comprising the state's independently elected cabinet members, was estab­
lished in 1850 after the federal government deeded to Florida all unowned 
public lands "wet and unfit for cultivation." From its inception, the TIIF 
served as a primary revenue-generating source for the state, and it rarely re­
stricted the sale of Florida's land and water.5 
After World War II, developers dredged indiscriminately, filling Florida's 
bays to meet the heavy demand for waterfront homes. In the early 1950s, con­
servation groups from coastal communities called on the state to restrict these 
projects, which were fouling some of the nation's most beautiful and pro­
ductive waters.6 During the 1953 gubernatorial campaign, LeRoy Collins 
promised to address this and many other issues. After his election, Collins 
came into the national spotlight when he attempted to break segregation's 
hold on Florida, but he did not forget his promise to the conservationists.7 
Collins enjoined a two-year moratorium on the TIIF's sale of submerged 
lands to give the state time to develop a program for regulating coastal 
building. He also issued a new policy that required investors seeking to buy 
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Figure 24 Approximately 25 percent of Boca Ciega Bay was either dredged or filled by 
1970. 
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submerged land from the TIIF to furnish environmental-impact studies for 
their proposed projects. Collins also established the State Land Use and Con­
trol Committee (SLUC) to explore ways to regulate dredge-and-fill operations 
in Florida waters.8 Furen's fill soon became a focal point for the Collins ad­
ministration. As Ney Landrum, one of the governor's aides, declared, "Things 
were entirely out of control in Pineilas and something had to be done."9 
In Pineilas, where "dredges were as routine as seagulls," elected officials 
openly abetted dredging operations.10 The county commissioners had never 
opposed a single fill proposal, and it seemed probable that the St. Petersburg 
City Council would extend city services to Furen's project. If Furen went on 
with hisfill, the Collins administration feared, the impact on Boca Ciega Bay 
would be devastating. The fill would also set an alarming precedent, because 
the huge project was "not related in a bonafide manner" to Furen's six-acre 
shoreline holding. If they supported the Furen project, the governor warned 
members of both the St. Petersburg City Council and the Pineilas County 
Commission, the state would intervene.11 
In December 1956, the St. Petersburg City Council voted four to three to 
negotiate with Furen about providing city services; the following March, the 
county commission gave its initial approval on the Furen fill. Collins backed 
up his threat by sending a condemnation act to the legislature. If passed, it 
would return Furen's submerged lands to the state. When the governor found 
that the large Pineilas delegation would block his draft act, he had the state at­
torney general, Robert Ervin, retain Tampa attorney Thomas Shackleford on 
behalf of the governor and the Florida State Board of Conservation. Shackle-
ford's role was to request a rehearing if the county commission gave final 
approval to the Furen project. In April, Ervin warned the commissioners 
that if they sanctioned the fill and refused to reopen the case with the state, 
Shackleford wouldfile suit in circuit court.12 
The Collins administration's effort to regulate dredge-and-fill operations 
received strong support from Nelson Poynter, publisher of the St. Petersburg 
Times. In increasingly Republican Pineilas County, Poynter gave Collins's De­
mocratic administration outspoken support, especially on this issue. Poynter's 
generous 1953 campaign contributions to Collins heavily influenced the de­
cision to call a moratorium on the sale of submerged land. Poynter felt that 
Pinellas's "sparkling waters" represented gifts of nature that needed protection 
from developers like Furen.13 "Furen and his partisans equate progress with 
quick profit," one editorial read. "Opponents think progress has a much wider 
and infinitely deeper meaning—Growth can be benign or cancerous."14 
While the St. Petersburg Times had always advocated the conservation of 
natural resources, it became a fervent supporter of Florida's ecology movement 
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Figure 25 While best known for his stand against segregation, 
Governor LeRoy Collins also championed Florida's early environ­
mental legislation. Courtesy of the University of South Florida Spe­
cial Collections. 
after Poynter struck up a friendship with the naturalist Rachel Carson. Carson, 
whose book Silent Spring (1962) awakened the nation to environmental dan­
gers, came to Tampa Bay in the mid-1950s to study marine ecology. Her ideas 
soon caught Poynter's attention. Carson's predictions about the consequences 
of human alteration of natural systems made Poynter intensify his campaign 
against dredge-and-fill. In 1955, the St. Petersburg Times published a series of 
articles describing how filling portions of Boca Ciega Bay for development 
would upset the ecological balance of the entire estuarine system. Poynter 
wanted the state to analyze the potential ecological ravages of additional 
dredge-and-fill projects in Boca Ciega Bay before the TIIF lifted its morato­
rium. He also urged the city council and the county commission to incorporate 
the results of such a study into a plan for regulating coastal development.15 
In 1956, a St. PetersburgTimes editorial claimed that the destruction of Boca 
Ciega Bay was especially "distressing for citizens interested in good planning 
131 
Chapter 7 
and preserving natural resources" because it pointed up the failure of the city's 
"ill-conceived planning philosophy." Bartholomew and Associates had omitted 
"human motivation" from their plan. Peopleflocked to the Pinellas area for its 
beautiful waters; yet the planners had failed to set the guidelines that could pre­
serve these natural resources. Local politicians chose to ignore this argument, 
but the plight of Boca Ciega Bay drew attention from outside the region.16 
Ecology and Planning 
By 1955, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) was reporting that 
Boca Ciega's "priceless assets" were in peril. Given "the serious threat of im­
pending dredging projects and the need for a comprehensive plan [emphasis 
added] to insure preservation of these resources," the USFWS urged, "a 
prompt and intensive study of this problem is warranted." The agency recom­
mended that the Florida State Board of Conservation undertake the study, be­
cause regulating fill projects fell under the state's jurisdiction.17 
The board immediately commissioned Robert Hutton, a marine biologist, 
to study the effects of dredging andfilling on Boca Ciega Bay. Hutton, a former 
professor of marine biology at the University of Miami, oversaw the project; 
Ken Woodburn, the state'sfirst ecologist, did much of thefieldwork. Five years 
earlier, the state had established a marine laboratory in St. Petersburg, and the 
research team had already analyzed portions of the bay. Between September 25, 
1955, and January 1,1956, Woodburn and Hutton carried out studies at fifteen 
sites throughout the bay. They recorded hydrological changes, analyzed bot­
tom samples, and accumulated a mass of biological data from examining man­
groves, sea grasses, algae, plankton, bacteria, echinoderms, fish, mollusks, and 
shrimp. Hutton also used the work of Robert Ingle, who had studied the effects 
of dredging in other southern states, for comparative analysis. 
In late 1956, Hutton completed his report, The Ecology of Boca Ciega Bay, 
with Special Reference to Dredging and Filling Operations. This study was the first 
ecological analysis that the state had sponsored to assess the impact of devel­
opment. Hutton concluded that Boca Ciega Bay would suffer irreparable dam­
age if the Furen project proceeded. Continuing to dredge andfill would heavily 
curtail commercialfishing because vast expanses of turtle grass, the bay's "key­
stone species," would be sacrificed for waterfront homes.18 Ecologists deter­
mine the health of natural systems by analyzing keystone species, which 
perform vital functions in the system and affect many other organisms. Turtle 
grass was essential to Boca Ciega Bay. Without it the estuary's interrelated web 
of land and marine life would collapse. 
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Besides providing a nursery for marine life, the root structure of the turtle 
grass kept the sandy soils at the bottom of the bay from dispersing. Further 
dredging projects would kill some turtle grass and cover the bay bottom with 
silt, choking a good portion of what remained. Turtle grass was the catalyst for 
the organic decomposition of waste. It could not survive in the deeper, dredged 
portions of the bay. Without this vital species, the ecosystem's ability to re­
cycle waste would be impaired, and the bay's water quality would drop expo­
nentially. Where dredging had already occurred, Hutton found that sulfate-
producing bacteria had created a rank black ooze that covered the bottom of 
the bay. Unless dredge-and-fill operations ceased, the bacteria that infested 
this anaerobic mud would spread throughout the bay. 
Dredge-and-fill operations like Furen's would only intensify the growing 
public health risk. While these projects were an inexpensive way for develop­
ers to create waterfront real estate, the public had to bear the cost of, as Wood-
burn put it, "permanent pollution." The destructive potential of the Furen 
project "should be weighed," Hutton concluded, "against expected benefits of 
the project before dredging is permitted to proceed."19 
In March 1957, Hutton'sfindings played an important role in the framing 
of the "Bulkhead Law," the SLUC's proposal to regulate dredge-and-fill oper­
ations. The idea was hardly new (the Nolen firm had presented a similar pro­
posal), but the time had now come to deal with the nearly intractable problem. 
Every deed to waterfront real estate in Florida carried a riparian provision that 
allowed landowners to extend existing lot lines into the water as far as the 
bulkhead, which was usually set at the edge of navigable channels. Property 
owners couldfill the area between the coast and the bulkhead line with mate­
rial excavated from the adjacent bay bottoms.20 The Bulkhead Law would pre­
serve waterfront property owners' access to existing channels, but all fill 
projects would have to meet minimum standards of health, safety, and welfare. 
The SLUC defined welfare as the "conservation of wildlife, prevention of ero­
sion, and damage of natural beauty." Its definition of health included the "pre­
vention of pollution." The Bulkhead Law also granted all cities and counties 
the authority to regulatefills through zoning. In addition to the Bulkhead Law, 
Collins requested legislation to regain the bottom lands that Furen held either 
by buying them or by exercising the right of eminent domain.21 
In 1957, in a special address before the opening session of the state legisla­
ture, Collins alerted Floridians to the pillaging of the state's most magnificent 
bays. Local officials had not only abused the public trust; they "actually en­
couraged the misuse of Florida's natural resources." Since county and mu­
nicipal governments appeared unwilling to protect Florida's waters, Collins 
announced that the state would regulate waterfront development.22 
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While the governor's conservation agenda was taking shape, Lee Ratner, a 
multimillionaire developer from Chicago, bought out Furen. Ratner claimed 
that his project wouldfill a gap in St. Petersburg's housing market by creating 
an exclusive setting for northern businessmen. "It has been proven that buyers 
of this type tend to bring their business enterprises to Florida," he said. Ratner's 
attorney, Leonard Bursten, a young lawyer who had started his career as an in­
vestigator for Senator Joseph McCarthy, promised that his client would nego­
tiate with all governmental agencies to improve the design of the project.23 
Lee Ratner had millions of dollars, but a less than sterling reputation. Ear­
lier in the decade, he had used advertisements in northern papers to sell thou­
sands of acres of unseen land near Fort Myers. Many of the buyers, novice 
investors, found that their "fabulous, improved lots," were instead watery plots 
in an impassable cypress swamp. Ratner's fraudulent scheme forced the state 
legislature to call a special session to discuss regulating land sales.24 
Ratner was the slick postwar developer personified.25 Besides his heavy use 
of advertising and other marketing ploys, he had an entourage of lawyers and 
consultants run through Florida's weak but growing list of regulations. Well-
placed political contributions and questionable ethics completed a scheme of 
operation seen all too often in the Sunshine State. During the 1950s, elected 
officials seldom worried if developers misled them. For "the good oP boy 
crowd," these entrepreneurs were simply trying to advance commerce and pros­
perity. It was just a matter of time before local officials began, John Rothchild 
writes, "codifying the promotional slogans into the county zoning."26 
On April 11,1957, the Pinellas County Commission approved the Ratner 
Fill, as the project was now called. At the end of the meeting, Shackleford 
handed the commissioners a petition for a rehearing and warned them that 
he would pursue the issue in court. Bursten claimed that the effort to block 
the project was "just because the people in Tallahassee disliked his client." He 
described the TIIF as a "bunch of bleeding hearts," and he cast doubt on the 
honesty of Hutton and Woodburn. Following in the steps of his former em­
ployer, Joe McCarthy, Bursten derided Hutton as a paid lackey who had "de­
liberately set out to wreck my client's plans." The aggressive young lawyer 
made a parting shot at Floyd Brown, the representative of the Alliance for the 
Conservation of Natural Resources (ACNR): "Instead of 20,000 members he 
is supposed to represent, the number had dwindled to a death march of a 
handful." 
Mrs. Robert Davis, an ACNR officer and president of the St. Petersburg 
Garden Club, immediately challenged Bursten. "If you want us to bring 1,000 
members up here to protest this fill, we'll do it." Since the city council had 
voted to work with Furen in December, the ACNR had sent more than 2,000 
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letters of protest. Floyd Brown also informed Shackleford that the ACNR 
would join the state board of conservation as a plaintiff if the state went to 
court against Ratner.27 
Davis, Brown, a high school science teacher, and Mary Bigelow had formed 
the ACNR in 1954. Bigelow devoted the most time to the organization. She 
had visited St. Petersburg in the early 1940s and had become enchanted with 
the region's natural beauty. In 1951 she moved to St. Petersburg. Three years 
later, she awoke one morning to the dull roar of a dredge. Incensed that her 
waterfront vista was being transformed into a subdivision, she organized the 
ACNR by gathering members from eight civic organizations. Between 1954 
and 1958, she traveled to Tallahassee numerous times to testify before the TIIF 
as the ACNR's representative.28 
On April 23, 1957, Bigelow was in Tallahassee when Ratner's lawyers and 
William Windom, St. Petersburg's city manager, appeared before Governor 
Collins and the rest of the TIIF board. Windom explained that Ratner would 
modify his project in exchange for the deeds to an additional section of the 
bay. When Windom admitted, despite Bursten's vehement objection (when 
Windom made his statement Bursten leaped up to and almost over the bar sep­
arating the audience from the TIIF), that Ratner intended tofill more than the 
area granted under the existing deed, Collins shook his head in disbelief. 
When the governor spoke, he chastised Windom for representing Ratner and 
endorsing a project "contrary to the interests of the city." He also informed 
Windom that the state would continue its effort to stop Ratner's project: "We 
have not counted ourselves out of the picture, even if you have." Windom 
apologized for having given the impression that the city wanted Collins to 
change his stance. 
Gerald Gould, the lawyer in charge of marketing the project, appeared next 
before the TIIF board. Gould complained that the state government had 
placed private citizens in jeopardy because agencies were "constantly chang­
ing their positions." The previous administration had already deeded the lands 
his client held, and Gould argued that the state's efforts to regulate develop­
ment were inconsistent with his client's legal standing. He also stated that he 
had a letter binding Florida's chief executive to "our legal position and moral 
position." Collins bristled as he told Gould, "I don't know who had told you 
what, but I do think I have a pretty good knowledge of what has been said at 
this table which is the official place that governs our conduct." 
The governor countered that the previous administration's decision repre­
sented "a considerable stretching of state policy." Then he asked Gould to pro­
duce his letter. The counselor haltingly admitted, "I'm not sure just where that 
letter is." The governor warned him to be more careful in what he said, and 
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Gould managed to stammer, "I'll try to get that letter." Collins suspended the 
discussion when Gould claimed that the governor had made certain promises 
to Ratner. Collins had never spoken with Ratner, he informed Gould, and the 
state would do whatever it could to stop his client's project. After the gover-
nor's declaration, Gould backed away from the stand, slumped down next to 
Bursten, and began murmuring into his briefcase.29 
Collins's stand ushered in a new era (figure 26). Even a multimillion-dollar 
project funded by northern capital was no longer an unquestioned good. 
While turning productive estuaries into subdivisions added to the local tax 
rolls, destroying Florida's natural resources compromised the public welfare. 
Collins represented a growing constituency that had come to see that the ben­
efits of protecting an important natural system outweighed the profitsfrom pri­
vate development. 
In June, despite opposition from the entire Pinellas delegation, the legisla­
ture passed an amended version of the Bulkhead Law. The bill's chief support­
ers camefrom coastal communities that feared their bays would suffer the same 
fate as Boca Ciega Bay unless the state took action. When Representative 
Thomas Carey of St. Petersburg tried to exempt Pinellasfrom the regulations, 
a Fort Myers representative noted that in "Pinellas you arefilling everything 
around there except the Sunshine Parkway" (the bridge between Bradenton 
and St. Petersburg). Carey countered that although thefish faced relocation, 
"We are putting people where we arefilling." Later Carey tried to shuttle the 
bill into committee, in hope that it would die a slow death. This motion lost 
after a representative from Bradenton, William Grimes, made the comment 
that if "we study this bill all summer isn't it possible Manatee County bays 
might end up as bad as Pinellas County bays?" Carey also failed to get a special 
exemption for the Ratner Fill, setting the stage for an important test of the 
state's new legislation.30 
While the Bulkhead Law represented an important step in the effort to reg­
ulate coastal development, it did little to alter existing building practices. The 
bill encouraged cities and counties to establish bulkhead lines, but it did not 
give any specific guidelines. In addition, the state legislature failed to provide 
funding for the technical assistance needed to design bulkhead lines properly. 
While the act gave the TIIF the right to withdraw landsfrom sale if the "con­
servation of natural resources were [sic] imperiled," there was no definition of 
what constituted peril. Thisflaw became only too apparent at the rehearing.31 
In December 1957, the county commission reopened proceedings on the 
Ratner proposal with expert testimony from Ratner's consultants.32 James B. 
Lackey, a marine biology professorfrom the University of Florida, testified that 
his employer's project would "encourage fish and marine life." Deep channels 
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Figure 26 Governor LeRoy Collins's fight against the Ratner Fill marked 
the beginning of a new era in Florida- Development, even in the form of a 
multimillion-dollar project funded by northern capital, was no longer seen 
as an unquestioned good. Jim Ivey, April 1957, St. Petersburg Times. 
on each side of the project would flush water into the most polluted section of 
the bay (north of the project), which would improve water circulation, dis­
perse bacterial pollutants, and even regenerate the dying scallop population. 
John Dequine, afish biologist for the Southern Fish Culture Company, backed 
up Lackey's testimony and added thatfishing opportunities would actually imr 
prove. The dredging operation would create deeper pools where fish would 
congregate, and the angle of the fabricated underwater slopes would also help 
to attract fish. "The heights of sophistry were reached," according to Ken 
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Woodburn, "when one consultant testified that sea grass beds were of little 
consequence to fish populations in Boca Ciega because fish came and went 
with the tides."33 Perhaps even more bizarre was the testimony of Dequine's 
employer, J. Hardin Peterson, a former U.S. Representative and Furen's attor­
ney. He claimed that the project would greatly benefit St. Petersburg because 
it would buffer the mainland during a hurricane. "I would suggest," com­
mented John Orr, the lawyer representing the ACNR, "this human buffer they 
are going to put out there certainly won't be in the real estate ads."34 
Robert Hutton, the author of The Ecology of Boca Ciega Bay, testified for the 
state. But before he could refute Ratner's consultants, he endured hours of in­
terrogation by Bursten. Burstenfirst tried to discredit The Ecology of Boca Ciega 
Bay by challenging Hutton's scientific credibility. After questioning the scien­
tist three separate times about his "compensation from the state," the lawyer 
tried to prove that Hutton was incapable of understanding the Ratner Plan. 
Huttonfinally received a respite when the state's attorney gained the floor. 
When asked what effect Ratner's project would have on the bay, Hutton re­
iterated his premise that the destruction of turtle grass beds would devastate 
the bay's marine system. Besidesfilling 500 acres of primefishing grounds, the 
dredging operations would deepen the shallow water surrounding the huge fill 
to a depth of between seven and twenty-five feet. Turtle grass thrived in depths 
of two to four feet, and Hutton had never found it in water deeper than six and 
a half feet. He pointed out that eliminating an estimated thousand acres of tur­
tle grass would increase the siltation problem, lower the water quality, and ac­
celerate the spread of anaerobic muck across the bottom of the bay. He also 
doubted that trading boat channels for grass flats would enhance fishing. "In 
my opinion," he concluded, "the elimination of Cats Blank Point would ma­
terially and adversely harm marine life." 
The Demise of Boca Ciega 
The Pinellas County Commission ignored Hutton's testimony and voted 
unanimously for Ratner to proceed. This was hardly surprising, especially after 
the county administrator, Dewey Morris, warned the ACNR to drop its oppo­
sition because the Ratner Fill would come "hell or high water."35 The anti-fill 
forces received more bad news when the ACNR and Shackleford challenged 
the commission's decision in the local circuit court and lost. Judge S. H. Har­
ris ruled that the TIIF's original sale to Furen was consistent with sound gov­
erning policy "and that public policy [was] irreversible."36 
The Collins administration contested the ruling, appealing jointly with the 
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ACNR and the THE In addition, the ACNR, the TIIF, and John Brantley, a 
St. Petersburg council member, challenged Ratner's title in a separate case. 
The coalition gained a very minor victory when Attorney General Ervin ruled 
that the TIIF could not grant title to submerged land off Cats Blank Point be­
cause St. Petersburg, not the state, held the rights to this domain. 
On January 8,1959, when the court challenges were still pending, Ratner's 
lawyers tried to force Collinses hand. A year had passed since the county com­
mission had issued Ratner's dredging permit, and if the operation did not 
begin within the year, the permit would lapse. Bursten informed Ervin that, 
unless the Collins administration agreed to a compromise, his client would be­
gin dredging. Collins responded to Bursten's threat by having the circuit court 
issue a restraining order against Ratner's project. He also informed Bursten 
that his administration would "resist to the fullest extent we can under the law 
and under legal obligations we have in the premises."37 
A month later the state court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling on 
the Ratner project. The ACNR and Ervin immediately petitioned the state 
supreme court. The petitioners claimed that the TIIF had exceeded its powers 
by selling lands outside its jurisdiction. The Florida Supreme Court denied this 
motion and ruled that it would not hear complaints against the actions of a 
state agency. With no legal means of redress, the Collins administration had 
little choice but to cut a deal. Ratner agreed to a slight modification of the proj­
ect, decreasing its size from 515 to 445 acres. He also donated some land to Pres­
byterian (now Eckerd) College and dedicated a right-of-way for the Bayway, a 
toll road that would link the south beach communities to St. Petersburg.38 
In 1961, Ratner's firm completed its dredging operation. While this project 
alone did not ruin the bay, its location and size ensured that the bay could 
never be restored to its former health. By 1964, this once shallow coastal la­
goon, with its vast meadows of turtle grass, had been transformed into a chan­
nelized cesspool. Fills occupied 12.5 percent of the bay's 20,000 acres, while 
dredging operations had altered another 5,000 acres to build thefills. The "sub­
urbanization" of the bay left the water discolored, stagnant, and laden with 
pollutants. As a layer of anaerobic muck replaced the sand of the bay bottom, 
commercial fishing interests, which brought in a yearly haul worth $1.4 mil­
lion, saw their catches plummet. By the late 1960s, Boca Ciega was Florida's 
most polluted bay, and fishing boats had to go into the Gulf of Mexico.39 
The first move to halt development in Boca Ciega Bay came in 1966, when 
the wealthy investor and environmentalist Nathaniel Reed joined Claude 
Kirk's Republican campaign for governor. In a surprise victory, Kirk returned 
the governor's office to the Republican Party for the first time in almost a cen­
tury. One of Kirk's first appointments went to Reed, who accepted the post of 
139 
Chapter 7 
"environmental advisor" and immediately set out to limit dredge-and-fill op­
erations. During the 1967 legislative session, Kirk and Reed teamed with Rep­
resentative Tom Randell of Fort Myers to secure passage of the Randell Act, 
which required developers seeking dredge-and-fill permits to furnish a detailed 
environmental-impact study that met specific state guidelines. Reed also per­
suaded Kirk to oppose any applications that significantly altered coastal habi­
tats. Before the Randell Act passed, Florida approved an average of 2,000 fill 
projects a year. By 1970 that number had shrunk to 200.40 
In 1969, Florida's bays received additional protection when Kirk signed the 
Aquatic Preserve Bill into law. Representative Dorothy Sample, a Republican 
attorney from St. Petersburg, spurred a bipartisan effort that prohibited dredg­
ing in designated preserves. She also convinced her colleagues to make Boca 
Ciega Bay Florida's first aquatic preserve.41 
During the late 1960s, new federal statutes also helped end dredge-and-fill 
operations in Boca Ciega Bay. In 1968 Congress passed the National Estuary 
Protection Act, which encouraged local municipalities to protect the biolog­
ical integrity of estuaries through planning. In addition, it called for federal 
agencies to consider the ecological impacts fostered by development projects 
in coastal areas. In 1970, the federal courtsfirst interpreted the National Estu­
ary Protection Act in Zabel v. Tabb, a case involving a dredge-and-fill project 
in Boca Ciega Bay.42 
In 1958, Alfred Zabel had requested a permit from the Pinellas County 
Commission to fill twelve acres of Boca Ciega Bay. Although it was tiny com­
pared to the Ratner Fill, Zabel's proposal to expand his trailer park into the 
bay attracted fierce opposition from local homeowners. The case went to the 
Florida Supreme Court twice before the TIIF was forced to grant a permit in 
1965. As a last—and usually pro forma—step, the project required approval 
from the Army Corps of Engineers. 
But when the project came in for review, the Corps1 Jacksonville office was 
inundated with protests. Colonel R. A. Tabb planned to postpone his decision 
until after the Corps had held a public meeting in St. Petersburg. In Novem­
ber 1966, more than a hundred citizens showed up to speak against the project. 
Only one person agreed with Zabel's attorney, Thomas Harris, who declared, 
"It's our land, we can do with it what we want." After the meeting, Tabb's staff 
consulted with other governmental agencies about the environmental impact 
of Zabel's project. The biologists at the Marine Research Laboratory in St. Pe­
tersburg provided the most information. Robert Ingle, a marine biologist who 
had worked with Hutton in the 1950s, was the director of the laboratory. In a 
meeting with the Corps' scientists, he restated most of Hutton's testimony 
140 
Beyond Limits 
from the previous decade. He also told them that the dredging andfilling of 
Boca Ciega Bay had cost thefishing industry $1.4 million a year.43 
In March 1967 Tabb denied Zabel's request for a permit. This was the first 
time the Corps had ever denied a project because of its potential to damage the 
environment. Harris immediately filed suit against the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and Tabb in federal court. The Tampa circuit court ruled against the 
Corps because the proposed project did not impede navigation. The court took 
the view that protecting the environment was an ancillary issue. In 1968, 
however, with the passage of the National Estuary Protection Act, the Corps' 
responsibilities increased. The Corps had to amend its permit and include an 
examination of the effects of proposed work on "fish and wildlife, conserva­
tion, pollution, aesthetics, ecology and the general public interest."44 After re­
vising its procedure for obtaining permits, the army appealed the circuit court's 
ruling in Zabel v. Tabb, In 1970, the case went before the federal appellate 
court in New Orleans. It drew national attention; both developers and en­
vironmentalists waited to see if courts would uphold the National Estuary 
Protection Act. 
In a precedent-setting decision, the court ruled that the project's destruc­
tive potential provided sufficient reason for refusing the dredging permit. The 
court found that, though projects like Zabel's had routinely received clearance 
a decade earlier, science had now clearly revealed the disastrous effects of 
dredge-and-fill projects on marine ecosystems. It was imperative that the gov­
ernment change its policies. Americans had become "aware of civilization's 
potential destruction," Judge John R. Brown stated, "from breathing its own 
polluted air and drinking its own infected water and the immeasurable loss 
from a silent-spring disturbance of nature's economy." Zabel appealed the de­
cision, but the Supreme Court refused to hear the case, and a new standard was 
set for Boca Ciega Bay and the? nation.45 
In 1970, the federal courts also sent Leonard Bursten, Ratner's attorney dur­
ing the late 1950s, to prison. Bursten had left Florida in the early 1960s to 
represent a group of high-rolling developers in Beverly Hills, where his intim­
idating tactics caught the attention of a task force investigating fraudulent real 
estate dealings. The Los Angles police later implicated Bursten in a scheme 
that involved bribing city officials, but before this case reached the courts, 
Bursten was sentenced to prison for tax fraud. While serving as Ratner's coun­
selor in 1957, Bursten had earned over $160,000, none of which he reported 
as earned income.46 
Boca Ciega Bay's condition, although pathetic enough, at least remained 
stable through the 1970s. By the end of the decade, the city's sewage plant had 
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stopped discharging partially treated sewage into the bay. Efforts to preserve 
and replace such vital species as mangroves and turtle grass even brought 
about minor improvements, but the bay remained an environmental hazard.47 
The U.S. Department of Commerce has featured Boca Ciega Bay in a film, 
Estuarine Heritage, that it distributes to coastal communities to warn them of 
unregulated development's disastrous consequences. Polluted urban bays are 
hardly uncommon, but no other bay in the nation has suffered such extensive 
damage in such a short period. Between 1940 and 1970, more than 80 percent 
of all Boca Ciega's marine grasses were lost, and 70 percent of the bay's nurs­
ery areas were destroyed. In 1940, Wilson Hubbard, captain of a charter boat, 
couldfish in the bay from his fourteen-foot skiff, using only a hook and a line, 
and consistently pull in over a hundred pounds of speckled trout a day. "You 
could look right through to the bottom,'* he recalled, "and see the fish swim­
ming around." In the late 1980s, Hubbard still ran charter fishing boats, but 
never in Boca Ciega Bay. Another commercialfisherman who had brought in 
giant hauls before the Ratner Fill lamented that there was nothing in the bay. 
"It's just so thick and heavy looking I wouldn't hardly swim in it, let alone fish 
it." In 1986, the county's chief health official discouraged swimming in the 
bay. "Why swim in it," he asked, "if you don't have to?" Shellfishing remains 
banned in most of the bay, and attempts to replant turtle grass have generally 
failed because of the poorflushing and heavy siltation-48 
Perhaps the most poignant reminder of Boca Ciega's demise comes from 
Governor Collins. Shortly before his death in 1991, Florida's senior statesman 
despaired that his administration did not do enough to protect the state's nat­
ural resources. Although he introduced many reforms through his office, the 
rape of Boca Ciega Bay still haunted him—so much so that, on flights to 
Tampa Bay, he always faced away from the coastal lagoon off St. Petersburg. 
What happened there was a "monstrous desecration" that he could never 
bring himself to view.49 
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Show me a man-oriented society in which it is believed that reality ex­
ists only because man can perceive it, that the cosmos exclusively is di­
vine and given dominion over all things, indeed that Go d is made in 
the image of man, and I will predict the nature of its cities and their land­
scapes. I need not look far for we have seen them—the hot-dog stands, 
the neon shill, the ticky-tacky houses, dysgenic city and mined land­
scapes. This is the image of the anthropomorphic, anthropocentric 
man; he seeks not unity with nature but conquest. Yet unity he finally 
finds, but only when his arrogance and ignorance are stilled and he 
lies dead under the greensward. 
Ian McHarg, Design with Nature, 1969 
I he controversy surrounding Boca Ciega Bay helped put the word ecology in 
the national vocabulary. By the early 1970s, depletion of natural resources, es­
calating levels of pollution, and suburban sprawl were forcing Americans to 
address the problems they had created. The noxious results of twenty-five 
years' unimpeded urban expansion on the Pinellas Peninsula were apparent to 
all. Hazy smog and cloudy, nutrient-laden bodies of water framed a degraded 
landscape: roads congested with cars and billboards, deteriorating downtowns, 
giant malls, endless sequences of strip centers, and a clutter of suburban sub­
divisions. The residents of St. Petersburg joined the chorus of Floridians 
clamoring for stronger land-use controls. Between 1972 and 1975 the state leg­
islature responded with a series of bills that made Florida a national leader in 
growth management. Planners moved from accommodating growth to re­
straining development that encroached on sensitive natural systems or over­
burdened public facilities. 
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The Quandary of Growth 
In the early 1970s, the issue of growth management dominated the public 
agenda throughout Florida. To address the impact of the South's growing 
affluence the University of South Florida hosted the Symposium on the 
Contemporary South in January 1972.1 Prosperity hadfinally arrived, but un­
regulated industrial and urban development had caused a multitude of en* 
vironmental and social problems.2 
The speakers presenting their views at the symposium included John Lewis, 
Julian Bond, Hodding Carter, Governor Rubin Askew, and LeRoy Collins. In 
the last session, Collins and C. Vann Woodward, the expert on southern his­
tory, talked about the region's future. To Woodward it seemed as though Henry 
Grady's dream of a "New South" had finally arrived. Tampa Bay's rapidly ex­
panding urban complex exemplified the image of a resurgent South. Yet in em­
ulating the North's creed of growth and development, the New South faced a 
new set of problems that were only too obvious to those driving along Pinel-
las's highly commercialized thoroughfares. The full horror of a "Yankeefied 
South," Woodward stated, "is suggested . .  . by a drive between Tampa and 
Clearwater."3 
During the early 1970s, St. Petersburg embodied the fortunes of a New 
South city overwhelmed by growth. While the rest of the nation's economy 
slowed down between 1970 and 1973, in St. Petersburg, where the population 
increased by almost ten percent (to 235,000), government services could not 
keep up with the demand for new roads and urban services. To complicate mat­
ters further, a record-breaking drought wreaked havoc in southwest Florida 
during the same period. 
The drought made the situation in St. Petersburg especially difficult. Al­
though south Pinellas averaged more than fifty inches of rain per year, St. 
Petersburg's potable water had to be piped in from outside the city limits. Salt­
water first intruded into the city's aquifer during the 1920s, and the city com­
mission leased water rightsfrom the Eldridge-Wilde wellfields in northeastern 
Pinellas and northwestern Hillsborough County. In the mid-1950s, the penin-
sula's rapid urbanization also forced the Pinellas County Water Authority to 
purchase lease agreements with the Eldridge-Wilde wellfields. A decade later, 
Pinellas authorities obtained more leases to water rights from wellfields in 
neighboring Pasco County, and by 1971, the 700,000 residents of Pinellas 
County got 43 percent of their potable water from wells outside the peninsula.4 
The drought exposed the precarious nature of the water supply. In 1971, 
saltwater intruded into municipal wells in northern Pinellas; shortly there­
after, excessive water use threatened the Eldridge-Wilde wellfield with the 
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same fate. Municipal and county officials scrambled to come up with a ra­
tioning plan, but no long-range solution emerged, and regional water supplies 
continued to dwindle.5 
The region's diminishing water supply forced St. Petersburg's municipal of­
ficials to manage the city's growth in a more responsible manner. In Novem­
ber 1971, the city council formulated the Citizens' Goals Committee to work 
over a two-year period toward a series of growth management goals. The more 
than 200 citizens concerned in this project included environmentalists, offi­
cers of homeowners' associations, home builders, realtors, property investors, 
and leaders from various civic groups. The group divided into twelve subcom­
mittees to deal with such major areas of concern as the natural environment, 
housing, transportation, and land use.6 
As the drought continued through the summer of 1972, the growing num­
ber of environmental problems made planning and land^use controls a com­
mon topic. The parched conditions meant that any project demanding 
additional sewer or water connections aggravated the outcry for strict mea­
sures to control growth. Surveys revealed that angry citizens, who saw their 
quality of life eroding, wanted municipal officials to put severe limits on de­
velopment. "The public did not want to hear about comprehensive plans," one 
reporter noted, "they wanted action."7 
Florida's Quiet Revolution 
All across Florida, elected officials, environmentalists, and citizens petitioned 
Tallahassee to solve the problems produced by a generation of untrammeled 
city building. Between 1950 and 1970 Florida's population more than doubled, 
jumping from 2.8 million to 6.8 million. Developers had drained wetlands and 
filled bays to meet the demand for new housing, amassing huge profits as they 
went. The drought pointed up the folly of disrupting the ecology of entire re­
gions. In the intensely developed coastal areas, the native vegetation died out, 
and foreign species like the Maleleuca from Australia and the Brazilian pepper 
replaced them. Since these exotic trees were immune to native predators, their 
populations exploded. The ground beneath their tightly packed limbs became 
a desert.8 
As water became scarcer, water pollution levels also mounted. The thou­
sands of acres of cypress stands and mangroves lost to development had per­
formed vital functions that human engineering could not replace. Besides 
serving as nurseries and sanctuaries for Florida's diverse wildlife, they had 
maintained the fragile balance between water quality and water quantity by 
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filtering out pollutants and storing vast amounts of rainwater. With fewer wet­
lands to act as filters, more pollutants found their way into Florida's waters. 
During the drought the problem became acute. As the levels of nutrients 
mounted, the available oxygen decreased. Algae blooms became common­
place in the increasingly turbid bodies of green water. High concentrations of 
nitrogen and phosphorous also contributed to covering sandy bay and lake 
bottoms with layers of anaerobic muck. For many, waterfront living became a 
curse when the wind shifted and the stench of decay pervaded the air.9 
The continuing dryness especially exacerbated problems in urban areas, al­
ready plagued by ecological problems. In spring 1971, the St. Johns's fresh­
water prairies dried out. Peat fires burned five to six feet below ground and 
shrouded Jacksonville, the Kennedy Space Center, and Orlando with smoke. 
Directly across the state, coastal cities in the Tampa Bay region fought a series 
of water wars against inland communities.10 
The drought placed south Florida and the Everglades at special risk. Peat 
fires burning in wetland prairies throughout the spring enveloped metropoli­
tan Miami in a gray haze. Water levels in the Everglades dipped to historic 
lows, threatening the entire region's water supply. The Everglades' countless 
sloughs, ponds, and wetlands were a freshwater bubble overlying a stratum of 
saltwater in the underground aquifer. As the Everglades' once plentiful supply 
of freshwater vanished, saltwater intruded more and more into the region's 
drinking wells.11 
Arthur Marshall, an outspoken ecologistfrom the University of Miami, had 
been predicting such a catastrophe for years. His studies revealed that Miami's 
urban complex had surpassed its "carrying capacity," the ability of a regional 
ecosystem to support life. In 1972 he reported that south Florida's problems 
were ample proof that the state's urban systems needed restructuring. Unless 
metropolitan Miami recognized the constraints imposed by its ecosystem, the 
vast Everglades-Lake Okeechobee natural system was doomed. Marshall 
wrote, "South Florida is a classic demonstration of the facts that growth and 
development cannot proceed endlessly without intolerable social costs; that 
the constraints of ecosystems ultimately clash with the economics of city bud­
gets; that a holistic interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems is 
essential; and that the impoverishment of our large urban areas may be the yet 
unrecognized environmental catastrophe many have been waiting to trigger 
the nation into action."12 
After studying Marshall's report, Rubin Askew, Florida's governor from 1970 
to 1978, brought Marshall on board as an adviser. Although Marshall's inabil­
ity to compromise shortened his stay in Tallahassee, he did help the Askew ad­
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ministration craft a reform package to manage Florida's natural resources, pro­
tect ecosystems of critical concern, and plan for urban expansion. If his agenda 
did not pass, Askew warned the 1972 state legislature, "It is not off-beat or 
alarmist to say that the continued failure to control growth and development 
in the state will lead to economic as well as environmental disaster."13 
Florida's coalition of environmental groups14 backed Askew's plan, but it 
also received strong support from Democrat Robert Graham of Miami Lakes, 
who led a coalition of urban legislators seeking a remedy for their predicament. 
Graham had made his mark as the developer of the planned community of Mi­
ami Lakes. The success of this enterprise lent him credibility in the eyes of 
both developers and environmentalists. He understood the issues of private 
property, but still advocated planning to solve environmental problems. 
Working together, Graham and Askew pushed the reforms through, and in the 
process transformed Florida's governing system.15 
Almost overnight Florida changed from a typical southern state devoted to 
boosterism and unfettered development into a national leader in growth man-
agement.16 In 1972 the legislature passedfive major acts: the Water Resources 
Bill, the Environmental Land and Water Management Bill, the State Com­
prehensive Planning Bill, the Land Conservation Bill, and the Environmen­
tal Reorganization Bill. Taken together these bills formed "Florida's quiet 
revolution," as Graham called it, in land use control.17 
The Environmental Land and Water Management Bill established five wa­
ter management districts to deal with Florida's water woes. The Southwest 
Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) included sixteen counties 
around Tampa Bay. The new agency initiated work on a plan to regulate wa­
ter use and warned Pinellas officials that it would, if necessary, reduce the flow 
of potable water into Pinellas. If this happened, the county commission would 
have to halt all building in order to conserve water. When the drought 
persisted into 1973, a prominent group of Pinellas developers threatened 
SWFWMD with a lawsuit if the agency moved ahead with its plans to ration 
water. The district's managing board, however, refused to make any adjust­
ment that would jeopardize the region's water supply.18 
Although the new legislation gave water management districts the power 
to influence local land-use planning, the State Comprehensive Planning Bill 
did not fare so well. Conservative rural legislators bitterly opposed any state-
mandated planning that limited property rights. They managed to strike down 
a proposal to create a state office for comprehensive planning. Without an 
agency empowered to review and implement plans, the planning bill was pow­
erless to help municipal governments manage their growth.19 
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John Harvey, St. Petersburg's planning director, felt that the failure of the 
State Comprehensive Planning Bill undermined St. Petersburg's effort to re­
plan. If other municipalities failed to follow the city's lead, he questioned 
whether St. Petersburg's new agenda could succeed. In May 1973 he wrote 
Daniel O'Connell, "We need a State Plan and strong centralized State gover­
nance of human activity to survive" (O'Connell headed the Florida Environ­
mental Land Management Study Committee, a group appointed by Governor 
Askew in late 1972 to draw up a statewide growth policy.) Harvey warned 
O'Connell that Florida would "develop itself to death" unless the state 
adopted a long-term approach to the environmental crisis, as put forth in the 
Club of Rome's (an international group of distinguished businessmen, states­
men, and scientists) groundbreaking work, The Limits to Growth (1972). A 
strong state directive for growth management was essential, he concluded, "so 
that . .  . a Florida with 14 million by the year 2000 can be avoided."20 
Despite the shortcomings of the State Comprehensive Planning Bill, 
Florida had a new look. After a few halting steps in the previous two decades, 
the state had finally devised a method to regulate the city-building process. 
"Florida is a place where, until recently, the use of land has reflected an ex­
ploitative laissez-faire philosophy," Luther Carter wrote, "but this state may 
now be at the threshold of great changes."21 Now that protecting the environ­
ment had become almost as acceptable as making profits, those two very dif­
ferent aims would drive the city-building process. 
St* Petersburg: An Experiment in Growth Management 
In September 1972, St. Petersburg's municipal officials faced a major test when 
the Joint Venture Corporation, a subsidiary of Lee Ratner's company, re­
quested utility connections for a project that would house 25,000 people on 
Bayway Isles, the new name for Boca Ciega's largest man-made island. The ex­
isting plan contained no guidelines for incorporating Bayway Isles into the 
city, and it was soon evident to everyone involved that St. Petersburg's plan­
ning system had failed. Over the next year countless public meetings, lawsuits, 
and countersuits ensued as citizens' groups, public officials, and Joint Venture 
haggled over building densities.22 
In July 1973, Bayway Isles came under even closer scrutiny after SWFWMD 
cut Pinellas's water ration by 23 percent. This cutback severely affected south­
west St. Petersburg, the fastest-growing section of St. Petersburg—and the 
section that would give Bayway Isles urban services. The southwest sewer 
treatment plant "was so overloaded," according to one report, "that residents 
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living nearby asked the city for gas masks as defense against the fetid smell." 
At a public meeting about Bayway Isles, some activists did show up wearing gas 
masks. After conferring with SWFWMD, the city council halted ail building 
in southwest St. Petersburg until a new sewage system was ready.23 
The city council finally worked out a compromise with the Joint Venture 
Company four months later. SWFWMD's water rationing made the develop­
ers scale down their original request. Instead of building twenty-eight high-
rises with 10,000 apartments, they agreed to a more "human scale design" of 
4,700 units. The developers also agreed to postpone construction until com­
pletion of the new Southwest Sewage Treatment Plant in 1975.24 
The Joint Venture controversy forced the city to reassess its entire planning 
process. The company had originally demanded that the city provide services 
for 10,000 new apartments; the planning department, to the city council's in­
dignation, could not even estimate the project's environmental impact. The 
council ordered a comprehensive analysis of the Pinellas environment, which 
the planning staff would combine with the work of the Citizens1 Goals Com­
mittee to form a new plan. The new plan would estimate maximum develop­
ment based on natural limitations, and might also "bring an end," one editor 
hoped, "to the asphalting and destruction of our once lush woodlands."25 
At the same time the city council established two new boards: an environ­
mental development commission (EDC) and a planning commission. These 
two bodies replaced the planning board, which, according to the St. Petersburg 
Times, was too often "impotent in dealing with the land-boom, people-rush 
growth style of St. Petersburg in the 1970s." The planning commission would 
handle long-range planning issues; the EDC would review development pro­
posals and requests for zoning variances.26 
The EDC quickly put an end to the rubber-stamping of development pro­
posals by requiring developers to prove that their projects would not have 
adverse social, economic, or environmental impacts. The overloaded sewage 
system, shrinking water supply, and crowded roads made building permits 
much more difficult to obtain. The St. Petersburg Times reported: "Dozens of 
times, developers, big and small, found that their vivid artist's renderings, their 
slick-papered charts and plans and their expensive attorneys' best verbiage 
were just not enough, and quite frequently they had no choice but to pack up 
their briefcases and stride angrily out the door with a rejection slip."27 
EDC meetings regularly erupted when developers confronted the commu-
nity's new guidelines. Property investors were still encouraged to make 
money—as long as their profit was not at the public's expense. "I think land is 
like a stock," the EDC chairperson, Helen Thompson, argued. "They bought 
it to speculate and there are no guarantees." When strip commercial projects 
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and proposals for intensive waterfront development came before the EDC, 
meetings frequently offered minor fireworks. "Occasionally, with issues like 
the Bayway," as a reporter noted, there were "moments of high drama." The 
rancorous hearings further highlighted—as if it were necessary—the existing 
plan's failure to guide development effectively.28 
County officials faced their own problems in trying to deal with the tremen­
dous pressures of growth in the region. When SWFWMD restricted the flow 
of water into Pinellas in July 1973, the county commission temporarily put a 
stop to building. The county planning staff also started assessing "a brake-the-
growth-formula" to find a better way to manage development.29 A report to 
the county commissioners stated, "In Pinellas County we have urbanized to 
the point where a project in northwest Pinellas will ultimately impact St. 
Petersburg and vice a versa [sic]." Since the St. Petersburg city council had 
already begun replanning, county officials looked to Pinellas's lead city for 
guidance in drawing up a growth-management plan.30 
The county joined with St. Petersburg to establish an environmental task 
force consisting of planners, environmentalists, and government administra­
tors. The goal of the task force was to assess the Pinellas environment and 
develop proposals for a county growth-management plan. In late 1973, the 
end of the drought brought a reprieve to Pinellas County. SWFWMD was able 
to increase the flow of water into the peninsula, and the county commission 
lifted the building moratorium. The county planners were granted additional 
time to research growth-management plans from across the country.31 St. 
Petersburg, however, continued to move ahead with its growth-management 
agenda. 
In November 1973, the Citizens* Goals Committee delivered its report to 
the city council. After two years of meetings, this diverse group had reached 
agreement on a series of growth-management goals. The committee placed 
special emphasis "upon maintaining satisfactory living conditions, providing 
for ease of movement throughout the community, maintaining a balance of 
economic growth and land use control, and preserving the ecology."32 
The next phase of the planning process required the planning department 
to design a conceptual plan that combined the work of the Citizens1 Goals 
Committee and the Environmental Task Force. The city council adopted an 
Interim Growth Policy (IGP) to guide growth in the meantime. The planning 
department had drafted the IGP with the goal of creating "a City for Living 
atmosphere."33 
The planners proposed preserving and restoring such natural features as 
wetlands, mangrove estuaries, beaches, and stands of native trees to help St. 
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Petersburg reclaim its past climate. Fifty years earlier, water and forests had 
covered more land, and temperatures were less extreme. The staff also recom­
mended setting aside as much permeable green space as possible to retain 
stormwater. This would mitigate flooding and allow rainwater to filter through 
the ground instead of pouring into the bays. With the area's mixture of sand, 
clay and limestone acting as afilter for more water, the threat of saltwater in­
trusion would decrease.34 
The planners also proposed redirecting development patterns. John Har­
vey, the planning director, wrote, "Redevelopment and improvement of exist­
ing urban areas must be favored over development which will utilize the 
remaining open lands." For new construction on vacant land, Harvey favored 
pedestrian-oriented cluster developments that situated homes and apartments 
around large common areas. Although this urban form offered less private 
open space than the typical subdivision, it provided more common green 
space. For this policy to succeed, the city also needed to reclaim a pedestrian 
orientation by deemphasizing auto travel and improving the public trans­
portation system. Besides relieving traffic congestion, a more diverse trans­
portation system would reduce pollution and energy consumption.35 
The IGP included directives that restricted development in areas where 
growth had outstripped the city's ability to provide services. The moratorium 
on new building in southwest St. Petersburg would stand until completion of 
the new sewage treatment plant, scheduled for July 1, 1975. A similar mora­
torium would prevent new construction in the northeastern area of the city 
until the new Albert Whitted Plant opened. Harvey warned the planning 
commission that these were only stopgap measures. If building failed to resume 
after a prescribed interval, the city might be violating the Fifth Amendment 
by having "taken" property without just compensation. To stay within legal 
bounds, the planning department needed to formulate a vision of the future 
that would allow development to proceed in the most appropriate manner.36 
In a planning commission workshop, Harvey placed his concerns in histor­
ical context by recounting the fate of John Nolen's vision for St. Petersburg. 
He told his listeners, "It has taken a long time for the idea to grab hold and be 
accepted, and I am not sure we are to that point yet."37 The condition of the 
environment and the state of Florida had, however, forced the city's hand. At 
the same time, Harvey worried that the EDC's desire to see an "across-the-
board reduction of residential building densities" was based on an arbitrary 
population figure.38 Harvey stressed that there was no legal precedent for a 
plan based on maintaining a desired population, and that the courts would 
strike down any plan that arbitrarily restricted growth. A legally defensible 
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plan would tie capital improvements (sewers, water, roads) to a reasonable 
schedule. That way, the city could delay construction of projects that ex­
ceeded its current ability to provide services. 
Harvey assured the planning commission that his department would pro­
vide a workable growth-management plan, once staff members had incorpo­
rated data from the Environmental Task Force's study into their work. The task 
force information explained "the effects of urbanization on natural systems" 
and suggested "directions for improved management."39 When this informa­
tion was fully integrated into the new plan, city officials would have solid le­
gal arguments for restricting development in fragile ecological areas.40 
The information in the Environmental Task Force report would enable 
planners to project a maximum population based on carrying capacity. Har-
vey's staff followed the planning principles set forth in Ian McHarg's landmark 
book, Design with Nature, to set building densities.41 Although McHarg's de­
sire to plan cities around natural constraints was hardly new, his ideas arrived 
at an auspicious moment. In a world finally confronting the limits to growth, 
planning remained the chief tool for shaping urban expansion. McHarg wrote, 
"There is a need for simple regulations, which ensure that society protects the 
values of natural processes and is itself protected. Conceivably such lands ex­
ist wherein these intrinsic values and constraints would provide the source of 
open space for metropolitan areas. If so, they would satisfy a double purpose 
ensuring the operation of vital natural processes and employing lands unsuited 
to development in ways that would leave them unharmed by these often vio­
lent processes. Presumably, too, development would occur in areas that were 
intrinsically suitable, where dangers were absent and natural processes un-
harmed."42 
St. Petersburg's planners used McHarg's techniques to outline the ecologi­
cal constraints on the city. They shaded each physiographic feature on a sepa­
rate clear plastic sheet and then placed the profiles over a blank base map. The 
parts of the white underlying map that showed through represented areas most 
suitable for development. Overlays shading a region indicated the presence of 
sensitive natural features. The completed map helped planners to weigh the 
factors influencing various landforms and assign appropriate building densities. 
Regaining a Lost Vision 
In May 1974, Harvey presented the 1974 Conceptual Plan (see figure 27) to the 
city council.43 The plan presented an ideal form and served as the base for the 
more detailed comprehensive plan. In the 1974 Conceptual Plan, planners 
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Figure 27 The "bold new concepts" that the 1974 Conceptual Plan used to develop a 
"man-made environment in harmony with nature" were undoubtedly bold—but hardly 
new. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Department of Planning. 
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analyzed the lower Pinellas Peninsula as if it were virgin land, then described 
"the best possible urban environment" based on natural constraints. The plan 
presented "bold new concepts," its authors wrote, "to guide the man-made 
aspects of our environment and protect and enhance the parts which nature 
provided." The goal of promoting a "man-made environment in harmony with 
nature" was undoubtedly bold—but it was hardly new. John Nolen had per­
formed the same featfifty years earlier. 
The design and methodology behind the Conceptual Plan and Nolen's plans 
(figures 27, 10, and 14) are strikingly similar. Each work analyzed the natural 
environment—soils, drainage, topography, and vegetation. Ecologically sen­
sitive areas were marked for preservation or conservation, then linked with ex­
isting parks, drainage canals, creeks, permeable green spaces, and a proposed 
system of heavily vegetated boulevards. This network of green also provided 
buffers between neighborhoods and set natural boundaries for the city's ex­
pansion. 
While the Conceptual Plan followed Nolen's general design, it furnished 
more precise guidelines for structuring future growth. The planning staff 
mapped and weighted each ecological feature to correlate building densities 
with the natural environment. For instance, they gave a weight of 2.0 to man­
groves, deciduous forests, and poorly drained soils, while pine flatwoods and 
soils with medium levels of percolation were weighted at 1.0. The planning 
stafTdrew up a formula assigning lands to one of three categories: preservation 
(4*0 or higher), conservation (2.0-3.0) and development (below 2.0). A 
preservation designation precluded development, but landowners received a 
"transfer of development rights." The less fragile conservation areas allowed 
owners to build on 40 percent of their property. The development designation 
allowed densities ranging from 7.5 units per acre in single-family residential 
areas to 30.0 units per acre in the downtown district. According to the plan­
ning department's analysis, St. Petersburg could sustain a maximum popula­
tion of 350,000 if property owners chose to build at maximum density levels. 
The 1974 Conceptual Plan also provided a vision of St. Petersburgfifty years 
into the future. Like Nolen, St. Petersburg's new generation of planners fore­
saw "a city very expressive of the unusual resort and residential character that 
is special to St. Petersburg." They centered the most intensive land uses in 
three "activity centers" that mixed large-scale commercial uses and high-
density residential developments. Outside these areas, new residential devel­
opments, whether single homes or multifamily units, would be clustered to 
maximize open space. The plan also proposed recycling land, especially in the 
downtown area. In "a city with limited land space," the plan read, "redevelop­
ment activity could ultimately provide as much work as new construction." 
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This new proposal labored under many more constraints than the Nolen 
plan had. In 1973 less than 20 percent of the city stood vacant;fifty years ear­
lier nonurban uses accounted for 90 percent of the land. In addition, 95 per­
cent of all in-town traffic used autos, sharply contrasting with the era when St. 
Petersburg's transportation system had both autos and trolleys. One of the new 
plan's principal goals was to reinstate an "integrated transportation system" by 
building fewer roads and making a gradual shift to public transportation, 
pedestrian walkways, and bikeways. Besides improving energy efficiency and 
lessening pollution, a "multi-modal" transportation system would allow the re­
maining permeable green spaces to filter the pollutant-laden runoff from city 
streets. 
The planners proposed a system of "transportation corridors" to blend dif­
ferent transportation modes. The corridors would include broad, tree-lined 
boulevards (figure 28) and make up the "backbone of the open space system." 
"These boulevards will be as important for their beauty as for their function," 
the plan read. "They will provide welcome visual relief in the midst of an ur­
ban environment." Fifty years earlier, Nolen had recommended that a system 
of boulevards (figure 29) would provide "welcome breaks in the street sys-
tem."44 The primary difference between the two boulevard proposals was that 
Nolen encouraged the planting of native plants and trees along the corridor, 
while the new plan contained no landscape specifications. 
St. Petersburg's planners promoted the proposed boulevards as key compo­
nents in the effort to carve out identifiable neighborhoods from the city's mass 
of homogeneous subdivisions. The plan established fifty-two neighborhood 
districts, or "modular neighborhoods." Besides ringing each modular with 
boulevards, the planners set the following goals for each neighborhood: In­
crease green space, de-emphasize vehicular traffic, provide an access to a mix­
ture of commercial uses, incorporate citizens' participation, and build a "sense 
of place." 
The plan envisioned distinctive neighborhoods that provided places of res­
idence, work, recreation, and commerce. Major transit connections abutting 
each neighborhood would lessen auto dependence. If each neighborhood had 
a variety of land uses, the planning staff hoped, residents would develop a new 
acquaintance with their local surroundings. Once the city council adopted the 
I974 Conceptual Plan, the planning staff would work with the people living in 
each neighborhood to assess and accentuate the area's unique characteristics. 
The onerous task of rezoning the city would accompany adoption of the 
plan. The 1972 comprehensive plan had allowed an ultimate, "built out" pop­
ulation of 750,000. Even after the city council reduced building densities in 
1973 and 1974, existing zoning still permitted a population of 550,000, a far 
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proposed boulevards 
Figure 28 The similarity between Nolen's work and this, the 1974 St. Petersburg 
Boulevard Plan, is striking. The principal difference was Nolen's proposal to plant 
native species. Courtesy of the St. Petersburg Department of Planning. 
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Figure 29 Pictured here is the 1923 Nolen Street Design Plan. Courtesy of the Division of 
Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library. 
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cry from the Conceptual Plan'sfigure of 350,000. Despite this discrepancy, the 
city council could move ahead because—in contrast to previous decades— 
there was now strong public backing for structuring growth.45 
In fact, the support was a bit too strong. Many people believed that achiev­
ing growth management demanded draconian measures. In March 1974, 
when the planning commission received the Conceptual Plan, one city coun­
cil member, Hugh Ruckdeschel, proposed a much more radical idea for meet­
ing the demands of future growth. He wanted to cap the population at its 
existing level of 235,000—and give newcomers six months to leave.46 
RuckdeschePs proposal passed and drew national attention for the severity 
of its restrictions. The New York Times applauded the effort as "a healthy resis­
tance to mindless expansion."47 On its national telecast CBS News called this 
radical growth measure a sign of the new era in municipal government. But the 
city council quickly rescinded the ordinance after Ruckdeschel admitted that 
the move was a ploy to get the city to take the new plan seriously.48 
RuckdeschePs gambit illustrated Florida's new priorities. Most residents be­
lieved that the state needed to be more aggressive in restraining growth. In 
1975, Patrick Caddell found in a poll that Florida was the only state where en­
vironmental concerns outweighed anxiety about the recession. Seventy-five 
percent of those questioned also supported stronger land-use controls to limit 
growth.49 
In May 1975, the city council adopted the Conceptual Plan withput any sub­
stantial changes or a single dissenting vote.50 Two months later, the plan be­
came even more significant when the legislature, acting on a report from the 
Environmental Land Management Study Committee, passed the Local Gov­
ernment Comprehensive Planning Act (LGCPA). This bill required all cities 
and counties to adopt comprehensive plans and submit them to the Depart­
ment of Community Affairs, the new state planning agency, for approval.51 
Haifa century after Nolen had introduced the idea in St. Petersburg at the Na­
tional Planning Conference, Floridafinally passed a state planning act. While 
the act gave legal standing to St. Petersburg's new urban vision, politics, not 
science or urban design, really drove the movement. 
Concept and Reality 
After the adoption of the Conceptual Plan, John Harvey moved on. Bruce 
Hahl, a Massachusetts planner, became responsible for the next phase of the 
planning process. Over the following two years, HahPs staff distributed 
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300,000 notices and held numerous open workshops to involve the public in 
the design of the more detailed comprehensive plan. The media reported ex­
tensively on the team's activities. The city planning department invested hun­
dreds of hours in research and public hearings to produce the final planning 
document, the comprehensive plan, which would guide development through 
the year 2000.52 
The planning staff divided the city into five sectors (east, north, west, 
south, and in-town), then analyzed four elements: (1) land use, (2) conserva­
tion of natural resources, (3) recreation and open space, and (4) traffic cir­
culation. The sector plans included general recommendations and design 
criteria for the policies and goals outlined in the Conceptual Plan. During the 
review of each sector, the city would modify its zoning ordinance and capital 
improvements program to reflect the plan. 
The enthusiasm that greeted the 1974 Conceptual Plan vanished when 
planners tried to sell their new vision. At workshop after workshop—and 
hearing after hearing—representatives from homeowners' associations, civic 
groups, environmental organizations, home builders' associations, and the re­
alty industry battled over land-use designations. Hahl and Doug Baird, an at­
torney and the chairman of the planning commission, had to resolve the 
conflict over property rights before the plan could have a hope of being 
adopted. Those fighting the plan claimed that the various down-zonings— 
zoning land for less intensive use—abridged their constitutional rights by de­
priving them of the full economic use of their land. But advocates of growth 
management contended that property owners needed protection from the ef­
fects of those altering the landscape for economic gain. As the process moved 
forward, it became apparent that the idyllic lifestyle depicted in the Concep­
tual Plan represented a radical departure from the version of the American 
Dream being built and sold in St. Petersburg.53 
Once Americans' sacred right to property had been invoked, the conflict 
soon heated up. "Who in the hell," one outraged businessman asked, "said that 
somebody who went to school and learned how to plan is better at planning 
the City of St. Petersburg than those who built it?" A small, close-knit group 
of developers, real estate brokers, and bankers led the assault against the plan. 
Despite their small number, this "high-gravity establishment," as one reporter 
called them, played an important role in municipal policy because its members 
owned most of the vacant land.54 
William Mills, the owner of a large constructionfirm, and an investor, E. B. 
Porter, first questioned the plan. Both men sat on the board of directors of 
Florida Federal Savings and Loan, one of St. Petersburg's dominant financial 
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institutions. Florida Federal had purchased land from Mills to build a branch 
office on the city's south side, but the planning staff down-zoned this site for 
residential use. 
The south sector, in the planners' analysis, contained far too much com­
mercially zoned land. A bank built on the Mills parcel would just add to the 
miles of commercial strip centers that lined the city's thoroughfares.55 The 
planners argued that the excess of commercial lands was in no one's best in­
terest. Store vacancies promoted blight, lowering revenues, and the prolifer­
ation of marginal uses for such land (used-car lots and secondhand stores) 
destroyed the appearance of an area because owners invested little in upkeep 
and improvements. An overabundance of commercial operations left too 
many competitors vying for too few consumers. With less revenue for each en­
trepreneur, profits and property values declined, tax revenues dropped, and the 
quality of life eroded.56 
The planners advocated building commercial clusters and decreasing the 
land devoted to commercial strip centers. Besides making mass transit more 
feasible, this would foster better traffic flow, cut down on accidents, and save 
energy. A compact, clustered development also allowed space for green buffers 
and reduced the number of signs—a special need in a city overloaded with 
billboards and neon. If the city council wanted to realize its new vision, Hahl 
argued, it was essential to rezone the Mills parcel and others like it.57 
In July 1975, Hahl informed Florida Federal that the planning commission 
intended to rezone the Mills property. Joseph Lettelleir, vice president of 
Florida Federal, promptly resigned as vice chairman of the planning commis-
sion.58 Lettelleir had heartily endorsed the Conceptual Plan as a member of the 
planning commission, but this changed when the LGCPA made it possible for 
the plan's pleasing prospects and idealistic visions to gain legal standing. As 
the rezoning process moved forward, Lettelleir dedicated himself to eradicat­
ing the "bad parts" of the plan. After reexamining the document, he found it 
"stilted and one-sided," with "no sense of economics."59 
Lettelleir's friend Charles Hicks III became the plan's most vocal critic. 
This second-generation real estate broker monopolized public meetings with 
long-winded harangues that disparaged planners for "overlooking the finan­
cial loss some people may sustain." Hicks specialized in commercial real estate, 
so he could lose large sums if the city down-zoned commercial properties. 
Hicks claimed he would relinquish his "personal property rights for the good 
of the community, as long as the community is willing to pay."60 
Down-zoning also exasperated James Stephenson, the wealthy scion of a 
previous generation of south Pinellas developers. Stephenson, a former St. 
Petersburg council member, was shocked that city officials would dictate to 
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him on questions of land use, especially after his family's forty years of service 
in the city. Stephenson found it absurd that officials "worry what I'm going to 
do with my land," he told one reporter. "All they have to do is look at what 
Fvedone."61 
Hahl assured his critics that the city was "morally and legally bound to pro­
tect property rights." But it had no obligation "to protect the potential earn­
ing capacity of any given parcel of land."62 While the Constitution protected 
landowners against government confiscation of property, it did not guarantee 
speculative profits. Investors who longed to turn coastal wetlands into condo­
miniums or strip malls might even find themselves legally prevented from do­
ing so. In Just v. Marinette (1972), the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that 
the owner of a swamp—who wanted tofill his property for commercial devel-
opment—was entitled only to the uses of a swamp: "It seems to us that filling 
a swamp not otherwise commercially usable is not in and of itself an existing 
use, which is prevented, but rather is the preparation for some future use which 
is not indigenous to a swamp."63 
St. Petersburg's growth-management agenda was not nearly so harsh as the 
Wisconsin ruling. The city met the legal test of reasonableness, which requires 
municipal governments to provide property owners with a reasonable use or 
an economic return on their land, by offering landowners the opportunity ei­
ther to sell or to transfer their development rights to a designated parcel of 
property.64 The planning staff selected conservation and preservation areas as 
"development right givers," while multifamily areas were "development right 
receivers." Investors received a 10 percent increase in building density for 
shifting development to multifamily areas. The mechanism for transferring 
development rights gave property owners the means to pursue profits, while 
helping to preserve environmentally sensitive lands. 
These provisions meant little to those demanding the "highest and best 
use" of their property—which for them meant the most intensive use. The 
crusade against the plan "was to some extent," as the St. Petersburg Times re­
porter Dudley Clendinen wrote, "a mass exercise in miscommunication." 
When the planning staff held itfirst public meetings to review the south sec­
tor plan, Hicks sent out a 2,000-piece mailing on his own letterhead, warning 
property owners that their investments were in danger. He claimed that the 
planning department was instituting a "municipal land grab scheme" that 
would devalue real estate. Residents were left feeling, Hahl stated, "that we 
had a team of twenty bulldozers just waiting to come in and plow down their 
property." Shortly after the mailing, Hahl received a letter with a fake ticket 
for him and his family to Lowell, Massachusetts, his hometown. If it had been 
real, he joked, "I might have taken it."65 
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At the public meetings, Hicks, Lettelleir, and Lloyd Williams, a prominent 
home builder, repeatedly damned government excesses and extolled citizens' 
rights to private property. A coalition of those who favored growth manage­
ment disputed their arguments. They pointed out that developers like James 
Stephenson intended to abandon the city once their ventures were played out, 
taking the profits and leaving the problems to the residents. For John Ritler, a 
livable future was worth a few sacrifices. "To bow along the way to the pres­
sures of the moneyed community—the landed gentry," he warned the plan­
ning commission, "is an outright waste."66 
The countless public hearings turned the conflict over planning into a war 
of attrition, which gave those fighting the plan an advantage. Their livelihood 
depended on attending planning commission hearings. Unlike their oppo­
nents, they could make it their job to attend meetings and devote time to 
studying technical reports. In addition, this elite group had strong ties with ex­
perienced lawyers and consultants who would plead their case. Even if they 
merely reiterated the alleged impositions of the plan on their clients, top at­
torneys from eminent firms could sway public officials. 
A year of constant wrangling brought out ideologues from both ends of the 
political spectrum. The new plan could seem menacing even to people whose 
investments were not especially threatened. One ultraconservative, Earl P. 
Myhree, a physician, threatened to go to court if the city council approved the 
plan. He ranted that the endeavor was part of a conspiracy to bring in "over­
all 'Ism.' Socialism. Call it Communism. Whatever. We are losing our free­
doms one-by-one, day-by-day."67 
Although Myhree's right-wing fulminations were easily disposed of, they 
served to make Lettelleir and his allies look much more reasonable. As the re­
view process dragged on into 1977, the city moved away from its "City for 
Living" stance and granted exceptions to the plan. These concessions were 
symbols of the city's historical weakness in prosecuting rational city building. 
Leading speculators reaped profits at the expense of a more balanced urban 
community. Once again, some of St, Petersburg's most influential citizens had 
sacrificed efficiency and natural harmony to the bottom line. According to the 
Urban Land Institute, the typical community supports one acre of commercial 
land for every 200 residents. In St. Petersburg, the plan adopted by the city 
council set a standard of one acre of commercial land for every 95 residents. 
With a population of 350,000, this ratio would become 1:141, still greater than 
the national average.68 
The comprehensive plan adopted in October 1977 followed the outline of 
the 1974 Conceptual Plan, but major compromises diminished its intended re­
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forms. After property owners threatened legal action, the city council opened 
preservation lands to limited development. Owners could alter 25 percent of 
their designated preservation land after review by either the planning staff or 
the EDC. The city council also removed all restrictions on development of 
land designated for conservation, saying only that these "areas should be de­
veloped with caution." 
By its actions, the city council made a conscious choice to trade the Con­
ceptual Plan's vision of an "ecological city" for the sprawling suburban pattern 
typical of the modern Sunbelt city. Despite its unique environment and loca­
tion, St. Petersburg was hardly a special place. Residents of St. Petersburg, like 
those of other Florida cities, could still revel in the sun and the sea, but the en­
vironment that had once had a diversity of plant and animal life uncommon 
in America was covered by ribbons of strip commercial centers and swaths of 
tract housing. In addition, the strand of salt marshes bordering the western 
part of the peninsula had vanished, and only a remnant of native forest re­
mained. A century earlier, hardwood forests had occupied almost a quarter of 
south Pinellas. Now that same amount of land was covered by asphalt.69 
Pinellas County: Following the Pattern 
Although the county was less eager to plan than St. Petersburg had been, 
eventually residents realized that they had to bring some order to Pinellas's 
chaotic government. With twenty-four separate municipalities in the county, 
it was impossible to coordinate land-use decisions. In 1973, the state legisla­
ture established the Pinellas Planning Council to alleviate the problem by or­
ganizing local planning efforts and designing a countywide comprehensive 
plan.70 But before reforms could get under way, the council needed the back­
ing of the county commission. 
Ever since Pinellas County had adopted itsfirst plan in 1958, scandal had 
marred the planning process. In 1974, a detailed investigation of the county's 
planning practices published in the St. Petersburg Times exposed a web of cor­
ruption and graft. Commission members regularly ignored staff recommenda­
tions on zoning matters and voted in favor of influential developers. Hundreds 
of thousands of dollars changed hands for votes. As Commissioner George 
Brumfield explained, "That's the way the system works." In one case four of the 
five commissioners (Brumfield, Charles Rainey, William Dockerty, and Eddie 
Taylor) switched their votes in a zoning case concerning a sensitive environ­
mental area after a friend of Commissioner Oliver McEachern gained control 
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of the tract. As the St. PetersburgTimes continued its probe, Pinellas residents 
realized that the region's growth problems were, at least in part, the fault of the 
county commission,71 
The newspaper's expose led to a grand jury investigation that revealed a 
level of deceit and greed fantastic even for Florida. Although Brumfield, Dock­
erty, and McEachern all served time in prison, no one could ascertain how 
many zoning changes had been sold or given away because, in the develop­
ment industry, influence-peddling went far beyond the courthouse. Although 
many, if not most, business leaders could have testified against the commis­
sion, Jim Russell, the state's attorney, could not get a single witness to step for­
ward. If nothing else, this failure attested to a system of ingrained deal-making 
that made the Pinellas case, Russell stated, "one of the greatest exposes of cor­
ruption in government that this state has ever seen."72 After this case, few be­
lieved that the 1975 LGCPA would have any significant effect on how the 
county commission did business.73 
After passage of the LGCPA, the county planning staff, like St. Peters-
burg's, used McHarg's overlay method and an intensive ecological study to de­
termine land-use designations and carrying capacity for the peninsula. Their 
efforts resulted in a massive 400-page work, The Conservation of Natural Re­
sources Element of Pinellas County's General Plan. This in-depth analysis of the 
Pinellas environment provided an impressive follow-up to the Environmental 
Task Force's examination of the ecology of the Pinellas Peninsula. Besides list­
ing the "environmental constraints to urbanization," the report presented a 
number of policy directives and offered "scientific justification for all detailed 
recommendations." This document also contained the critical data for estab­
lishing land-use categories and carrying capacity (fixed at L1 million for Pinel­
las County). The planners' ecological concepts, however, separated them from 
many of the region's decision makers.74 
After public review, the planning staff's work—altered to include the de­
sires of the investors and realtors as well as the designs of the planner—was 
adopted in 1980 as the Pinellas County Comprehensive Land Use Plan.15 Like St. 
Petersburg, Pinellas County had a surplus of commercial land and a deficit of 
public green space. In fact, the county ranked last among Florida's urban areas 
in per capita park land.76 Despite these shortcomings, Pinellas County's growth-
management plan did follow the guidelines used in such other communities as 
Petaluma, California, and Ramapo, New York.77 The plan made wetlands 
preservation areas, for example, and gave elected officials powers to manage 
growth and restrict strip commercial development. But the commission's will­
ingness to exercise these powers remained in question. 
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East Lake Tarpon: Changing the Pattern of Development 
In 1978, planners forced a showdown between the county commission and 
property owners when they pushed for down-zoning in the Eldridge-Wilde 
wellfields and the surrounding lands in the East Lake Tarpon area. Continuing 
water problems had brought these lands in northeast Pinellas County under 
close scrutiny by both county planners and SWFWMD. Only 2,000 people 
lived in the 22,000 acres of pineflatwoods, swamps, and sandhills lying be­
tween Lake Tarpon and Hillsborough County. A maze of wetlands accounted 
for almost 40 percent of this unincorporated area, while the sandhill areas in 
the northeast corner of the county contained the wellfields. Although this re­
gion held most of the peninsula's remaining natural resources, during the early 
1970s the county commission had zoned much of it for medium-density (fif­
teen units per acre) development. This translated into a future population of 
218,000. Building at this intensity would not only destroy Pinellas's last pris­
tine ecosystem, but would also place the county's water supply in jeopardy.78 
County planners pushed to down-zone East Lake Tarpon after they found 
that Pinellas had imported more than half of its water (52.6 percent) from 
Pasco and Hillsborough Counties in 1911J9 The Pinellas planning staff pre­
sented compelling data for cutting building densities by 70 percent in East 
Lake Tarpon. Despite fierce protests from landowners, the county commission 
voted unanimously—in accordance with the staff's report and under threat of 
legal action by SWFWMD—to down-zone a 10,000-acre tract.80 
In drawing up the Pinellas Comprehensive Land Use Plan in 1979, planners 
had given special attention to the 22,689-acre East Lake Tarpon area. In addi­
tion to its special natural features, this backwater section held one-third of all 
the vacant land in the county. The planners concentrated their analysis on the 
wetland areas and the land surrounding the wellfields. They studied aerial 
maps and made numerousfield studies to designate the boundaries of the var­
ious stands of cypress, black gum, bayhead, and hardwood swamps slated for 
preservation. In East Lake Tarpon, they had placed 4,375 acres of wetlands in 
the preservation category, which ensured that these lands would not "be de­
veloped without so altering the resource that the benefits are lost or signifi­
cantly diminished."81 
In this plan, preservation lands accounted for almost 20 percent of the East 
Lake Tarpon region. The higher dry land surrounding the wellfields was put in 
the conservation category, limiting development to one unit per acre, and the 
area's built-out population was lowered to 40,000. The down-zoning of East 
Lake Tarpon the previous year had set a precedent, and this time the planners' 
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agenda met little resistance. Although Pinellas residents still faced critical 
water problems, they finally had a plan that would make the future a bit more 
secure. 
The down-zoning of the East Lake Tarpon region marks one of the few 
times planners have shifted the course of city building in Pinellas. This oc­
curred, however, only after the population had grown so large that the demand 
for water impinged on outside jurisdictions. Twentieth-century American 
settlements in scenic areas with abundant ecosystems have demonstrated a de­
pressingly similar pattern of development.82 Despite repeated warnings, the 
residents of Pinellas ignored the dictates of nature until environmental prob­
lems had reached crisis proportions. But reforms did at least curb the excesses 
of city building, and if regulations werefirst imposed out of necessity, attitudes 
were also changing. The environmental problems that plagued Pinellas during 
the 1970s convinced thousands of residents that their quality of life—and the 
health of future generations—demanded ethical treatment for the land. By 
1980, Pinellas had the civic machinery to move in this direction. But was it 
too late? 
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Recycling Eden: Planning for the Next Century 
W  e recognize the beauty, which is still hard to miss, but w  e also see 
the filled bays, the commercial strips, the dwindling forests and the traf­
fic and the crime and the noise and the funny yellow haze that smudges 
the skyline on days with no r a i n . . .  . The author [John MacDonald] tries 
to deal with this gloom head o n . . .  . If the result is not a completely suc­
cessful experiment, it goes off in some interesting new directions. 
St. Petersburg Times, 1985 
In the 1980s, after a half century of dizzying growth, St. Petersburg's popula­
tion stabilized at 240,000* As the supply of vacant land dwindled, recycling 
and conservation were at the top of the municipal agenda. By the early 1990s, 
water, waste, and abandoned rail lines were recycled, public projects to spur 
downtown redevelopment had commenced, and the county had bought en­
dangered natural lands for preservation. Other Florida cities soon followed St. 
Petersburg's lead, especially after the 1985 Florida Growth Management Act 
required all municipalities and counties to draw up comprehensive plans that 
complied with state directives. Although St. Petersburg had adopted a model 
plan to resolve its problems, the city was hardly the prototype community John 
Nolen had envisioned. Despite spending millions of dollars to rejuvenate the 
downtown area, Florida's most expensive public and private partnership had 
attracted more controversy than clients. At the same time, high levels of pol­
lution, the uncertain water supply, and the perennial threat of a cataclysmic 
hurricane were constant reminders of the problems that come when a city ex­
ceeds the limits of nature. 
Restoring the Green Infrastructure 
In accordance with LGCPA guidelines, St. Petersburg's planning department 
filed afive-year review of the city's planning process in 1982. The most notable 
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finding was that St. Petersburg's population stood at 238,893, a gain of only 
one percent since 1977. Only eight percent of the city remained vacant. As 
there was less pressure for growth, municipal officials worked harder to struc­
ture development around the remaining natural areas.1 
Of the 1,578 acres designated for preservation on the 1977 land use map, 
530 were privately owned. Between 1977 and 1982, development took place 
on only thirteen of these acres. The city council had allowed the dredging of 
three acres; a developer who had apparently misunderstood when the new reg­
ulations went into effect built on the other ten. In 1983, the Southwest Florida 
Water Management District (SWFWMD) started a wetlands mitigation pro­
gram to provide more protection for the remnants of this valuable natural habi­
tat. The new regulations required developers to alleviate the impact of projects 
in wetlands by either enhancing, preserving, or creating more wetlands.2 
St. Petersburg could not afford to buy land designated for preservation, but 
in 1980, Pinellas voters passed a referendum increasing the ad valorem tax for 
the purchase of "endangered lands." The measure raised $7.9 million, and a 
task force of environmentalists and county planners made up a prioritized list 
of the most important land to buy. The county acquired 1,700 acres including 
beachfront properties, wetlands, and lands surrounding the Eldridge-Wilde 
wellfield. Although the county bought no St. Petersburg properties, the task 
force assigned a high priority to buying the coastal mangroves in the northeast 
portion of the city if funding became available. 
In 1986 and again in 1989 referenda supporting the acquisition of endan­
gered land passed. Thefirst election netted $23.9 million through an increase 
in ad valorem taxes. The second vote allocated $47 million for endangered 
natural lands (out of a total of $488 million for various projects) and raised the 
sales tax by a cent. This time St. Petersburg benefited, as the county commis­
sion spent $3.9 million to acquire 94 acres of mangrove habitat on Weedon 
Island. This purchase placed the entire 627-acre mangrove island in public 
hands. Besides serving as a rookery for wading birds, Weedon Island buffers 
northeastern St. Petersburg from hurricane storm surges.3 
Although the county commission has thefinal say on land purchases, poli­
tics have not, for once, had much influence on the disbursement of public 
funds. Stringent guidelines for selecting properties, combined with a dearth of 
viable parcels, helped planners systematically assemble purchases. In 1992, 
county planners joined with a team from the University of South Florida's In­
stitute for Environmental Studies to create a restoration plan for the Brooker 
Crefek ecosystem in northeast Pinellas. The restoration plan was central to the 
county commission's request for a $2.7 million matching grant from the state. 
Besides establishing a restoration program for the ecosystem, Pinellas officials 
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wanted to purchase thirteen inholdings in the 6,700-acre Brooker Creek Pre­
serve, which surrounds the Eldridge-Wilde wellfields.4 
The county commission sent its proposal to the Florida Communities Trust, 
which receives funding from Preservation 2000, the nation's premier land-
acquisition program. In 1989, through the sale of $3.2 billion in bonds, the 
Florida legislature established Preservation 2000 to fund the acquisition of 
natural lands for ten years. The state has funneled 50 percent of Preservation 
2000 funds into the Conservation and Recreation Lands Program (CARL). 
The CARL program concentrates on obtaining lands that are sensitive envi­
ronmentally: significant wetlands, wildlife corridors, and endangered species' 
habitats. Pinellas's highly urbanized environment effectively precludes fund­
ing through CARL. But the Florida Communities Trust, which receives ten 
percent of Preservation 2000 funds, provides matching funds for the imple­
mentation of conservation policies in local growth-management plans.5 
The Pinellas County Planning Department's fifteen-year investment in the 
East Lake Tarpon region played a crucial role in the decision by the Florida 
Communities Trust to fund the Brooker Creek project. In 1981, after the leg­
islature allocated funds to the water management districts for acquiring "lands 
necessary for water management, water supply, and the conservation and pro­
tection of water resources," county planners and SWFWMD joined forces to 
set up the Brooker Creek Preserve.6 To establish the preserve, SWFWMD 
spent $25 million on 4,000 acres; the Pinellas endangered lands program was 
able to set aside another 2,000 acres. The grant from the Florida Communities 
Trust not only allowed the county commission to buy out the remaining prop­
erty owners; it also gave land managers the opportunity to restore the land­
scape to a more natural state.7 
The Brooker Creek restoration plan broke new ground for environmental 
planning in Florida. The task force had a twofold goal for the Brooker Creek 
Preserve: (1) to protect PinellasJs water supply, and (2) to restore one of the re-
gion's most diverse ecosystems. Although only 100 acres of the preserve had 
been altered for urban uses, almost 1,000 acres had been converted to cattle 
pasture. In the previous half century, ranchers had drained wetlands and 
cleared the land to create range land. Once cattle started grazing, the quality 
of the environment deteriorated. The weight of the cattle compacted the soil 
and reduced its oxygen content. As the land lost the ability to absorb nutrients 
and water, its carrying capacity dropped. Undesirable "weedy" species, such as 
dog fennel and common ragweed, moved in. The new pasture could still sup­
port cattle, but the altered landscape hindered the movement of nutrients and 
species between uplands and wetlands. As ranchers continued to expand their 
range land, biodiversity plummeted.8 
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After taking inventory of Brooker Creek's natural resources, the task force 
drafted a plan to restore sections of the preserve where native species had dra­
matically declined and the natural habitat had become degraded. The task 
force wanted to return the Brooker Creek Preserve to some of its former vital­
ity through controlled burns, the extraction of weedy and exotic species, the 
planting of native vegetation, and the reestablishment of wetlands.9 In addi­
tion, the Pinellas County planners wanted to connect the peninsula's largest 
natural preserve to the rest of the county by way of the Pinellas Trail, Florida's 
most heavily used greenway. 
The Pinellas Trail: Florida's "Emerald Necklace" 
The Pinellas Trail, the "emerald necklace of Old Florida," as one writer calls 
it, is an urban greenway that will eventually stretch from St. Petersburg to 
northeast Pinellas, a distance of forty-seven miles. This project to recycle the 
old Orange Belt Railroad originated in the early 1980s, when Pinellas County 
planners started designing a comprehensive bikeway system. The "rails-to-
trails" idea, however, did not take root until the Florida Department of Trans­
portation (DOT) purchased a fourteen-mile stretch of the abandoned Orange 
Belt line in 1983. The DOT wanted this sixty-foot-wide corridor between 
Seminole and Dunedin eventually to serve as a light-rail line. In 1984, Dan 
Burden, the DOT's bikeway coordinator, suggested that a pedestrian and bike 
path would be a good interim use for it. The Pinellas County Bicycle Advisory 
Board adopted Burden's idea. Only a year later, Pinellas County planners had 
completed a feasibility study that addressed encroachment problems, design 
criteria, security issues, and cost estimates for building and maintaining the 
trail. The planners estimated that a ten-foot-wide, ten-mile asphalt trail would 
cost $657,200. They also recommended that the DOT, Pinellas County, and 
the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) join together to fund the 
project. The Pinellas MPO, which is made up of elected officials appointed by 
the governor, was in charge of coordinating traffic planning with the DOT. 
After considerable debate, the MPO delayed making a decision until its 
staff could conduct further studies. The MPO accepted the bicycle-and-
pedestrian trail idea, but because trail users would have to cross two six-lane 
highways, there was a legitimate concern with safety. The MPO had its staff 
consider the feasibility of building a "passive recreational" facility along an ad­
ditional twenty-one miles of abandoned rail right-of-way that the DOT had 
recently bought. (The DOT's holdings now stretched the length of the county, 
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Figure 30 Over 2 million people use the Pinellas Trail each year. This 
"emerald necklace of Old Florida" has become a prototype for the nation's 
booming greenway movement. Courtesy of the Pinellas County Com­
mission. 
from Tarpon Springs to St. Petersburg). If the light-rail project proved unten­
able, and the MPO's new study was favorable, construction of the bike trail 
could move ahead. 
In spring 1988, the MPO tabled its light-rail plans. Its staff began working 
with Pinellas planners to design a fourteen-mile rails-to-trails project between 
Seminole and Dunedin. That summer the city councils of St. Petersburg, 
Clearwater, Seminole, Largo, Bellair, and Dunedin approved resolutions sup­
porting a bike path along the abandoned rail corridor. In November 1988, trail 
activists formed a nonprofit corporation, Pinellas Trail, Inc., to raise funds and 
promote the greenway concept for the entire thirty-five-mile portion of the 
old Orange Belt line. (Greenways are linear corridors with vegetation that 
is more natural than the surrounding areas.)10 Besides lobbying the county 
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commission and raising funds, Pinellas Trail, Inc., actively marketed the vision 
of a greenway that would provide pedestrians and bicyclists with a protected, 
natural passage through the county. 
In December 1988, Pinellas Trail, Inc., donated $125,000 to the county for 
publicizing the trail and providing support facilities. This grant enhanced the 
project's standing with the county commissioners. The commissioners also 
gravitated to the greenway concept because it seemed to be a popular issue that 
might translate into votes. In August 1989, the traiPs supporters cleared a ma­
jor hurdle when the Pinellas County Commission signed a five-year renewable 
lease with the DOT The lease gave the commission responsibility for over­
seeing the construction of the trail planned for the thirty-five-mile railroad 
right-of-way. County planners started working on a plan to connect parks, 
schools, and commercial centers situated near the trail. A month later, the 
county commission appropriated $1.5 million to construct the fourteen-mile 
segment between Dunedin and Seminole. At the same time, Pinellas Trail, 
Inc., started its "A Penny for the Trail" campaign to use a portion of the pro­
posed one-cent increase in the sales tax for the trail. In November 1989, vot­
ers adopted the measure, and the project received $5,270,000 to push the 
construction schedule forward and acquire an additional twelve-mile corridor 
along the MacKay Creek drainage system. This purchase extended the trail 
corridor into Pinellas's last remaining expanses of natural lands in the East 
Lake Tarpon area. 
Once construction started in 1991, homeowners living near the rail corri­
dor raised concerns that allowing public access to this abandoned property 
would increase criminal activity and lower property values. A Trail Safety and 
Security Task Force was established to address these issues and to serve as a li­
aison between police departments and trail users. Keith Bergstrom, the police 
chief in Tarpon Springs, headed the group, which included elected officials, 
concerned property owners, and greenway supporters. At the task force's re­
quest, a bicycle patrol went on duty when thefirst fourteen miles of the trail 
opened in 1991. By the end of the year, two to three thousand people a day 
were on the trail. Homeowners' fears dissipated when they realized that the 
traffic on the trail, instead of abetting crime, was a deterrent to it. "Trail­
watching" became a common occupation for property owners, and gates began 
appearing in fences adjoining the trail. By summer 1993, homeowners' fears 
had so far diminished that the Security Task Force considered disbanding.11 
Although bicycling is the most popular recreational activity in Florida, 
even the most avid trail enthusiasts were astounded by the Pinellas Trail's pop­
ularity. In 1992, LI million people enjoyed the twenty-three-mile segment of 
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the trail. In 1993, Pinellas Trail, Inc., had over a thousand paying members, 
while civic groups, churches, schools, environmental groups, running and cy­
cling clubs, merchants* associations, and homeowners dedicated their time 
and money to beautify the trail and push it toward completion. In addition, al­
most half a million dollars in matching federal funds came from ISTEA (In­
termodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act) to construct an overpass 
across a major highway in St. Petersburg. The state legislature also earmarked 
the same amount for the Pinellas Trail from Florida's Rails-to-Trails program. 
By 1995 the number of users had doubled, and the trail had stretched to thirty-
five miles. If funding continues on course, the project should reach completion 
in 1997, at a total cost of $8.7 million.12 Ken Bryan, Florida's coordinator for 
the national Rails-to-Trails Conservancy (RTC), stated in Planning that the 
"Pinellas [Trail] ranks among the topfive of 500 trails nationwide by virtue of 
its heavy usage and strong citizen support."13 
The Pinellas Trail has also served as a spur for economic development. Its 
role in the resurgence of downtown Dunedin has drawn the most attention. In 
1990, occupancy rates in this dying city center had dropped below 50 percent, 
but once the trail opened, hundreds of people traveling on it found Dunedin 
an ideal place to stop off. Within two years, the town had attracted a weekly 
farmers' market and had converted an abandoned train station into a museum. 
Festivals, for example, the Suncoast Mardi Gras, also moved to downtown 
Dunedin now that revelers were not so dependent on autos for transportation, 
and thus not in need of limited parking spots. By 1995 the downtown had 
reached full occupancy. Its small shops and restaurants now receive a steady 
stream of customers. Dunedin's success has not only served as a model for other 
communities along the trail, but has also drawn the attention of many politi­
cians and planners from across the state.14 
In 1992, Orange County planners envisioned a seventeen-mile greenway 
running on an abandoned stretch of the Orange Belt line just west of Orlando, 
but they were unable to obtain the consent to build it until after the Orange 
County Commission visited Pinellas. After walking portions of the trail and 
visiting Dunedin, the commission's chairperson, Linda Chapin, became a 
staunch supporter of the greenway proposal. The West Orange Trail opened in 
September 1994; the monthly number of users soon mushroomed to 30,000. 
Lake County's planners also brought their county commissioners to Pinellas 
to sell the idea of linking up with West Orange Trail and extending it across 
Lake County. In January 1994, the Lake County Commission appropriated 
$900,000 in county funds to construct a recreation/bike trail that would also 
use an abandoned section of the Orange Belt line. Since then, the Florida 
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Greenway Commission and the Florida RTC have begun planning to link 
Orlando with the Pinellas Trail.15 
In January 1994, the Florida RTC chapter held its first conference in 
Dunedin. The president of the national RTC, Richard Burwell, opened the 
proceedings l?y proclaiming, "God Bless the Pinellas Trail" Pinellas's success 
offered the 150 trail advocates and greenway planners from all over Florida a 
blueprint for community action. Burwell announced that in 1995 the national 
RTC meeting would be in Pinellas because of the Pinellas Trail's "rapid devel­
opment, popularity, and partnership with citizens and local governments."16 
The Pinellas Trail has been successful because it (1) provides a link between 
isolated subdivisions, and (2) offers a pleasant way to explore the county. 
While the concept of a greenway is not new (the Olmsted Brothers had pro­
posed an interconnected system of parkways in 1913), in Pinellas's urban 
environment the trail is unique because it gives people a way to see the 
countryside without being dependent on a car. Not only can trail users see an­
cient live oaks, hammocks, and tidal streams; they can also safely bike, walk, 
or run through one of the nation's most congested urban areas. "The Pinellas 
Trail," its advocates contend, "is a priceless haven in a busy, overcrowded 
world."17 
Recycling Resources 
While the rails-to-trails venture has been the most popular recycling project 
in Pinellas, the county has also been a testing ground for new advances in the 
recycling of other wastes. In 1977, St. Petersburg opened a new tertiary sewage 
complex that eradicated 90 percent of the pollutants from sewage and elimi­
nated the effluent that once went into the surrounding bays. St. Petersburg's 
innovative system, the first of its kind in the nation, recycled the sewage 
plants' nutrient-rich effluent and used it to water public lands. During the 
1980s, the system began to provide businesses and homeowners with this "gray 
water" as well, helping to alleviate the overall demand for water.18 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the other municipalities surrounding 
Tampa Bay followed St. Petersburg's lead. The region made a $90 million in­
vestment in new technology to reduce sewage pollutants by 90 percent. This 
move not only satisfied EPA standards forfighting water pollution; when mu­
nicipalities recycled their waste water, they were alsofreed from the necessity 
to make ail water potable. By 1990, the Tampa Bay region led the state in the 
use of gray water.19 
174 
Recycling Eden 
Even though water recycling was helping Pinellas reduce potable water 
consumption, a continuing drought forced SWFWMD to cut back on well 
pumping in July 1994. This severely affected Pinellas's supply of potable wa­
ter and made new moratoriums on construction a distinct possibility. The 
county commission wanted SWFWMD to remedy the situation by building a 
pipeline between Lake Rosseau (in Citrus County) and St. Petersburg. 
SWFWMD, however, rejected this proposal. The agency's scientists feared 
that such a project would lower the water table and degrade freshwater wet-
lands—in a region that had already lost 35,000 acres of wetlands to over-
pumping. The water-rich portion of eastern Pasco County had suffered from a 
series of environmental problems because it had overdrawn its groundwater 
supply. Swamps and lakes dried up, trees died, wells pumped sand, and yards 
dropped into the ground. After one homeowner's yard fell like a "souffle," she 
commented, "If I did this kind of damage to my neighbor's yard Pd be held 
criminally accountable. We realize that everybody needs water, but not at the 
expense of the environment."20 
Rather than continuing to draw groundwater from inland areas, 
SWFWMD wanted to construct a desalination plant in St. Petersburg. The 
agency believed the plant would give Pinellas residents drinking water and 
have only a minimal ecological impact on the region. Anticipated construc­
tion costs were in excess of one billion dollars, and it would take another $70 
million a year to operate the plant.21 
Pinellas's municipal governments have had mixed success in recycling solid 
waste. Because there was so little vacant land, the idea of recycling solid waste 
took hold in Pinellas earlier than in any other major urban area in the state. 
In the late 1970s, a consultant's study showed that the county's overburdened 
landfill could never meet anticipated trash loads.22 The county commission 
moved to solve the problem by constructing a massive electricity-generating 
incinerator that opened in 1983 (figure 31), The "Refuse to Energy Plant," lo­
cated just north of St. Petersburg, burns 2,000 tons of garbage per day and gen­
erates $900,000 worth of electricity per month.23 While the plant relieved the 
strain on the landfill, it has had some potentially devastating side effects. Ac­
cording to one study, mercury contamination in the Everglades can be traced 
at least in part to this incinerator. In 1990, a Florida Department of Environ­
mental Regulation sampling found that the plant released about twenty-one 
pounds of mercury into the atmosphere every day. The prevailing winds carry 
these pollutants into the Everglades ecosystem, where they have infiltrated the 
food chain. Mercury levels are so high in bass that anglers are warned not to 
eat their catch.24 
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Figure 31 The Refuse to Energy Plant, a massive electricity-producing incinerator, burns 
2,000 tons of garbage per day and generates $900,000 worth of electricity per month. Un­
fortunately, prevailing winds carry some of the mercury it releases into the atmosphere to 
the Everglades' ecosystem, which has become contaminated. Courtesy of the Pinellas 
County Commission. 
The 1985 Growth Management Act 
Despite its efforts to protect the environment, St. Petersburg could not escape 
the problems of growth. While the city's population stabilized in the 1980s, 
the surrounding urban complex continued to swell. By 1985 the population of 
Pinellas had passed 800,000, and 1.8 million people lived in the greater Tampa 
Bay area. To complicate matters, between 1974 and 1984 the amount of de­
veloped land increased at twice the rate of the population. As more newcom­
ers crowded into waterfront condominiums, apartment complexes, and large 
tract developments, air and water quality continued to decline. At the same 
time, poorly designed and placed developments blighted the landscape and ag­
gravated traffic problems.25 
In the mid-1980s, yet another statewide drought exposed the weakness of 
the region's water supply. With less rain to recharge the aquifer, the supply of 
groundwater diminished, and saltwater intruded into the supply of drinking 
water. A lower water table also led to loss of more wetlands. The population 
continued to outstrip the water supply, and in 1985 SWFWMD placed St. Pe­
tersburg and the rest of Pinellas on year-round water rationing.26 
At the same time, Tampa Bay was failing. Dredge-and-fill operations, urban 
runoff, human waste, and chemical dumping had all degraded this once houn­
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tiful resource. After a century of exploitation, scientists found that Tampa 
Bay had experienced an 81 percent loss in sea grasses and a 45 percent loss of 
mangrove habitat. Between 1957 and 1977, shellfish harvests dropped by two-
thirds, from 20 million tons to 6.5 million tons. "Natural thresholds," scien­
tists warned, "are being approached beyond which ecosystems fail."27 
Air pollution also threatened the health of those living on the Suncoast. In 
1983, the region failed to meet federal standards for ozone. This pollutant 
makes breathing more difficult, reduces endurance, helps cause disorientation, 
and aggravates pulmonary stress. Ozone also damages vegetation, fabrics, 
building materials, and rubber, and it was the principal component in the 
growing cloud of brown smog over Tampa Bay.28 
In 1985, the issue of growth management dominated political agendas 
across Florida. Although the state was having another building boom, resi­
dents realized that the Florida lifestyle was fast eroding. The Miami Herald ed­
itor Carl Hiaasen wrote that Florida had started to resemble "Newark with 
palm trees."29 "If we continue to allow our environment to be degraded," Lee 
Moffitt, speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, warned, "word will 
spread that Florida has become an environmental disaster area." The plans 
drawn up in the last decade, he added, amounted to little when county com­
missions "knuckled under whenever a developer asked for an exemption." 
Moffitt called for a bipartisan effort by Florida legislators to enact more strin­
gent growth controls.30 
During the 1980s Pinellas officials—and their counterparts throughout the 
state—had been willing to alter the county land-use plan to grant developers 
concessions. In a three-and-a-half-year stretch in the mid-1980s, the Pinellas 
County Commission granted 253 plan amendments for more intensive land 
use. Many of these projects were in already overburdened areas. "Gridlock and 
commercial sprawl in this county didn't just happen," the St. PetersburgTimes 
editor Jon East wrote. "To a disquieting degree we planned them."31 
Massive infrastructure needs also led to the outcry for growth manage­
ment. Throughout the 1970s, Florida remained a "fool's paradise," growth-
management expert John DeGrove wrote, "in which it was believed that 
growth paid for itself and that sooner or later the new growth would pay for 
new infrastructure." Crowded highways and schools were constant reminders 
not only that growth had failed to pay its way, but that it was out of control. 
By 1985, there was widespread support for Tallahassee to enforce a system of 
growth management that could balance development, the health of natural 
systems, and the provision of public facilities.32 
Governor Bob Graham, Florida's longtime champion of growth manage­
ment, heeded the call. He needed an issue to propel his run for the Senate in 
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1986, and he found the perfect vehicle. He pushed through the 1985 Growth 
Management Act (GMA), which revised the 1975 LGCPA. Passage of this 
bill gave Florida the most innovative and complex planning process in the na-
tion.33 While Graham received rave reviews, his successors faced the difficult 
task of enforcing the legislation. 
The GMA granted the state additional powers to enforce and implement 
plans at the local level. While the LGCPA had forced local governments to 
plan, it had offered no guidance for designing, implementing, or funding. With 
no state master plan to guide local efforts, Florida was trapped in a maze of con­
tradictory and inconsistent city plans. Under the LGCPA, the state provided 
little incentive to implement the planning process, and most municipalities 
had shelved their plans. Although the plans offered visions of a better life, they 
were politically untenable. The GMA sought to rectify the situation by re­
quiring local governments to follow guidelines set down in the Comprehen­
sive State Plan. This top-down system included review of local plans by the 
Department of Community Affairs (DCA), the state planning agency, to en­
sure compliance. If local governments failed to amend their plans, or if, after 
amendment, the DCA still found them in noncompliance with state direc­
tives, the Office of Budget and Planning could withhold state funds.34 
The GMA also required local plans to meet the test of concurrency. "This 
element is what transforms Florida's planning act from a planning exercise," 
land-use lawyer Charles Simeon writes, "into a mandate for implementa-
tion."35 Concurrency provided county and municipal officials with a tool to 
prevent urban sprawl and make growth pay for itself. Until public facilities for 
roads, sewers, water, solid waste, drainage, and parks meet adequate levels of 
service, as determined by the DCA, local governments cannot grant develop­
ment orders.36 
Elected officials in St. Petersburg were fortunate that the existing plan had 
already designated some levels of service, such as the goal to keep 50 percent 
of the city permeable green space. In restructuring their plan to meet the 
GMA mandates, the city's planning staff faced fewer impediments than most. 
With its limited amount of vacant land and stable population, St. Petersburg 
escaped the controversies over growth that slowed planning in many places.37 
The DCA found that St. Petersburg's plan not only passed state criteria; it 
excelled. 
In April 1990, St. Petersburg received an award from the DCA for being the 
large city with the best plan. The state planners felt that the plan deserved spe­
cial recognition for preserving natural lands and achieving the goal (first spec­
ified in the J 974 Conceptual Plan) of keeping 50 percent of land permeable 
green space. The planning department had reported that permeable green 
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space occupied 52.4 percent of the city. Projections indicated that the figure 
would still be above 50 percent after development of the city's 2,208 acres of 
vacant land.38 
Although the DCA had recognized St. Petersburg's diligence in meeting 
the provisions of the GMA, people living in the city were questioning its vi­
sion for the future. Citizens generally approved of acquiring natural lands and 
rejuvenating the downtown area, but the price seemed outrageous. 
The Redevelopment of Downtown St. Petersburg 
In the mid-1980s, the city council had allocated $ 170 million to revitalize the 
downtown. The construction of a domed stadium, the renovation of the Mu­
nicipal Pier and the Bayfront Center, and the Bay Plaza project represent the 
culmination of the growth-management process begun in the early 1970s. In 
1973, the Citizens' Goals Committee had made redevelopment of the down­
town a primary goal. Committee members felt that the legitimacy of the 
growth-management process necessitated redirecting development from envi­
ronmentally sensitive areas and outlying lands into the downtown. The com­
mittee also wanted the downtown to be able to assume a larger share of the tax 
burden. In the early 1970s, the downtown had lost much of its vitality; by 
1981, it accounted for only 3.8 percent of the city's tax base. In its 1982 "In­
town Redevelopment Plan/ ' the city council set a goal of 20 percent for the 
downtown. Unfortunately, the plan did not contain a comprehensive strategy 
to accomplish this feat.39 
Downtown St. Petersburg had been declining as a retail destination since 
the mid-1960s. In the early 1980s, only one department store, Maas Brothers, 
remained, and its future was in jeopardy. Vacancy rates in the scattered office 
buildings fluctuated between 20 and 30 percent. The hotels built before World 
War II were sliding into disrepair and transitional uses. Yet despite being run­
down and shabby, downtown St. Petersburg still projected a sense of place. In 
contrast to the region's giant malls, "Downtown still feels like a town center," 
a prestigious consultant team wrote. "With the right kind of redevelopment, 
downtown has the potential to become a lively, lovely and enjoyable com­
mercial center."40 
In 1983, the St. Petersburg City Council fully committed itself to down­
town redevelopment when it voted for a $60 million bond issue. The plan was 
to use a third of the money to renovate the Municipal Pier, the city's most 
important tourist attraction, and the Bayfront Center, a cultural and enter­
tainment complex. The remaining two-thirds would go to spur downtown 
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redevelopment* The city council also wanted to construct a multipurpose sta­
dium, but before going ahead with this proposal, they needed assurance that 
the stadium, which would cost $110 million, would bring a commensurate 
commitment from private investors.41 
The city council conducted a national search to find a firm that would man­
age both the proposed stadium and the redevelopment of the downtown's 
retail core. Two developers came forward, Neil Elsey, president of Elcor Com­
pany of Phoenix, and Lynn McCarthy, president of the J. C. Nichols Company 
of Kansas City. Together they formed the Bay Plaza Company to capitalize on 
this opportunity. Elsey and McCarthy saw the stadium as a catalyst in the cre­
ation of an activity-based downtown, and they believed that the natural 
amenities of St. Petersburg's waterfront location would distinguish Bay Plaza's 
undertaking from others of its kind. "The combination of St. Petersburg's spec­
tacular downtown waterfront location, recent development progress, easy 
interstate highway access, and three regional attractions (stadium, Pier, 
Bayfront Center) presented an opportunity unmatched/* Elsey stated, "in any 
other major metropolitan area."42 
In 1987, St. Petersburg and the Bay Plaza Company agreed to the most am­
bitious public-private partnership in Florida. Bay Plaza took responsibility for 
managing and marketing the pier, the Bayfront Center, and sports stadium, 
which would be built with city funds between 1987 and 1989. The most sig­
nificant portion of the project, however, was the redevelopment plan for the 
downtown's nine-block commercial core. This ten-year enterprise would take 
place in three phases, at a cost of $200 million. The city would spend $40 mil­
lion on infrastructure—parking garages, street design, park improvements, 
and utility relocations.43 
The Waterfront Retail District, renamed Bay Plaza, was the focal point of 
the downtown revitalization strategy. Elsey wanted to raze most of the nine-
block area and build 1.1 million square feet of high-quality retail shopping. 
Three major department stores on the order of Saks Fifth Avenue and Neitnan 
Marcus would anchor the shopping district's dozens of smaller specialty shops, 
boutiques, restaurants, and cafes. According to the Bay Plaza Master Plan, "St. 
Petersburg, with the Bay Plaza Companies, is forming a community that holds 
a vision for the City's next 100 years."44 
Without being aware of it, the Bay Plaza planners were resurrecting much 
of what John Nolen had proposed for Central Avenue in 1923.45 Native plants 
would line the Plaza Parkway (as a portion of Central Avenue is called in the 
redevelopment project), which would connect the waterfront, the Bay Plaza, 
and the stadium. Apart from the pedestrian bridges, the street and building de­
sign for Bay Plaza is almost a copy of Nolen's original plan for Central Avenue. 
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Figure 32 Bay Plaza's design to rejuvenate downtown St. Petersburg followed Nolen's early 
lead, but the project ground to a halt when it became clear that the Tampa Bay region could 
not support an exclusive retail mall. Courtesy of Grubb and Ellis, Tampa, Fla. 
Mediterranean architecture, open balconies, wide sidewalks, benches, green 
spaces, and native plants remain vital components for planners trying to pro­
mote human interaction and a sense of place in downtown St. Petersburg 
(figure 32). 
In spring 1988, the Bay Plaza Company introduced its master plan to the 
public. The St. Petersburg Times and a citizens' group, Save Our St. Petersburg 
(SOS), examined the plan carefully. SOS had fifty core members; two archi­
tects, Eric Lindstrom and Tim Clemmons, and one journalist, Tim Baker, 
served as co-chairs. While there was general agreement that the downtown 
needed attention, both the newspaper and SOS questioned the project's feasi­
bility. "The Bay Plaza would be something," a St. PetersburgTimes editor wrote 
several months later, "but would it work?"46 
In July 1988, SOS published a critique of Bay Plaza. The group favored 
downtown redevelopment, but a retail mall devoted to high-priced stores con­
tradicted the city's character. St. Petersburg was a middle-income resort com­
munity, and attempting to remake the city was, SOS believed, "a radical and 
risky solution to the traditional urban problems of business and people mov­
ing away from the central city." "If it fails," the report went on, "the damage to 
the city will be severe."47 
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SOS believed that by catering solely to an exclusive clientele, Bay Plaza's 
venture was "more like a theme park than an urban downtown." The group 
recommended that the project include more offices and affordable commercial 
establishments to attract St. Petersburg residents. Bay Plaza's refusal to con­
struct apartments or condominiums was another point of contention. The de­
velopers argued that "the low-income nature of downtown" made building 
multifamily units too riskyfinancially. But if downtown had a "low-income na­
ture," how could it support an exclusive mall? SOS argued further that the 
downtown area already contained higher-income residences at Bayfront 
Tower and Fareham Square, and similar units overlooking the waterfront were 
already planned.48 
SOS also thought it was essential to maintain the downtown's identity. 
Clemmons recommended that Bay Plaza incorporate buildings of historical 
significance into the project, especially the Soreno Hotel, which was slated for 
demolition. This "million-dollar" hotel of the 1920s had shaped the city's re­
sort character. The Vinoy Hotel aside, the Soreno was the best example of the 
Mediterranean Revival style that had flourished in St. Petersburg during its 
early boom. In 1981, the Community Development Department completed a 
four-year study that ranked 350 of St. Petersburg's buildings. The Soreno Ho­
tel had the highest ranking, and the committee wanted it put on the National 
Register of Historic Places. SOS felt that incorporating the Soreno into Bay 
Plaza would ensure that the downtown embodied St. Petersburg's past as well 
its future.49 
After SOS published its assessment, the St. Petersburg Times hired two dis­
tinguished consultants to review the Bay Plaza plan. Mary Means, the orig­
inator of the Main Street program at the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, and Ronald Thomas, an expert in urban design and the author 
of Taking Charge: How Communities Are PlanningTheir Futures, spent a month 
on the project. The two gathered data, visited the site, and interviewed civic 
leaders, business executives, and city officials. After reviewing the project with 
their colleagues, Means and Thomas came to the same conclusion as SOS. 
"The path the city has started down with Bay Plaza is longer, is much more dif­
ficult and carries greater risk," the consultants wrote, "than either city officials 
or the developers have acknowledged so far." 
According to Means and Thomas, the city council's $40 million commit­
ment to the project was similar to redevelopment efforts in other urban cen­
ters. But unlike other cities, St. Petersburg would never be able to attract 
retailers of the caliber of Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus, because the 
percentage of high-income households in the Tampa Bay area was so small. In 
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1987 only 13 percent of families living in the area had incomes above $50,000, 
compared to a national average of 21 percent. The consultants also point out, 
"Fully developed and built up, older cities with fixed boundaries like St. Pe­
tersburg typically lag in terms of resident income." Although downtown St. 
Petersburg could undoubtedly support a more viable commercial center, it was 
not, Means and Thomas wrote, "a Neiman Marcus kind of place." 
The consultants also voiced concern over the demolition of the Soreno 
Hotel. As an "authentic relic" of the architectural style that Bay Plaza in­
tended to reflect, it seemed logical to restore the Soreno to connect the new 
project with the past: "Under no circumstances should the building be de­
molished until there are guarantees that a suitable replacement will immedi­
ately rise in its place." They recommended that the city council set up an 
advisory committee of experienced urban designers to ensure that the Bay 
Plaza project maintained some semblance of continuity with St. Petersburg's 
history. 
Means and Thomas also believed lack of citizen involvement threatened 
the viability of the entire undertaking. In their discussions with civic leaders, 
they had found that widespread agreement existed about the use of Mediter­
ranean architecture and the protection of the waterfront. Yet they had not dis­
covered any public initiative or debate that would turn this vague dream into 
reality. Baltimore's successful waterfront rejuvenation, for example, had had 
the support of diverse civic organizations and a business-sponsored, not-for-
profit management organization. St. Petersburg's planning staff had yet to fos­
ter this type of public involvement in or commitment to the Bay Plaza project: 
"We found a complex climate of hope, fear, frustration, suspicion, and, most of 
all, confusion about the future of downtown."50 
Robert Pittman, a longtime editor of the St. PetersburgTimes, voiced a sim­
ilar concern. Consensus building among the city's various interest groups "has 
been a problem for St. Petersburg as long as I can remember." The only suc­
cessful endeavor on this front that he could recall was the work of the Citizens' 
Goals Committee, which had laid the foundation for the city's existing plan. 
Pittman believed that it would take the same type of long-term effort on the 
part of a diverse group of citizens to make Bay Plaza a reality. "The city can 
benefit from the expertise and knowledge of these consultants," he wrote, "but 
we've got to work for our own visions and decide our future ourselves."51 
The city council ignored the recommendations from SOS and the two con­
sultants. City staff continued to work with the Bay Plaza developers, without 
consulting a citizens' advisory council. The idea of forming a nonprofit man­
agement group also foundered. In 1989, construction started on thefirst phase 
153 
Chapter 9 
of the project, an attractive five-story parking garage with 70,000 square feet 
of retail space on the bottom two floors. When the structure opened in late 
1990, the Mediterranean design was enthusiastically received. But the build­
ing had one major problem: there were no tenants.52 
In summer 1991, the Bay Plaza project collapsed. The existing retail space 
was still empty, and Elsey resigned after failing to attract any major tenants for 
the proposed mall. Elsey did not limit his search to the Saks Fifth Avenues of 
the retail world; midlevel and discount retailers declined his offers as well. In 
addition, St. Petersburg lost out to Miami and Denver in the competition for 
an expansion baseball team, and the new stadium sat empty. With the nation 
in recession, city officials realized that their strategy of offering massive subsi­
dies to lure major league baseball and exclusive retailers was ill timed and ill 
advised.53 
In early 1992, downtown St. Petersburg was in worse trouble than ever. 
Tenants were still flocking away from Bay Plaza, and Maas Brothers, long the 
anchor for downtown retail, had finally closed. The office vacancy rate of 35.4 
percent was the highest in the state, ten points higher than second-place Mi-
ami's. As downtown properties continued to lose value, St. Petersburg faced a 
financial crunch. In the early 1980s, when it borrowed $60 million in long-
term bonds to fund downtown projects, the city council had assumed that in­
creased tax revenue from rising property values would cover the debt. With tax 
revenues declining, the city's administrators were scrambling, skimming funds 
from city programs to meet the mounting interest payments. By 1994, one es­
timate put the annual shortfall at $1.5 million.54 
The Bay Plaza Companies went ahead and razed the Soreno, but they were 
unable to obtain financing, and no new building rose on the site. The de­
struction of the Soreno left a void in the heart of the city and seemed to 
symbolize the entire Bay Plaza gamble. The attempt to fit St. Petersburg's 
downtown into an upper-class mold had failed miserably. In March 1992, after 
contemplating the contrast between the scenic waterfront and the down-
town's fragmented look, a Russian visitor commented that St. Petersburg 
looked like "a lovely lady without a smile."55 
Hopes flickered—and were again dashed—in late 1992 when the San 
Francisco Giants decided not to move to St. Petersburg. Bay Plaza remained 
an unrealized dream, while the empty stadium was a painful token of the city's 
vanished hopes. The sportswriter Richard O'Brien wrote that it reminded him 
of "the segment in the movie Mondo Cane in which aborigines in New Guinea, 
enchanted by the big airplanes that fly overhead, clear a landing strip in the 
belief that it will lure the craft to their village."56 
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Missed Opportunities, Unfulfilled Dreams 
In choosing to entice investors with huge outlays for dubious projects, the city 
council ignored simple proposals that could have yielded great returns. In 
1973, the Citizens' Goals Committee advocated the creation of a multifaceted 
transportation system to improve St. Petersburg's quality of life. The 1974 
Conceptual Plan envisioned a system of landscaped boulevards that would al­
low safe and shaded access for pedestrians, bicyclists, and cars. The boulevards 
would also serve as the backbone of the open-space system by providing a 
green buffer around the city's neighborhoods. By 1982, the city council and its 
staff were of a different mind. While $60 million in taxpayers' money was al­
located for downtown redevelopment, the planning staff declared that the 
boulevard concept represented an unaffordable "luxury in a time of fiscal con-
servation."57 
The $40 million that subsidized Bay Plaza could have constructed between 
thirty and sixty miles of landscaped boulevards with bikeways.58 Given the 
popularity of the Pinellas Trail, investing in beautification and bikeways would 
undoubtedly have been more profitable than sinking money into a grandiose 
downtown mall A system of boulevards would have given pedestrians, skaters, 
and bicyclists safe access between subdivisions and into the downtown area. 
There is no reason that downtown St. Petersburg, with its public waterfront 
and novel sense of place, could not repeat Dunedin's success as a stopping 
place. A link to the downtown, moreover, would be more than an investment 
in infrastructure. It would be a step toward building the public support that 
every successful redevelopment effort needs. 
The empty stadium and the Bay Plazafiasco are all-too-familiar parts of a 
pattern that is as old as St. Petersburg. In the 1920s, John Nolen recommended 
that the city commission purchase St. Petersburg Beach for $750,000 and es­
tablish a system of interconnected nature preserves. Instead, that money went 
to build the Municipal Pier and fund a disastrous program of public "improve­
ments." These past follies became especially apparent in 1985, when the 
county commission paid $5.9 million for only 5.3 acres of St. Petersburg 
Beach, the two-mile-long barrier island.59 If the city commission had followed 
Nolen's recommendations, those investments might have produced exponen­
tial returns. Besides the benefits to the tourism industry and the region's qual­
ity of life, the environmental costs accompanying urbanization would have 
been much less. Yet St. Petersburg today, as in Nolen's time, continues on a 
course of luring outsiders with expensive facades, rather than cultivating its 
true resources. 
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John Nolen's plan for St. Petersburg has a timeless quality, because it rests 
on humanity's most inescapable relationship: our tie to the natural world. Al­
though technology has liberated most of us from the toil of wresting a living 
from the environment, we ignore our dependence on the earth at our peril. In 
the twentieth century, the character of our relationship with our planet has 
changed, as Nolen recognized. Modern society can choose to consume the 
earth—or conserve it. Nolen's genius lay in his understanding of the dy­
namism of modern city building. He realized that there was an urgent need to 
establish collective controls in order to sustain the health of the landscape for 
future generations. In the case of St. Petersburg, such restraints have proved 
incompatible with pursuing the American way of life. For too long people have 
favored profit and increased convenience over such basic needs as clean air 
and water. 
Over the last two decades, the decline of the environment globally has 
forced us to reexamine our relationship with the natural world. Unless city 
building takes place in a sustainable fashion, following the lines of nature, fu­
ture generations will never enjoy a quality of life comparable to ours.60 If we 
are to sustain hope for the future, we cannot ignore the past. 
Seventy years ago, John Nolen offered the people of St. Petersburg the 
chance to build a city that would usher in a new era of urban living. They 
squandered the opportunity because a persuasive band of land speculators sold 
them on the image of a false Eden. The realtors and subdividers who mesmer­
ized the public were brilliant in their way. They realized that, in the modern 
era, public relations count far more than analytical studies or facts. But once a 
community yields to the supremacy of public relations, reason falls away, and 
it becomes impossible to distinguish between fact and fantasy. Then, as was 
the case in St. Petersburg, tragedy awaits. "We suffer primarily not from our 
vices or weakness," the eminent social historian Daniel Boorstin wrote, "but 
our illusions."61 
While the 1920s real estate boom is long forgotten, boosterism and specu­
lation still drive communal decision-making throughout Florida. The ca­
cophony of fast food establishments, billboards, parking lots, convenience 
stores, and harried pedestrians is a glaring reminder that we have reduced the 
dimensions of complex society to the point that consumption is our one com­
mon value (figure 33). In a republic founded on the ideal of citizenship, St. Pe-
tersburg's disjointed landscape reflects a culture that has equated consumerism 
with citizenship. The costs of an indifferent citizenry are obvious, but social 
scientists are only beginning to assess the damage sustained by an underclass 
that can neither attain nor escape the image of affluence. 
Pinellas offers pockets of matchless beauty, but it is mostly a mass of undif­
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Figure 33 The miles of strip commercial centers illustrate the priorities of St. Petersburg's 
city builders and the values of a consumer society. 
ferentiated suburban sprawl. The mosaic of farmland, natural communities, 
and human settlements that once defined the landscape has all but vanished. 
Between 1956 and 1986 citrus acreage dropped from 13,540 to 394 acres, a 
97.1 percent decline. During a similar period (1954 to 1988), the number of 
farms fell from 769 to fewer than 100, while the amount of farmland went from 
60,680 to 2,877 acres. By the end of the century, planners anticipate that the 
peninsula will have no agricultural land. The rush of development has also 
pushed the forests toward extinction. Between 1959 and 1984, forest cover de­
clined by 65.7 percent, falling from 57,949 acres to 19,862 acres.62 Although 
the $50 million allocated for natural lands during the 1980s and 1990s will 
preserve a remnant of the forests, the county still has the least open space per 
capita of Florida's eight most populous counties.63 
The most intensive development on the peninsula has occurred on the bar­
rier islands. From Clearwater to St. Petersburg Beach, condominiums, hotels, 
and assorted high-rises crowd the narrow beaches. Fictional accounts, scien­
tific studies, and computer models all offer cataclysmic projections of a hur­
ricane descending on Pinellas's overpopulated chain of barrier islands. 
According to the "index of catastrophe potential" developed through com­
puter simulation, Tampa Bay is the most vulnerable region in the nation to 
hurricanes (figure 34). Five billion dollars in damage to insured property is the 
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Figure 34 Black areas indicate soils with high water tables. These place 
severe constraints on urbanization, and during a hurricane they would ex­
perience severe flooding. Courtesy of the Pinellas County Department of 
Planning. 
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projected cost of an "average" hurricane's visit to the Tampa Bay area. Pinel­
las County would take 64 percent of the loss. By comparison, in 1972 Hurri­
cane Agnes caused three billion dollars worth of damage in eighteen states. In 
1985, when Hurricane Elena passed within fifty-five miles of Pinellas, it left 
$ 100 million worth of damages. Pinellas suffered greater ravages than any Pan­
handle county, where the storm tides were twice as high.64 
In a state crafted by natural disasters, an innate sense of hubris united the 
multitudes of rootless Floridians. For some reason, Florida's residents have long 
believed that they are immune to natural disasters. Hurricane Andrew—and 
the insurance industry—have laid that myth to rest. While Pinellas did man­
age to escape the hurricane, homeowners felt its impact in their wallets. An­
drew forced the insurance companies to confront the folly of insuring 
properties located on land that hurricanes periodically reconfigure. After pay­
ing out $16 billion in damages, eight companies folded, and even two of the 
giants, State Farm and Allstate, were badly shaken. To prevent such heavy 
losses in the future, insurance companies threatened to drop thousands of pol­
icyholders in Florida's heavily populated coastal communities. The state 
quickly moved in to fill the void by establishing a catastrophe fund and a joint 
underwriting association, but insurance rates continue to rise despite the state 
subsidy. Between 1993 and 1995, Allstate and State Farm raised their rates by 
46.1 percent and 58.4 percent, respectively.65 
If a hurricane were to strike Tampa Bay, deaths could be prevented only by 
a successful evacuation of the more than 100,000 residents and tourists on the 
barrier islands. Ben Funk, using computer estimates to support his fictional ac­
count of a hurricane's effects, wrote: "How many were killed—10,000,30,000, 
50,000? It all depended on how many ran."66 Terrible losses await Pinellas in 
the future, when nature again unleashes its uncontrollable forces. 
St. Petersburg and her sister Pinellas communities provided the setting for 
some of the late John D. MacDonald's novels. In his bestseller Condominium 
(1977), MacDonald wrote of a hurricane smashing into an overbuilt section of 
southwest Florida. He attempted to depict the essence of human nature and 
the natural world in a conversation between a construction engineer and a 
naive newcomer: "Opposing a big new project on one of the keys is not a pop­
ular stance in Florida these days. Even though the project will go up on fragile 
land? If they can get it up and sell it out before the big waves come that's all 
they want."67 
MacDonald "created a heartbreakingly vivid portrait of a jungly Eden," 
Jonathan Raban writes, "spoiled and besmirched by human vanity and greed." 
His villains are never innately evil; they are only weak. Raban writes that they 
are "easily dazzled by easy money. They are decent Rotarians, small-town 
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politicians and businessmen who can't resist a share of the takings when it is 
offered to them on a plate.. . . The irony at the heart of MacDonald's books is 
that these feeble, childish miscreants behave so wantonly in a setting that 
looks as if it really was designated to be a paradise—and could, even now, be 
rescued . .  . just."68 
The history of city building in St. Petersburg is the story of a people who, 
through folly, have lost their birthright to Eden, yet somehow have managed 
to keep their dreams of it alive. Although St. Petersburg is hardly the city John 
Nolen envisioned, there is still hope for it. It has the tools it needs to manage 
growth, protect the remaining natural resources, and restore others. While the 
water supply remains a problem, cutting the flow of sewage into Tampa Bay has 
helped regenerate portions of the bay. In 1994, scientists found new stands of 
sea grasses and a corresponding increase in marine life in those areas of the bay 
not scarred by dredging.69 
St. Petersburg—and the rest of the municipalities in Florida's most urban­
ized county—will continue to push the natural world to its limits. Yet, at the 
same time, the following state, regional, and local initiatives provide a model 
for any metropolitan area attempting to reconcile urban expansion with envi­
ronmental protection. 
1. An ecobgical plan. St. Petersburg's 1974 Conceptual Plan made use of a 
study of carrying capacity that set initial limits to growth based on envi­
ronmental studies. 
2. A strong regional planning agency. The planning authority given the 
Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) to safe­
guard the region's water supply placed the protection of the system of in­
terconnected wetlands and waterways, or "green infrastructure" on an 
equal footing with other infrastructure requirements. 
3. Environmental technology. Besides securing and rationing the region's 
water supply, the EPA and SWFWMD worked with St. Petersburg to 
build a prototype waste-water treatment system to recycle gray water. 
4. Top-down state-mandated planning. The 1985 Growth Management Act 
allowed the state to review plans for consistency, while the test of con­
currency provided local governments with a tool to identify and pre­
serve sensitive natural lands in a more efficient manner. 
5. Land acquisition and restoration programs. By combining local land acqui­
sition programs with Preservation 2000, Pinellas has managed to pre­
serve, maintain, and even restore portions of its remaining natural 
systems. 
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6. Greenways. The Pinellas Trail has connected the fragmented Pinellas 
landscape and provided an important recreational outlet. At a time 
when Americans are desperate for common civic enterprises,70 the trail 
has become an exemplar of building community by connecting commu­
nities. 
In 1995, St. Petersburg had a stroke of good luck when major league base­
ballfinally awarded a franchise to the city. The national pastime will undoubt­
edly furnish a pleasant outing for residents, and it may even elevate St. 
Petersburg to the status of a "major league city." Baseball, however, is no sub­
stitute for good planning. If St. Petersburg is to reach its potential, citizens must 
not lose sight of the vision John Nolen presented so long ago. Despite many 
technological advances, the formula for building livable cities has not changed 
since modernization first overwhelmed the nation in the 1920s. "The first step 
out of the present disorder," Lewis Mumford wrote in 1922, "is to ignore all fake 
Utopias and social myths that have proved either so sterile or disastrous." Once 
these myths have been discarded, "We do not jump blindly into a blankness." 
Rather, he warned, our society must choose between designing with nature or 
building cities that will end in "nothing, or rather nothingness."71 
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The Nolen Renaissance 
In fact, one of the most promising byproducts of the back-to-the-old-
ways movement is the attention it has focused on such figures as Elbert 
Peets, Raymond Unwin and John Nolen. 
Ruth Knack, 1989 
In November 1990, the University of Miami's School of Architecture held a 
symposium on John Nolen's Florida plans. Nolen has heavily influenced the 
work of the symposium's hosts, Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk. As 
principal proponents of the traditional town planning movement, Duany and 
Plater-Zyberk organized the symposium to explore the timeless quality of 
Nolen's work. Over time, planners have instituted a number of the proposals 
from Nolen'sfirst Florida plan. But his recommendation to set aside a portion 
of the barrier islands as nature preserves, perhaps his most significant proposal, 
has hardly received consideration. Today the most intensely developed sec­
tion of the Pinellas Peninsula occupies its most fragile landforms. Yet it is pos­
sible to catch a glimpse of Nolen's vision in the design of Seaside, Duany and 
Plater-Zyberk's seminal addition to American city planning. 
According to Duany, "We must revert to planning approaches from the 
days when America was a poorer but smarter nation." By studying the works 
of John Nolen and Raymond Unwin, he contends, laymen can know more 
about urban planning than the experts.1 Seaside has become a popular place 
to examine the revival of traditional town planning. Unlike the typical Amer­
ican suburb, in which large plots, decentralized development, and the auto­
mobile combine to isolate residents, Seaside is focused on the public realm, set 
to the pedestrian scale, and designed to blend with the natural landscape. 
Duany and Plater-Zyberk's architectural code requires homes to follow the re-
gion's vernacular tradition. During the lastfive years, this 280-acre new town 
has received more attention than any other city planning project in the na-
tion.2 Recently Seaside passed the most difficult test of all. 
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Seaside was at ground zero when Hurricane Opal ripped through the 
Florida Panhandle in October 1995. Although countless beachfront condo­
miniums, hotels, and apartments near it were devastated, Seaside came 
through almost unscathed because it sits behind the beach dune system. This 
natural barrier saved the residents from everything except having sand, blown 
by the 110 mph gusts, filter into the pastel, clapboard homes with their tin 
roofs. Construction costs run 10 percent higher in Seaside than in the sur­
rounding area, but Opal made it apparent that this investment paid a tremen­
dous dividend. The town's landscape, most of which consists of native sandy 
pine and scrub oak habitat, also helped to keep Seaside safe. The native vege­
tation buffered the heavy winds, and the sandy soil supporting it allowed the 
stormwater to drain at a faster rate than in the typical suburban landscape.3 
The practical genius in Seaside's design and building reflects the adage that 
John Nolen delivered years before in St. Petersburg: "Well conceived ideals 
are more practicable than they seem."4 
Within days of the hurricane, the town was operating at its normal pace. 
Although the fifteen-foot storm surge had eaten into the dunes, the board­
walks leading over the dunes were still intact, and Seaside was the only place 
for miles where one could escape the clutter of destruction. Three months af­
ter the hurricane, I paid my annual visit to Seaside with a class of undergradu­
ates. With most of the coast still in a state of disrepair, Seaside offered a 
tranquil oasis that seemed in tune to the natural world. Couples, families, and 
students gathered in quiet anticipation to watch the sunsets, which were pe­
culiarly mesmerizing. People found places on the platforms above the dunes 
and listened to the rhythmic pounding of the waves as they watched the sun 
slowly vanish beneath the horizon. "The state," one DCA official proclaimed, 
"is extremely fortunate to have Seaside to serve as a model for a new era of ur­
ban design in Florida."5 
Despite Seaside's success, the project is not free from irony. Although it was 
designed to foster communal relations and a sense of place, it is a site to visit, 
not a place to live, and most inhabitants are renters. Seaside's success has also 
made it an exclusive place. Building lots have tripled in value since its incep­
tion. Although Seaside is successful, it is not the working model that critics 
would like to see. The town has become, Plater-Zyberk states, "a place of 
polemics."6 
Sam Kaplan, writing in Planning, contends that Seaside provides a "cozy 
and communal feeling, albeit for persons of a particular aesthetic conceit 
and income bracket." He finds the traditional town design concept elitist, with 
"hints of a repressive, dogmatic approach to planning."7 Similar charges 
come from two University of Florida professors, Ivonne Audirac and Anne 
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Shermyen. They view the new movement as a naive attempt to return to the 
preindustrial age. In the effort to reverse history, the urban designer becomes 
a manipulative—if not a menacing—social engineer. By limiting private 
spaces, people are forced into public spaces that could "turn a benign inten­
tion into a totalitarian act."8 
These critics, however, miss one of the major points about Seaside: the en­
vironmental issues. When regulations protect endangered ecosystems, the 
price of land and housing goes up, reducing the amount of available and af­
fordable private space.9 This combination of economics and ecology has 
forced municipal governments and private developers to change direction. 
Throughout Florida, planning commissions and developers have begun to use 
traditional town planning concepts in an effort to satisfy the GMA and the 
test of concurrency.10 At the same time, John Nolen's work has become an in­
creasingly popularfield of study for both practitioners and academics. 
Seventy years after Nolen called the 1926 National Planning Conference 
to order in St. Petersburg, the nation's planners returned to Florida. The 
American Planning Association held the 1996 National Planning Confer­
ence in Orlando because it offered an ideal setting to discuss "planning in the 
real world, the type of suburban and growth management planning 95 percent 
of APA members are doing."11 This gathering, like the one in 1926, took time 
to examine Nolen's ideas. In a session devoted to Nolen, academics, consul­
tants, and public planners looked at his criteria for urban design, the livability 
of the communities that instituted his plans, and the relevance of his work.12 
Nolen's vision might yet come to pass, but it will "require above all," as Nolen 
wrote in 1923, "a cordial spirit of cooperation and a public-spirited backing of 
enterprises for the common good."13 
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